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Zusammenfassung
Die optimale Allokation der Ressourcen ist Ziel ökonomischen Handelns und stellt
eine grundlegende Voraussetzung für wirtschaftlichen Wohlstand dar. Der Kapital-
markt ist in der heutigen Unternehmenswelt wesentlich an einer effizienten Ressour-
cenallokation beteiligt. Aus diesem Grund ist ein funktionierender Kapitalmarkt
eine Bedingung für ein erfolgreiches Wirtschaftssystem. Die Trennung von Eigen-
tum und Kontrolle hat allerdings eine asymmetrische Informationsverteilung sowie
Interessenkonflikte zur Folge, welche die effiziente Funktionsweise des Kapitalmarkts
negativ beeinträchtigen können. Eine Lösung dieser Problemstellung, welche in der
Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie erörtert wird, ist daher erstrebenswert.
Anhand der Rechnungslegung kann durch die Bereitstellung von Informationen
durch den Manager—den Agenten der Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehung—maßgeblich
zur Linderung der beschriebenen Problematik zwischen Manager und Eigentümer—
dem Prinzipal—beigetragen werden. Dies kann aus theoretischer Sicht nur gelingen,
wenn die bereitgestellten Rechnungslegungsinformationen sowohl relevant als auch
verlässlich sind und somit eine hohe Qualität aufweisen. Folglich beschäftigen sich
zahlreiche Studien mit dem Thema Rechnungslegungsqualität und versuchen eine
Begriffsdefinition zu erarbeiten, eine empirische Messung zu ermöglichen und Ein-
flussfaktoren zu erforschen. Hierbei ist die Wahrnehmung der Aktionäre bezüglich
der Rechnungslegungsqualität von besonderer Bedeutung, da die Aktionäre einen
wichtigen Bestandteil funktionierender Kapitalmärkte darstellen und weithin als
primäre Adressaten von Jahresabschlussinformationen angesehen werden.
In der Vergangenheit wurde das Vertrauen der Aktionäre in die Rechnungslegungs-
qualität wiederholt strapaziert. So wurde die Qualität der Rechnungslegungsinfor-
mationen beispielsweise infolge der Bilanzskandale zu Beginn des Jahrtausends oder
während der Banken- und Finanzkrise kritisch hinterfragt. In diesem Zusammenhang
wurde speziell das Vertrauen der Aktionäre in die Unabhängigkeit des Abschluss-
prüfers und die Integrität der Vorstände und Aufsichtsräte thematisiert. Daneben ist
allerdings auch die Mitwirkung der Aktionäre durch die Ausübung ihrer Stimmrech-
te im Rahmen der Hauptversammlung der Unternehmen zu einem Gegenstand der
Forschung und der politischen Diskussion geworden. So setzte sich die Europäische
Union in ihrer kürzlich veröffentlichten Richtlinie 2017/828/EU zur Förderung der
langfristigen Mitwirkung der Aktionäre zum wiederholten Male für eine Stärkung
der Stimmrechte und eine Vereinfachung der Stimmrechtsausübung ein. Die Abstim-
mungsergebnisse der Hauptversammlungen ermöglichen zudem einen Einblick in die
Perspektive der Aktionäre und werden daher zunehmend Gegenstand empirischer
Untersuchungen im Bereich der Rechnungslegungsforschung.
Vor diesem Hintergrund soll die vorliegende Dissertation zu einem tieferen Ver-
ständnis der Sichtweise der Aktionäre in Bezug auf die Rechnungslegungsqualität
kapitalmarktorientierter Unternehmen beitragen. Insbesondere stehen Indikatoren
für die Wahrnehmungen der Rechnungslegungsqualität, der Einfluss der Unabhän-
gigkeit des Abschlussprüfers auf diese Wahrnehmungen und die Einschätzung der
Aktionäre hinsichtlich der Bedeutung der Rechnungslegungsqualität im Fokus. Da-
bei werden die Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf Gewinnveröffentlichungen, Größen zur
Messung der Rechnungslegungsqualität und der Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprü-
fers sowie das Abstimmungsverhalten der Aktionäre auf Hauptversammlungen un-
tersucht.
Nachdem in der Einleitung in Kapitel 1 die Motivation sowie die Zusammen-
fassungen der Bestandteile der Arbeit dargelegt werden, beschäftigt sich Kapitel 2
zunächst mit dem Zweck der Rechnungslegung im Kontext der Prinzipal-Agenten-
Theorie. Anschließend wird in diesem Zusammenhang eine Definition des Begriffs
Rechnungslegungsqualität erarbeitet. Darüber hinaus wird die Verbindung zwischen
der Rechnungslegung und dem Kapitalmarkt hergestellt. Abschließend wird die Rolle
des Abschlussprüfers und dessen Unabhängigkeit im Rahmen der Prinzipal-Agenten-
Beziehung erörtert und skizziert, wie die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers sowie
die Prüfungsqualität definiert und beeinflusst werden können.
Das dritte Kapitel behandelt die Bedeutung der Abstimmung der Aktionäre auf
der Hauptversammlung im Kontext der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie und erläutert
die gesetzlichen Regelungen zu den Aktionärsrechten. Dabei wird insbesondere auf
die Unterschiede zwischen Deutschland und den USA im Hinblick auf die Rechte
der Aktionäre sowie die Tagesordnungspunkte der Hauptversammlung eingegangen,
da sich jeweils eine der folgenden Studien mit den Abstimmungsergebnissen von
Hauptversammlungen amerikanischer bzw. deutscher Unternehmen beschäftigt.
Die erste empirische Studie, die in Kapitel 4 vorgestellt wird, untersucht die Ab-
stimmungsergebnisse der Bestätigung des Abschlussprüfers durch die Aktionäre in
den USA. Obwohl diese Abstimmung in den USA weder verpflichtend durchzufüh-
ren noch rechtlich bindend ist, hob die US-Börsenaufsichtsbehörde deren Bedeutung
durch eine Änderung der Offenlegungspflichten für die Abstimmungsergebnisse her-
vor. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob die Abstimmungsergebnisse der Bestätigung des
Abschlussprüfers aussagekräftig im Hinblick auf die Wahrnehmungen der Aktio-
näre bezüglich der Rechnungslegungsqualität sind. Das Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit
der genannten Fragestellung und zeigt auf Basis einer Ereignisstudie, dass die Ab-
stimmungsergebnisse der Bestätigung des Abschlussprüfers mit den Kapitalmarkt-
reaktionen auf unerwartete Gewinne zum Zeitpunkt der Gewinnveröffentlichungen
zusammenhängen. Darüber hinaus liefern die Ergebnisse Hinweise dafür, dass der
beobachtete Effekt von dem Grad der Informationsasymmetrie zwischen Managern
und Aktionären abhängt. Dementsprechend unterstützt die empirische Evidenz die-
ser Studie die Annahme, dass die Abstimmungsergebnisse der Bestätigung des Ab-
schlussprüfers rechnungslegungsbezogene Informationen darstellen, welche den Ak-
tionären beim Treffen ihrer Investitionsentscheidungen zu Gute kommen können.
Angesichts der Erkenntnisse erscheint es sinnvoll, die Abstimmungsergebnisse offen-
zulegen und die Diskussion um eine verpflichtende Abstimmung der Aktionäre über
die Bestätigung des Abschlussprüfers in den USA aufrechtzuerhalten.
Das fünfte Kapitel befasst sich mit dem Einfluss der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung
eines Mandanten auf die wahrgenommene Rechnungslegungsqualität. Es wird er-
forscht, ob und wann Aktionäre die wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit eines Abschluss-
prüfers von dem Mandanten als negativ erachten. Die empirische Evidenz einer
Untersuchung der Geschäftsjahre 2010 bis 2014 einer Stichprobe amerikanischer
Unternehmen, welche von einer Big 4 Abschlussprüfungsgesellschaft geprüft werden,
deutet auf einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung
des Mandanten und der Wahrnehmung der Aktionäre hinsichtlich der Rechnungsle-
gungsqualität hin. Die Ergebnisse werden dahingehend interpretiert, dass der Kapi-
talmarkt auch zehn Jahre nach Einführung des Sarbanes-Oxley Acts infolge der er-
wähnten Bilanzskandale weiterhin bezüglich der Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprü-
fers besorgt ist. Insbesondere ist der Zusammenhang zwischen der wirtschaftlichen
Bedeutung des Mandanten und der wahrgenommenen Rechnungslegungsqualität vor
allem für Mandanten zu beobachten, welche sich eher in finanziellen Schwierigkeiten
befinden. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen daher, dass die wahrgenommene Un-
abhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers von den Eigenschaften des Mandanten abhängen
kann. Diese Erkenntnis könnte dazu motivieren weitere Mandantenmerkmale zu un-
tersuchen, um dadurch einen tieferen Einblick in die Wahrnehmungen der Aktionäre
im Hinblick auf die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers zu ermöglichen.
Die in Kapitel 6 vorgestellte Studie soll zu einem tieferen Verständnis der Einschät-
zungen der Aktionäre in Bezug auf die Bedeutung der Rechnungslegungsqualität
beitragen. Die Studie beleuchtet insbesondere die Frage, ob die Rechnungslegungs-
qualität die Zufriedenheit der Aktionäre mit dem Vorstand und dem Aufsichtsrat
eines Unternehmens beeinflusst. Zu diesem Zweck werden die Abstimmungsergebnis-
se bezüglich der Entlastung des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats von 1.237 Haupt-
versammlungen deutscher börsennotierter Unternehmen aus den Jahren 2010 bis
2015 untersucht. Die Betrachtung der Entlastung der Vorstands- und Aufsichtsrats-
mitglieder ist dabei besonders vorteilhaft, da diese einerseits obligatorisch bei der
jährlichen Hauptversammlung und andererseits separat für Vorstand und Aufsichts-
rat zu erfolgen hat. Dies ermöglicht eine Differenzierung zwischen der Zufriedenheit
mit dem Vorstand und dem Aufsichtsrat der Gesellschaft und eine Analyse der Ver-
antwortlichkeit für die Rechnungslegungsqualität aus Sicht der Aktionäre. Die em-
pirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Rechnungslegungsqualität, welche anhand dis-
kretionärer Periodenabgrenzungen gemessen wird, einen positiven Zusammenhang
mit der Zufriedenheit der Aktionäre aufweist. Die hinsichtlich der Größenordnung
und der statistischen Signifikanz schwächeren Ergebnisse bezüglich der Entlastung
des Aufsichtsrats im Vergleich zur Entlastung der Vorstandsmitglieder implizieren,
dass die Aktionäre überwiegend den Vorstand für die Rechnungslegungsqualität ver-
antwortlich machen. Insgesamt unterstreicht die empirische Evidenz die Bedeutung
der Rechnungslegungsqualität für die Aktionäre und vermittelt außerdem einen de-
taillierteren Einblick in die Sichtweise der Aktionäre.
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1 Introduction and Summary
“Economy is the art of making most of life.”
— George Bernard Shaw
This quote originates from George Bernard Shaw, the winner of the 1925 Nobel
Prize for Literature, and was recited by Gary S. Becker, the laureate of the No-
bel Prize for Economics in 1992.1 It implies that limited resources must be made
available to those who can use them most efficiently for the benefit of the econ-
omy. Consistently, Healy and Palepu (2001, 407) state that “a critical challenge for
any economy is the optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities.” In
the modern business world, this allocation of funds is accomplished by the capital
market, which is the reason why an efficient capital market is a prerequisite for a
successful economy. However, asymmetric information and incentive problems due
to the separation of ownership and control hamper the efficient functioning of the
capital market. This phenomenon is known as the agency problem and can poten-
tially cause a breakdown of the capital market (Healy and Palepu 2001).
In this context, accounting plays an essential role through the provision of infor-
mation by the manager and is intended to contribute to solving or at least mitigating
the agency problem between shareholders and managers (Healy and Palepu 2001;
Lev and Ohlson 1982). From a theoretical point of view, however, this can suc-
ceed only if the accounting information is both relevant and reliable and, hence,
of high quality. This is also demonstrated by the following quote, which stems
from the speech given by the former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Arthur Levitt on “The Importance of High Quality Accounting
Standards” at the Inter-American Development Bank (Levitt 1998, 80).
1 See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economics/1992/press-release/; accessed on
October 1, 2018.
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“I firmly believe that the success of capital markets is directly dependent
on the quality of the accounting and disclosure system. Disclosure sys-
tems that are founded on high quality standards give investors confidence
in the credibility of financial reporting – and without investor confidence,
markets cannot thrive.”
The statement highlights very clearly not only the relevance of the quality of the
accounting system, but also the importance of high earnings quality in general.2
Therefore, it is not surprising that many studies deal with the definition, the mea-
surement, and particularly the determinants of earnings quality (cf. Gaynor et al.
2016). Besides the mentioned accounting system and regulatory standards, many
other factors influence earnings quality. For example, the company environment,
the corporate governance system, the auditor, and also the management play an
essential role in this context.
The speech of Levitt (1998, 79) also emphasizes the importance of shareholders
and the fulfillment of their need for information by characterizing informed share-
holders as “an important ingredient of liquid, stable capital markets.” Moreover,
the shareholders are widely considered to be among the main users of the financial
statements (Khurana and Raman 2006; Lev and Ohlson 1982). This is why share-
holders’ perceptions of earnings quality and capital market research have long been
in focus of the accounting literature (Kothari 2001). The relevance of sharehold-
ers’ confidence in earnings quality was also repeatedly inflamed, for example, by
the accounting scandals at the beginning of the millennium or the financial crisis
(Ball 2009; Jany 2011; Li et al. 2008). In particular, the trust of shareholders in the
independence of the external auditor and the integrity of the company’s board was
under discussion (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnamurthy et al. 2006; Landsman et al.
2009). In addition to these monitoring mechanisms and other corporate governance
instruments, shareholder participation has become a subject of research and po-
litical discussion in the last decade (Gal-Or et al. 2018). Recently, the EU (2017)
called for a strengthening and improvement of the shareholder involvement. This
2 In the literature, the terms “accounting quality”, “credibility of financial statements”, “earnings
quality”, and “external financial reporting quality” are often used interchangeably. They refer
to the quality of the audited accounting earnings and financial statements. The earnings number
is of vital importance in the financial statements, and most of the literature focuses primarily on
the information properties of earnings (Nichols and Wahlen 2004). As the empirical measures
used in this dissertation concentrate mainly on earnings, the term “earnings quality” is used
throughout this thesis.
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involvement takes place by shareholder votes at the annual general meeting of the
company. Since the voting results also allow a look into the shareholders’ world of
thoughts, they have increasingly become an object of research in the accounting,
auditing, and finance literature (Cai et al. 2009; Mayhew 2017).
In this context, the present dissertation intends to contribute to a deeper under-
standing regarding earnings quality from the perspective of shareholders of capital
market-oriented companies. In particular, the thesis deals with indicators of share-
holders’ perceptions of earnings quality, the influence of the auditor’s independence
on this perceptions, and the shareholders’ assessment of the importance of earnings
quality in general. Therefore, this dissertation examines market reactions to earn-
ings announcements, measures of earnings quality and the auditor’s independence,
as well as shareholders’ voting behavior at annual general meetings. Before the re-
search question, research design, findings, and implications of the related studies in
the central part of this work are briefly summarized, a description of the chapters
providing corresponding theoretical economic background should be given.
Chapter 2 first discusses the objective of accounting in the context of the agency
theory. Subsequently, the resulting information function of accounting is elabo-
rated, and it is dealt with the question of what is understood by high earnings
quality. Moreover, the link between accounting and the capital market is presented.
In particular, the importance of accounting and earnings quality for functioning
capital markets is demonstrated. Finally, the role of the auditor is highlighted, and
the interpretation of the auditor’s independence in the agency context is discussed.
Besides, it is outlined how high audit quality and auditor independence can be
defined.
Chapter 3 addresses the meaning of shareholder voting at annual general meetings
in the agency theory and describes the regulations regarding shareholder rights. In
particular, the difference between annual general meetings in Germany and the U.S.
are emphasized since both settings are subject to examination in one of the following
three chapters in each case.
The empirical study presented in chapter 4 investigates auditor ratification votes
in a U.S. setting. Although auditor ratification by shareholders is usually a rou-
tine, non-binding action in the U.S. and the ratification rates are in the 95% region
or higher, the SEC (2009) emphasized the importance of auditor ratification by
amending the disclosure requirements for the voting results. Thus, the question of
whether the results of auditor ratification votes are informative regarding sharehold-
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ers’ perceptions of earnings quality arises. The study addresses this question using
a returns-earnings design and demonstrates that the results of auditor ratification
votes are associated with market reactions to unexpected earnings at the earnings
announcement date. Furthermore, there are indications that this association seems
to be positively related to higher levels of information asymmetry between managers
and shareholders. Additional analyses reveal that the results of auditor ratifica-
tion votes provide incremental information beyond that of other publicly available
audit-related information. Thus, there is empirical support for the notion that the
results of auditor ratification votes are earnings-related information that might help
shareholders to make informed investment decisions. In light of these results, it
appears reasonable to disclose the results of auditor ratification votes and to discuss
a mandatory shareholder vote on auditor ratification.
Chapter 5 deals with the relation of the economic importance of the client and per-
ceived earnings quality. In particular, it is examined whether and when shareholders
have a negative perception of an auditor’s economic dependence on the client. The
results from a Big 4 client sample in the U.S. (fiscal years 2010 through 2014) indicate
a negative association between the economic importance of the client—measured at
the audit office-level—and shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality—measured
by the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and ex ante cost of equity capital. The
results are interpreted to mean that shareholders are still concerned about auditor
independence even ten years after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX). Furthermore, the association between the economic importance of the client
and shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality applies predominantly to the sub-
sample of clients that are more likely to be financially distressed. Thus, there is
evidence that shareholders primarily care about earnings quality of economic im-
portant clients that are in a financially difficult situation. Therefore, the empirical
results reveal that shareholders’ perceptions of auditor independence are conditional
on the client’s circumstances. The suggestive findings provide initial insights and
could motivate future research to examine other circumstances, especially because
little attention has been devoted to this issue in the context of shareholders’ per-
ceptions of earnings quality.
The study presented in chapter 6 aims to contribute to a systematic understand-
ing of shareholders’ view on the importance of earnings quality. By examining votes
on the discharge of the management board and the supervisory board in Germany
as a proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction, the study responds to the call of Cai et al.
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(2010) for international research on shareholder voting. The paper sheds light on the
question of whether earnings quality influences shareholders’ satisfaction with the
members of the company’s board. Using data from 1,237 annual general meetings
of German listed companies from 2010 through 2015, the study provides evidence
that earnings quality—measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals—is
related to shareholders’ satisfaction with the board. The study considers the advan-
tageous German setting, which offers voting results from the mandatory discharge
of the management board and the supervisory board. By taking the opportunity to
differentiate between shareholders’ satisfaction with the two parts of the company’s
board, the study provides a more in-depth understanding of shareholders’ opinions.
The fact that the findings regarding the discharge of the supervisory board are less
substantial in magnitude and significance than those for the management board
implies that shareholders predominantly blame the management board for inferior
earnings quality. Additional analyses indicate that the company’s information en-
vironment, company’s performance, and the presence of an audit committee have
an attenuating moderating effect on the caused shareholders’ dissatisfaction due to
poor earnings quality. Overall, the evidence that earnings quality positively influ-
ences shareholders’ satisfaction emphasizes the relevance of earnings quality. To-
gether with the other two studies of this doctoral thesis, this conclusion underlines
the importance of accounting and auditing research on shareholders’ perceptions of
earnings quality.
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2 Accounting, Earnings Quality, the Capital Market,
and the Auditor
The focus of this dissertation is on the quality of accounting—i.e., earnings quality—
and the related perceptions of shareholders. Therefore, it is expedient to discuss
what is meant by high earnings quality. In order to define earnings quality, it is
essential to first deal with the purpose of accounting. The link between accounting
and capital market participants can then be established. Building upon this, factors
that could influence shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality, such as the audi-
tor, can be taken into account. Thus, this chapter aims to explore these aspects by
discussing theoretical background knowledge.
In the next section, the agency theory is explained. Subsequently, accounting as
an approach to solving or at least mitigating the agency problem is examined. Fur-
thermore, the resulting information function of accounting, which is regarded as the
main objective of accounting worldwide, is addressed. Finally, the section describes
what is understood by high earnings quality in the context of the information func-
tion. The relationship between accounting and the capital market is examined in
section 2.2.3 In particular, the ERC, which is of considerable importance in this
work, is presented. On the one hand, the ERC establishes a direct theoretical link
between accounting and the capital market, and on the other hand, the ERC serves
as a measure of perceived earnings quality, which is used in chapter 4 and chapter
5. Since this dissertation also deals with the role of the auditor and auditor inde-
pendence, section 2.3 describes how the auditor can be integrated into the agency
model. In addition, it is explained what is meant by high audit quality and auditor
independence.
3 In this thesis, the term “capital market” is to be considered as equity market and not debt
market.
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2.1 Agency Theory and the Objective of Accounting
To justify accounting, agency theory is often used in the literature. Therefore, this
chapter briefly describes the agency problem and presents accounting as a possible
way to alleviate this problem. The agency theory is based on the circumstances and
the structure of a modern company. The separation of ownership and control is a ba-
sic characteristic of a contemporary public company (Berle and Means 1932; Fama
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Fos et al. 2018; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith
1776). This development can be explained by the continuous enlargement of the
companies and is vital for economic progress (Berle and Means 1932; Fama 1980).
In this way, individual savers invest their capital in business ventures which they
do not operate themselves (Healy and Palepu 2001). They try to benefit from the
specialization of the management employed to lead the company (Fama and Jensen
1983). In this way, an optimal capital allocation is crucial for economic development
and welfare increase.
The agency theory can illustrate the challenges of achieving allocation effi-
ciency and is based on a contractual relationship between the principal and the
agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The principal—typically the owner(s) of the
company—delegates work to the agent—the manager(s) of the company—and at
the same time ensures compensation for the agent’s effort. As already mentioned
above, the principal tries to benefit from the agent’s capabilities. However, this
goes hand in hand with an agent’s information advantage over the principal.4 Infor-
mation asymmetries thus characterize the contractual relationship. Since both the
principal and the agent are utility maximizers, the fact that there are divergences of
interest between the two parties of the relationship besides the information asym-
metries leads to an agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Accordingly, the
contractual relationship is subject to agency conflicts which both contracting par-
ties would like to avoid. On the one hand, the principal engages in monitoring to
prevent the agent from opportunistically exploiting the information advantage. On
the other hand, the agent attempts to credibly assure to act in the principal’s inter-
est. Although both actions cause costs—monitoring and bonding costs—according
to Jensen and Meckling (1976, 308), “there will be some divergence between the
agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the prin-
4 This concerns information on the agent’s characteristics, alternatives, and strategies with the
associated consequences, namely: hidden characteristics, hidden action, and hidden intention
(Breton 1995).
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cipal.” The latter results in a residual loss and sums up with the expenditures for
monitoring and bonding to the agency costs.
Transferred to the contemporary economic world, following Fama (1980, 289),
“the firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of production, with each
factor motivated by its self-interest.” The separation of ownership and control in a
company, therefore, creates an agency problem due to asymmetric information and
conflicting interests between owners and managers. It is in the sense of the con-
tracting parties to minimize incurring agency costs (Christie and Zimmerman 1994;
Jensen and Meckling 1976). The better informed manager can contribute to this
common goal by providing information to the owner (Ng 1978; Sunder 1997; Sunder
2002). This provision of information to mitigate agency costs can be made through
accounting on the basis of financial statements. The accounting information is in-
tended to reduce information asymmetries and assist the owners in making their
investment decisions but also in evaluating the manager. Thus, Healy and Palepu
(2001, 410) state that the manager’s reporting on the use of the allocated capital
“enables investors to monitor compliance with contractual agreements and to eval-
uate whether entrepreneurs have managed the firm’s resources in the interests of
external owners.” Since financial statements are the primary source of information
for the owners, the manager’s compensation is based on the accounting earnings
(Ng 1978; Ng and Stoeckenius 1979; Watts and Zimmerman 1979). The objective
of this remuneration system is that managers act in the interests of the owners
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978), which is the reason why accounting information also
fulfills a stewardship function (Gjesdal 1981).
Thus, accounting plays an eminent role in drafting contracts by providing proper
information (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Sunder 2002; Watts and Zimmerman
1986). Accordingly, the purpose and therefore the basis for justifying accounting is
to mitigate agency costs (Healy and Palepu 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts
1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Thereby, the fo-
cus is on the provision of information that is useful for decision-making. This may
concern primarily decisions of the owners but also decisions of any other possible
parties, which are potentially part of a contractual relationship with the company.
The information function is formulated as the objective of accounting. For example,
in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), the FASB (2010, OB2) expresses itself as follows: “The
objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information
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about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders,
and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity.”
The wording of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which can
be found in Framework F.12 of the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS), goes in the same direction: “The objective of financial statements is to pro-
vide information about the financial position, performance and changes in financial
position of an enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic
decisions.”
The accounting information should, therefore, facilitate sound economic decisions
for its addressees and also contribute to an enhancement of overall welfare through
efficient capital allocation. For this to succeed and for the information function to
be fulfilled, the accounting information must be of high quality (Messier et al. 2016).
This argument can be illustrated by looking at the agency model. It is the manager
who provides information to the owners. As the manager’s compensation is tied
to reported earnings, the manager has an incentive to manipulate the accounting
earnings in order to receive a higher remuneration (Christie and Zimmerman 1994;
He and Yang 2014). Empirical research has indeed identified such opportunistic
behavior by managers (e.g., Healy 1985). As a result, it must be ensured that the
information provided to the owner is credible to mitigate information asymmetries
and enable effective monitoring. Watts and Zimmerman (1990, 135) conclude that
“contracts that use accounting numbers are not effective in aligning managers’ and
contracting parties’ interests if managers have complete discretion over the reported
accounting numbers.“ Thus, the objective of accounting to mitigate agency costs can
be achieved only if the accounting information provided by the manager is of high
quality.
The question arises what is meant by high earnings quality. Unfortunately, there
is no generally accepted definition of earnings quality in the accounting literature
(Cohen et al. 2004; Gaynor et al. 2016). The legislators postulate a fair presen-
tation and focus on the decision-usefulness of earnings. Essentially, the criteria
relevance and reliability—or faithful representation, respectively—can be derived as
qualitative characteristics of decision-useful information (FASB 1978; FASB 2010).5
Correspondingly, Dechow et al. (2010, 344) define earnings quality in their litera-
ture review as follows: “Higher quality earnings provide more information about
5 In addition to these two fundamental characteristics, there are other requirements, such as
materiality, comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understandability (FASB 2010).
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the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific deci-
sion made by a specific decision-maker.” Gaynor et al. (2016, 2) refer more directly
to the reliability of earnings and suggest that high quality financial reports “are
more complete, neutral, and free from error and provide more useful predictive or
confirmatory information about the company’s underlying economic position and
performance.”
Similarly, there is no consensus on a comprehensive measure of earnings quality
(Knechel et al. 2013). The empirical research considers various measures of differ-
ent dimensions of earnings quality which can, according to Dechow et al. (2010),
be classified into the following categories: earnings properties, external earnings
misstatement indicators, and shareholders’ responsiveness to earnings.6 The latter
represents a measure of shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality and is discussed
in more detail in the following section. Specifically, section 2.2 deals with the role of
accounting in the capital market as shareholders at the capital market are regarded
as the major addressees of accounting information and are responsible for efficient
resource allocation (Khurana and Raman 2006; Lev and Ohlson 1982).
6 For additional information regarding different measures of earnings quality, please refer to
Dechow et al. (2010) or Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014).
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2.2 Accounting and the Capital Market
In the previous section, the need for financial reporting was motivated by the agency
theory, and the information function of accounting was elaborated. As described in
section 2.1, the FASB and the IASB have an interest in ensuring that accounting
provides all information that is useful for the decisions of any users of financial
statements. However, the primary addressees of the provided information are the
shareholders who are intended to make their investment decisions in the best possible
way (Khurana and Raman 2006; Lev and Ohlson 1982). Moreover, it is assumed
that the information demands of the shareholders mainly include those of the other
addressees (IFRS Framework F.10). Accordingly, the provision of information to
shareholders that is useful for decision-making should also satisfy the other users of
financial statements.
For this reason, this section deals specifically with the equity capital market and
establishes a link between accounting and the capital market. The capital market
is responsible for an efficient allocation of resources and is therefore expected to
contribute to a functioning economy. Alternatively, expressed in the words of Fama
(1970, 383): “The primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of
the economy’s capital stock.” However, this requires an economic functioning of
the capital market in terms of information efficiency. Information efficiency is the
ability of the capital market to process information and incorporate it into stock
prices (Fama 1970; Wagenhofer and Ewert 2015). The semi-strong form of infor-
mation efficiency—assumed in large parts of capital market research—implies that
shareholders take all publicly available information into account when making their
investment decisions (Fama 1970; Fama 1998). The major source of publicly avail-
able information represents the accounting of companies (Basu et al. 2013; Ng 1978;
Ng and Stoeckenius 1979). In this way, the functioning of the capital market de-
pends on the availability of high quality accounting information (Healy and Palepu
2001; Levitt 1998). This is operationalized by the provision of decision-useful infor-
mation in the sense of the information function of financial reporting which is the
link between accounting and the capital market.
Besides, it was mentioned in section 2.1 that the purpose of accounting can be
achieved only if the information provided is of high quality. High earnings quality
implies that the information provided is relevant and reliable in representing the
financial performance of the company. Since shareholders need useful information
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to make their investment decisions, they are more willing to invest in companies
that deliver high earnings quality (Levitt 1998). As a logical consequence, it is
not only the actual earnings quality that is important, but especially sharehold-
ers’ perceptions on this topic. After all, shareholders must be able to trust the
financial statement information. Whether shareholders consider this information
relevant and reliable is a central issue in market-based accounting research. Indeed,
the findings of empirical studies—that the capital market includes accounting in-
formation in its decision-making and formation of stock prices—support this notion
(Collins and Kothari 1989; Kothari 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). The field of
positive accounting literature is based on the seminal publications of Ball and Brown
(1968) and Beaver (1968) that heralded methods from empirical finance into account-
ing research. Further studies have taken up the connection between accounting and
capital market and developed theoretical models with the aim of empirically testing
them. In doing so, the stock price is formulated as a function of financial statement
data and, hence, a relation between accounting information and market valuation is
established (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). In particular, future cash flow expecta-
tions are formed from the disclosed earnings information.
To measure how earnings map into stock prices, the literature uses the ERC de-
termined on the basis of an event study. The earnings announcement represents the
event, and the change of the stock price is the variable to be explained. The logic be-
hind is that the disclosure of decision-useful information should revise the market’s
previous expectations and result in a stock price reaction (Kothari 2001). Accord-
ingly, the ERC offers a conceptual specification of the link between accounting and
the capital market, which has been one of the most popular fields of research in ac-
counting to this day (Dumontier and Raffournier 2002; Kothari 2001). At the same
time, the ERC also provides a measure of shareholders’ perceptions of earnings qual-
ity (Dechow et al. 2010). Thus, seminal ERC studies (Holthausen and Verrecchia
1988; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lev 1989) reveal that the extent of the price re-
action due to a single earnings announcement depends, inter alia, on the quality
of the earnings signal. Therefore, the ERC metric is of great importance not only
for market-based accounting research in general, but in particular for the studies in
chapter 4 and chapter 5 of this dissertation. For this reason, special attention is paid
to the ERC model at this point, and it is explained in more detail. Consequently,
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a closer look is taken at the theoretical model developed by Lev (1989), which con-
siders the revision of a firm’s market price due to a single earnings announcement.7
As shown in Equation 2.1, the price of a firm at date 0, P0, equals the present
value of the unknown random normally distributed future cash flows to the firm’s
risk-neutral shareholders, E(C˜F ).
P0 = E(C˜F )
C˜F ∼ N (E(C˜F ), σ2)
(2.1)
At date 1, the firm releases an earnings signal, e1, before any cash flow to the firm’s
shareholders is observable. As a result of this signal, shareholders can revalue the
firm because the expected future cash flows are linked to the firm’s earnings. The
earnings signal corresponds to a scale factor, a, multiplied by the present value of
random future cash flows, C˜F , plus a random noise term, ǫ˜, which is independent
of these cash flows. Furthermore, the noise is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2ǫ .
e˜ = aC˜F + ǫ˜
ǫ˜ ∼ N (0, σ2ǫ )
Cov(C˜F , ǫ˜) = 0
(2.2)
As it is assumed that the shareholders use Bayes’ rule to update their expectations
regarding the present value of the unknown random future cash flows, the price of
the firm after the announcement of the signal is represented by Equation 2.3.
P1 = E(C˜F | e1) =
e1/a
σ2ǫ
+ E(C˜F )
a2σ2
1
σ2ǫ
+ 1
a2σ2
(2.3)
Considering Equation 2.2, it follows that E(e˜) = aE(C˜F ). For further simplification,
the scale factor, a, is set to 1.
P1 − P0 =
σ2
σ2 + σ2ǫ
(e1 − E(e˜1)) (2.4)
7 The following description of the theoretical model is based on a previous version of the study
presented in chapter 4.
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Equation 2.4 highlights that the change in the stock price is determined by the
earnings signal, e1, and its expectation, E(e˜1). In addition, the change in the stock
price also depends on variances in the value of the firm and the earnings noise, i.e.,
the ERC, σ2/(σ2 + σ2ǫ ).
∂ERC
∂σ2
> 0
∂ERC
∂σ2ǫ
< 0
(2.5)
The variance, σ2 (σ2ǫ ), has a positive (negative) influence on the ERC (Equation 2.5).
Thereby, the earnings information is of higher relevance, if the variance of future
cash flows is greater. Notably, shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality are also
represented by the variance of the earnings noise, σ2ǫ . In this context, higher quality
means higher reliability and, hence, a lower variance; it results, ceteris paribus,
in a higher ERC and, therefore, a greater price reaction. In the end, following
Barth et al. (2001, 80), the earnings information can only influence the stock price
if it is “relevant to investors in valuing the firm and is measured reliably enough.”
Accordingly, the presented theoretical model suggests a direct influence of ac-
counting information on the capital market. Moreover, it reveals that shareholders’
perceptions of earnings quality determine the extent to which unexpected earnings
are priced in (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lev 1989).
Therefore, the ERC model is a basis for empirical studies and at the same time pro-
vides a measure of shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. How the earnings
quality and shareholders’ related perceptions can be influenced by the auditor and
how this may result in a need for independent auditing is described in the next
section.
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2.3 The Role of the Auditor and Auditor Independence
The demand for auditing—like the need for accounting—can be derived from the
agency theory (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, the role of the auditor in the
agency model will be discussed in more detail below. Fundamentally, the relation-
ship between the principal and the agent is characterized by information asymme-
tries and conflicts of interest. The agent can contribute to alleviating the arising
agency costs by providing information to the principal through accounting. The
information is intended to mitigate the information advantage of the agent and to
facilitate the principal to monitor the agent effectively (Healy and Palepu 2001).
However, since the agent has discretion regarding the provided information, there
exists the chance for opportunistic manipulation at the expense of the principal
(Christie and Zimmerman 1994). But, helping to solve the agency problem by min-
imizing agency costs can be successful only if the accounting information is of high
quality and is considered credible by the principal. However, it should not be easy
for the agent to convince the principal of the reliability of the information provided.
Therefore, the assignment of an independent third party can help to monitor the
agent and to ensure a minimum level of reliability of the accounting information, and
thus, effectively reduce the agency costs (Cohen et al. 2004; Jensen and Meckling
1976; Ng and Stoeckenius 1979).
The independent auditor is an acknowledged monitoring instrument that assures
earnings quality.8 Accordingly, the need for auditing arises because of the exis-
tence of information asymmetries and conflicts of interest between the principal
and the agent (DeAngelo 1981b; Healy and Palepu 2001; Watts and Zimmerman
1986). This can also be transferred to the contemporary economic world: the
demand for auditing results from the need of independent assurance of earnings
quality on the part of the users of accounting information (Cahan et al. 2009;
Healy and Palepu 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Therefore, the objective of
auditing is to ensure a sufficient earnings quality, and thus, mitigate the agency
problem (DeFond and Zhang 2014; Watts and Zimmerman 1983).
Because of the important role of auditing in the agency context, a voluntary audit
is beneficial for all parties, at least in companies with separation of ownership and
control (Messier et al. 2016; Watts 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1979). Indeed,
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) discovered that auditing has already taken place in
8 For further mechanisms and information intermediaries to reduce agency costs, please refer to
Healy and Palepu (2001) or Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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early business enterprises around the year 1200 and was performed by shareholders
and directors. In 1844, auditing was required by law for the first time by the
British Companies Act (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). In contrast, independent
professional auditors in their present form had not emerged until the end of the
19th century (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). The fact that the appointment of a
professional auditor was common practice—despite the lack of regulations in this
regard—indicates the critical importance of auditing for the economic success and
the continued existence of a company. Transferred to the capital market, proper
auditing can strengthen public confidence in the accounting information, and thus,
contribute to the functioning of the markets (EU 2014; FASB 1978). To fulfill its
purpose, the audit must be—like accounting information—of high quality and it
must also be perceived as being of high quality. Therefore, the question inevitably
arises what is meant by high (perceived) audit quality.9
Knechel et al. (2013) notes that despite decades of research efforts, unfortunately,
no consensus has been reached on what characterizes audit quality. Nevertheless,
relevant present studies define audit quality as follows: DeFond and Zhang (2014,
281) describe higher audit quality as “greater assurance that the financial state-
ments faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics, conditioned on its finan-
cial reporting system and innate characteristics.” Gaynor et al. (2016, 5) define “a
higher quality audit as one that provides a higher level of assurance that the auditor
obtained sufficient appropriate evidence that the financial statements faithfully rep-
resent the firm’s underlying economics.” Both definitions point in the same direction
and directly address the objective of auditing—i.e., the assurance of the accounting
information. Even if these definitions are very focused on the objective of auditing,
the widespread notion of DeAngelo (1981b, 186), which refers to the attributes of
the auditor, is also valuable in understanding audit quality: “The quality of audit
services is defined to be the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor
will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the
breach.”
This definition categorizes the quality of the audit into two essential compo-
nents: (1) the ability and effort of the auditor to identify misstatements and
(2) the willingness to express an objective opinion and disclose detected errors
(Knechel et al. 2013). Thus, audit quality might be compromised—even though
9 For detailed discussions on the definition of audit quality, please refer to DeFond and Zhang
(2014), Francis (2011), and Knechel et al. (2013).
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the auditor has the necessary capabilities—if the auditor does not act in the inter-
ests of the shareholders, but the interests of the manager. Therefore, the audit is
effective in mitigating agency costs only if the auditor’s independence is maintained
(Watts and Zimmerman 1983). However, to successfully assure earnings quality, the
auditor does not only need to be independent in fact but, in particular, independent
in appearance (Shockley 1981). The fact that shareholders’ perceptions of auditor
independence are essential in this context, as they must rely on financial statement
information, is also evident from the reference to the “market-assessed probability”
of DeAngelo (1981b, 186).
Nonetheless, theory and practice reveal that auditor independence is not given
without any doubt. On the one hand, the agency theory including conflicts of in-
terest is not limited to managers and shareholders. The incentives of the auditor
cannot be ignored in this context (Gjesdal 1981). Accordingly, Antle (1982) in-
cludes the auditor as an additional benefit-maximizing agent in the agency model.
Thus, this three-party relationship can be regarded as a strategic game in which the
auditor does not wish to lose the profits from future audit fee streams (DeAngelo
1981a; Sunder 2002). Because of the large influence of the management on the
auditor appointment, there might be skepticism among shareholders regarding the
auditor’s independence (Mayhew 2017; Watts and Zimmerman 1981). On the other
hand, in practice, accounting scandals like Enron and the collapse of Arthur An-
derson have cast serious doubts on auditors’ independence (Fearnley et al. 2005;
Krishnamurthy et al. 2006; Landsman et al. 2009).
There are also incentives for the auditor to maintain independence. In model the-
ory, expected profits from the fees of the other clients serve as collateral (DeAngelo
1981b). In addition to this phenomenon known as reputation rational, the litiga-
tion rational—which states that auditors try to avoid litigation exposure—enhances
auditor independence (Dye 1993). In line with this reasoning, empirical studies
show that shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality are influenced by attributes
of auditor independence—e.g., auditor size as a proxy for the reputation collateral
and auditor wealth or high non-audit fees as a sign of jeopardized independence—
and further auditor characteristics—e.g., industry specialization (Balsam et al.
2003; Francis and Ke 2006; Higgs and Skantz 2006; Khurana and Raman 2004;
Krishnan and Ye 2005; Krishnan et al. 2013; Teoh and Wong 1993).
To sum up, theory and empirical evidence imply that independent auditors play
an essential role in mitigating agency problems. As shareholders seem to consider
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independent auditors enhancing earnings quality, they play a vital role in the func-
tioning of capital markets. This was also recognized by the regulators, which is the
reason why the role of the auditor and auditor independence were strengthened as a
response to the accounting scandals and the financial crisis (e.g., SOX; Dodd-Frank
Act; EU 2014). Besides, the legislator also aims at facilitating and strengthen-
ing shareholder participation by extending voting rights (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act; EU
2007; EU 2017). Thus, the next chapter deals with shareholder voting at annual
general meetings.
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3 Shareholder Voting at the Annual General Meeting
As discussed in chapter 2, a modern company is characterized by the separation of
ownership and control (Berle and Means 1932). The arising asymmetric informa-
tion and conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders result in agency
costs. Accounting by the manager and the assurance of high earnings quality by
an independent auditor are supposed to mitigate this agency problem. The pro-
vided information is intended to reduce information asymmetries and enable the
shareholders to monitor the manager effectively. Accordingly, shareholder control of
the manager’s incentive structure and performance is a fundamental element of the
agency theory. Only effective monitoring ensures that the manager acts in the best
interests of the shareholders. Therefore, the corporate law should provide share-
holders with sufficient monitoring rights to overcome the problems associated with
the separation of ownership and control (Black 1992). In line with this perspective,
Bebchuk (2005, 836) argues that “increasing shareholder power to intervene [...]
would improve corporate governance and enhance shareholder value by addressing
important agency problems that have long afflicted publicly traded companies.”
The legal operationalization of shareholder control is based on the voting rights
on critical corporate decisions, such as amendments of bylaws, structural changes,
or the election and removal of board members (Thomas and Tricker 2017). In the
literature, the voting right—especially the right to elect board members—besides
the right to sell shares is considered as the most fundamental right of sharehold-
ers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Velasco 2006). The shareholder monitoring by vot-
ing rights typically takes place at the annual general meeting of the company
(Mason et al. 2018; Thomas and Tricker 2017; Van der Elst 2011). In addition, the
annual general meeting serves as a forum for questions and discussions by which
the management is required to account to its shareholders (§ 131 (1) AktG). Thus,
in the theoretical agency context, the annual general meeting represents a major
monitoring instrument to mitigate costs resulting from information asymmetries
and conflicting interests between managers and shareholders (Lafarre 2017). In this
respect, it appears logical that the legislators endeavor to strengthen the role of the
annual general meeting. In the last decade, the importance of the annual general
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meeting, both in the EU and in the U.S., has been highlighted by extending voting
rights or by facilitating shareholder participation (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act; EU 2007;
EU 2017).
Nevertheless, the theoretical importance of the annual general meeting does not
appear to coincide with its practical relevance (Lafarre 2017; Palmiter 2015). In
particular, not all shareholders exercise their control rights and participate in the
annual general meeting. As thorough decision-making and voting at the annual
general meeting can be cost-intensive for an individual shareholder, the benefits of
participation might not cover the expenses. At the same time, an individual share-
holder could rely on the remaining shareholders and abstain from monitoring the
management, which would result in a free rider problem (Thomas and Tricker 2017;
Van der Elst 2011). Consequently, shareholders have some incentives not to vote
and are rational apathetic despite the theoretical meaning of shareholder monitor-
ing (Lafarre 2017). This applies in particular to small shareholders who have neither
strong enough incentives nor sufficient voting power to influence corporate decision-
making (Leech 2013; Sainty et al. 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Therefore, it
might be more feasible for a small shareholder to follow the “wall street rule” and
sell the shares (Gillan and Starks 2007).10 For this reason, legislators aim at facili-
tating shareholder participation and allow shareholders to authorize proxies to vote
their shares in absence from the annual general meeting. Beyond this, in advance of
the meeting, the management has to provide adequate information for shareholders
to vote their shares.
In contrast to small shareholders, institutional shareholders have greater in-
centives to monitor management and to participate in corporate decision-
making (Krishnan et al. 2013; Leech 2013; Palmiter 2015; Sainty et al. 2002;
Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Velasco 2006). Therefore, institutional shareholders en-
gage proxy advisors—e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Glass Lewis—
to consult them how to vote their shares (Cunningham 2017; Langenbucher 2018;
Palmiter 2015).11 Consistently, empirical studies demonstrate that voting recom-
mendations of proxy advisors have a considerable impact on the outcome of share-
holder voting in the U.S. as well as in the EU (Alexander et al. 2010; Cai et al.
10 However, other authors represent a contrary opinion (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009; Dao et al.
2008; Del Guercio et al. 2008; Parrino et al. 2003), and at least for large shareholders it should
be less expensive to vote their shares then selling them.
11 In Germany, there additionally exist shareholder protection associations—e.g., Deutsche
Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW) or Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger
(SDK)—that represent the interests of minority shareholders at annual general meetings.
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2009; Choi et al. 2010; Cunningham 2017; Hitz and Lehmann 2017). The increas-
ing influence of institutional shareholders, who control about 70% of the stock of
the largest public companies in the U.S. (Palmiter 2015), suggests that the annual
general meeting might represent an effective monitoring mechanism. This opinion is
supported by the fact that the average voter turnout in the U.S. totals approximately
80% (Van der Elst 2011). In Germany, however, the average voter turnouts over the
recent years from 2010 onwards are between 50% and 60% and for small share-
holders at least over 40% (Lafarre 2017; Langenbucher 2018; Mendoza et al. 2010).
Even if the voter turnouts do not fully justify the theoretical meaning of shareholder
monitoring, they are still considerable. The reason for that is the previously men-
tioned regulatory encouragement of voter participation through simplifications of
the voting procedure. Nevertheless, the voting results are generally very high, and
majorities below 90% or even 95% are already regarded as outliers (Cai et al. 2009;
Cunningham 2017; Lafarre 2017; Mendoza et al. 2010).
Although the latter insight may not be a strong argument for the importance and
effectiveness of shareholder monitoring, empirical studies reveal that shareholder
voting can induce real economic consequences. For example, recent studies show
that even minor changes in the voting results are related to corporate changes, such
as the turnover of board members or auditors (Aggarwal et al. 2017; Barua et al.
2017; Cai et al. 2009; Cuñat et al. 2016; Del Guercio et al. 2008; Tanyi and Roland
2017). Therefore, it is not surprising that the literature using the voting behavior of
shareholders to investigate their perceptions is growing rapidly. In particular, more
and more studies are focusing on the question of which factors influence shareholders’
satisfaction and thus the voting results (e.g., Cai et al. 2009; Sainty et al. 2002;
Ye et al. 2013). All in all, the literature supports the conclusion of Cai et al. (2009,
2417) “that at least some shareholders care about performance and governance, and
their opinions are reflected in the way they vote.” In chapter 4 and chapter 6, this
thesis also makes use of voting outcomes to measure shareholders’ satisfaction. In
this way, the two studies deal with voting results from annual general meetings in
the U.S. and Germany, respectively. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter
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compares the shareholder voting rights, voting procedure, and the legal structure of
the annual general meeting in the U.S. and Germany.12
In both Germany and the U.S., shareholder voting rights are exercised at the
annual general meeting (§ 118 (1) AktG; Del. GCL § 211(b); MBCA § 7.01).
Special meetings take place only in exceptional cases, and therefore, will not be
discussed further at this point. In Germany, the annual general meeting has to
be held within the first eight months after the end of the fiscal year and has to
be announced at least 30 days before the day of the meeting (§§ 123 (1) and 175
(1) AktG). Similarly, according to MBCA § 7.03, the annual general meeting has
to take place within six months after the fiscal year-end or 15 months after the
last annual general meeting.13 In addition to the location and time of the meeting,
information on the individual agenda items has to be provided (§ 121 (3) AktG).
Furthermore, additional information rights have to be fulfilled within the context of
the annual general meeting, which are intended to support shareholders in exercising
their voting rights. In particular, the audited financial statements—which are used
by shareholders to monitor and to vote (Leuz 2010)—have to be provided to the
shareholders (§§ 175 (2) and 176 (1) AktG). However, in the U.S., the latter is
prescribed only by MBCA § 16.20 but not by Del. GCL. Attendance at the annual
general meeting enables the shareholders to gather information, ask questions, and
finally, to vote on resolutions regarding important corporate decisions that will be
discussed in more detail later.
Shareholders who own shares with voting rights on the record date are entitled
to vote on the resolutions at the annual general meeting. In Germany, the record
date is set three weeks before the meeting (§ 123 (4) AktG). In the U.S., it can be
set by the board within a specified period depending on the specific state law.14 In
general, in Germany as well as in the U.S., all shareholders have the right to vote,
and the principle of one-vote-per-share exists (§ 12 (1) AktG; Del. GCL § 212(a);
12 In Germany, shareholder rights are defined in the Stock Corporation Act (AktG). In the U.S.,
voting rights are governed by state law, whereby the vast majority of companies follow the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) or the Delaware General Corporation Law (Del.
CGL). However, there are also federal regulations and SEC rules. Though, the regulations are
largely consistent with each other and differ only in some details, which will be dealt with in
the following paragraphs.
13 According to Del. GCL § 211(c), the annual general meeting has to be held within 30 days
after the designated date or 13 months after the latest annual general meeting.
14 According to MBCA § 7.07, the record date has to be not more than 70 days before the meeting;
Del. GCL § 213(a) prescribes a record date within the period from 60 to 10 days before the
meeting.
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MBCA § 7.21). However, in addition to the common shares, there are also preference
shares that can be issued without voting rights.15 While the introduction of multiple
voting rights per share is prohibited in Germany (§ 12 (2) AktG), deviations from
the one-vote-per-share principle are more frequent in the U.S. (Dunlavy 2006). To
facilitate the exercise of voting rights for shareholders and to ensure a high level
of voter turnout, shareholders can vote their shares by mail or electronically before
the annual general meeting in the U.S. and Germany. Furthermore, it is possible to
delegate voting rights to proxies to enable a vote in absence of the annual general
meeting (§ 134 (3) AktG; EU 2007; Thomas and Tricker 2017; Velasco 2006).
Before the various resolutions on the agenda of annual general meetings are
presented, the structural differences in the board structure of German and U.S.
companies must be dealt with. In the U.S., companies are governed by a one-tier
board in which executive—i.e., management—directors as well as non-executive—
i.e., independent—directors are present. On the contrary, German companies have
to implement a two-tier board system by fully separating the roles of executive and
non-executive board members in the management and supervisory board, respec-
tively (§ 105 (1) AktG). The management board members, similar to the executive
directors, are responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. The su-
pervisory board members, which are comparable to the independent directors, are
responsible for appointing and monitoring the management board (§§ 84 (1) and
111 (1) AktG). The formal structure, as well as the voting items on the agenda of
the annual general meeting regarding the members of the board, differ between the
U.S. and Germany.
In Germany, only the members of the supervisory board but not the management
board are elected by the annual general meeting (§ 101 (1) AktG).16 Thereby, the
members of the supervisory board are elected on the basis of a simple majority
for a maximum tenure of five years (§ 102 (1) AktG), with premature dismissal
by the annual general meeting being possible with a three-quarter majority of the
votes cast (§ 103 (1) AktG).17 In the U.S., the annual general meeting has the
15 In return, owners of preference shares have the right to receive a preferred and generally higher
dividend as owners of common shares.
16 Besides, it must be taken into account that employee representatives are also required to be
represented on the supervisory boards of sufficiently large stock corporations following the
German Co-Determination Act. However, the chairman of the supervisory board has to be a
shareholder representative.
17 According to § 103 (1) AktG, the company’s bylaws can determine a different majority and
other requirements.
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right of election and removal of the board directors (Del. GCL § 211(b); MBCA
§ 8.08). Although generally, all members of the board have to face election every
year, staggered boards are a widespread exception to the annual election (Del. GCL
§ 141(d); MBCA § 8.06). In staggered boards, which are implemented by about
half of the largest U.S. companies (Palmiter 2015), board members are classified
into different groups that are elected in a multi-year election cycle. Usually, the
method of electing directors in the U.S. is straight plurality voting (Del. GCL
§ 216; MBCA § 7.28). This means that the candidates with the highest numbers
of votes are elected to the board of directors. Thus, it is irrelevant whether they
receive a majority of the votes cast. Correspondingly, in an uncontested election—
which is the case for the overwhelming majority of annual general meetings in the
U.S.—directors could be re-elected with a single vote (Thomas and Tricker 2017). In
addition, in the straight voting method, a majority shareholder is able to appoint all
directors. An alternative approach that can be used is cumulative voting that gives
minority shareholders the opportunity to be represented on the board by bundling
their votes on a limited number of candidates (Del. GCL § 214; MBCA § 7.28). In
addition to the election of the supervisory board members, there is an additional
vote in Germany where shareholders can express their satisfaction with the work of
the board members. This vote is the discharge of the management board and the
supervisory board, which has to take place each annual general meeting for both
boards separately (§§ 119 (1) number 3 and 120 (1) AktG).18 Since the discharge
of the board members takes place every year with no exception, it is an interesting
area for research, and therefore, used in the study presented in chapter 6 of this
thesis.
In addition to voting concerning the board members, in which the shareholders can
signal their confidence, further resolutions are on the agenda of the annual general
meeting. These are not decisions about the day-to-day business, but important
matters that are usually not on the agenda every year. These are in particular
resolutions concerning changes to the company’s bylaws or far-reaching structural
changes, such as the procurement and reduction of capital, or even the dissolution
of the company (§ 119 (1) AktG; Del. GCL § 109; MBCA § 10.20; Bebchuk 2005;
Thomas and Tricker 2017). In addition to these rather exceptional cases, there are
also a few votes that are regularly on the agenda of the annual general meeting. In
18 By granting discharge, the annual general meeting approves the administration of the company
by the members of the management board and the supervisory board. However, the discharge
does not include a waiver of claims for reimbursement (§ 120 (2) AktG).
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Germany, there is a mandatory resolution which decides on the appropriation of the
distributable profits (§§ 119 (1) number 2 and 174 (1) AktG). Finally, two further
agenda items are voted on at a broad number of annual general meetings that also
attract considerable attention in accounting research. This concerns auditor election
or ratification and say-on-pay votes that again legally differ between the U.S. and
Germany. In Germany, for example, the appointment of auditors by the annual
general meeting is mandatory and binding (§ 119 (1) number 4 AktG), whereas in the
U.S. the auditor ratification is neither mandatory nor binding. However, it should
be noted that over 90% of the largest companies in the U.S. voluntarily seek auditor
ratification (Cunningham 2017). Say-on-pay, on the contrary, has been mandatory
at least every three years in the U.S. since the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 (Section
953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act) but voluntary in Germany (§ 120 (4) AktG).19 In
both countries, however, say-on-pay has an advisory character. In addition to the
mentioned votes, shareholders—which (jointly) hold a sufficient number of shares—
can propose items on the agenda and may also nominate board members. This has
been simplified in the U.S. in particular by the SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule
14a-8 that allows these issues to be included in the proxy material.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in both Germany and the U.S. all voting
results and the number of votes cast of listed companies have to be disclosed. This
requirement applies irrespective of whether the vote is mandatory or voluntary.
In Germany, according to § 130 (6) AktG, the disclosure has to be made on the
company’s website within seven days after the annual general meeting. In the U.S.,
the SEC (2009) requires the results of any vote to be filed on Form 8-K within four
days after the annual general meeting. This disclosure of the voting outcome enables
the empirical investigation of shareholders’ satisfaction with the aim to contribute to
a deeper understanding of shareholders’ perceptions regarding economic questions.
19 However, in the recent directive regarding the encouragement of long-term shareholder en-
gagement, the EU (2017) calls for a mandatory vote of the annual general meeting on the
remuneration system of the management at least every four years.
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4 Results of Auditor Ratification Votes and
Shareholders’ Perceptions of Earnings Quality20
“There is meaning to auditor ratification votes.”
This quote is the conclusion of Mayhew (2017, 127) from the three papers of
the Auditor Ratification Research Forum in the American Accounting Association
Journal Accounting Horizons. The need for such a forum, which deals in particular
with the consequences of auditor ratification votes, demonstrates the increasing rel-
evance of shareholder participation at annual general meetings, not only in practice
but also in auditing and accounting research. Most importantly, these votes might
allow valuable insights into the understanding of shareholders’ opinions.
In chapter 2, both the importance of high earnings quality and the auditor’s as-
surance function to reduce information asymmetries and, hence, agency costs were
discussed. Against the backdrop of these insights, it would be beneficial to have a
comprehensive indicator of shareholders’ confidence in the reliability of accounting
information. This, in turn, could help an average shareholder to make informed and
reasonable investment decisions. Shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection ex-
pressed in the above-mentioned auditor ratification vote at annual general meetings
(Cohen et al. 2004) could be an attempt to find such an indicator, especially given
that independent auditors play an essential role in assuring sufficient earnings quality
and contributing to mitigating the agency problem (Watts and Zimmerman 1983).
Although auditor’s responsibility is to shareholders and it is the audit committee’s
responsibility to hire the auditor, management plays a major role in the appoint-
ment of the auditor (Barua et al. 2017; Beck and Mauldin 2014; Cohen et al. 2010;
20 This chapter is based on a working paper titled “Results of Auditor Ratification Votes and
Shareholders’ Perceptions of External Financial Reporting Quality”, which is co-authored by
Jacob Justus Leidner. The paper was presented at the 2015 DART Mini Graduate Work-
shop in Graz, the 38th European Accounting Association Annual Congress in Glasgow, the 77.
Wissenschaftliche Jahrestagung des Verbandes der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft in
Vienna, the 2015 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in Chicago, and the 8th
European Auditing Research Network Symposium in Lausanne. The reasoning, results, and
interpretations of this study might change after the submission and publication of this doctoral
thesis. The recent version of the paper is available upon request.
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Dhaliwal et al. 2015). This poses a threat to auditor independence and ultimately
to the quality of the audited financial statement (Mayhew 2017). Nevertheless, it
is the task of shareholders to monitor the management as far as possible, and the
auditor ratification vote at annual general meetings is one of the very few evident
opportunities to monitor (Van der Elst 2011). Accordingly, it would be interesting
to know whether the results of auditor ratification votes that express sharehold-
ers’ satisfaction with the management-selected auditor allow inferences regarding
shareholders’ assessment of earnings quality.
However, the fact that the dissenting votes are far below a simple majority
(Mayhew 2017), might indicate that shareholders do not fulfill their obligation
and that the voting results constitute an indicator of perceived earnings quality.
Additionally, a considerable fraction of shareholders is passive in director elec-
tions or auditor ratification votes (Dao et al. 2008). Finally, auditor ratification
by shareholders in the U.S. is usually a voluntary, routine, and non-binding matter
(Hermanson et al. 2009). An effect can, therefore, be achieved only by disclosing the
voting results by signaling earnings-related information to the capital market. In-
deed, the SEC (2009) requires the disclosure of auditor ratification votes and empha-
sized the importance of auditor ratification by amending the disclosure requirements
for the voting results. This situation implies that the results of auditor ratification
votes are important information. Notwithstanding, little is known about sharehold-
ers’ interests in and perceptions of the auditor’s election, approval, or ratification
process (Wei et al. 2015). Although there are some studies on the determinants and
consequences of auditor ratification votes that also point to a link between share-
holders’ perceptions of audit topics and their voting decisions, it remains an open
question whether the voting result can be regarded as an earnings-related signal
that is associated with shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality.
This question should be answered in this association study by examining whether
the results of auditor ratification votes are associated with the decision-usefulness
of earnings, and therefore, whether they might represent beneficial, comprehensive
information for the capital market. Thus, this chapter aims to provide evidence
on whether the results of auditor ratification votes are informative in assessing not
only shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection, but also their perceptions of
earnings quality. Additionally, this chapter deals with cross-sectional differences
in information asymmetries and sheds light on the following question: Does the
association between shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection and perceived
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earnings quality depend on the level of information asymmetry between managers
and shareholders?
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4.1 Introduction
Shareholder activists and the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession
(ACAP) demand mandatory shareholder ratification of auditors (ACAP 2008;
Liu et al. 2009).21 Furthermore, studies on auditor ratification suggest a linkage
between audit quality-related issues and shareholders’ voting decisions regarding
the auditor (Dao et al. 2008; Hermanson et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2009; Mishra et al.
2005; Raghunandan 2003; Raghunandan and Rama 2003; Sainty et al. 2002), which
reveal that shareholders consider their vote thoroughly and use it as a communica-
tion tool. Against the background that the objective of auditing is to safeguard that
financial reports are credible, audit quality plays a vital role because it is an integral
part of earnings quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). As a consequence, shareholders’
satisfaction with auditor selection—expressed in auditor ratification votes—could
be an indicator of shareholders’ expectations regarding earnings quality.
Nevertheless, shareholder voting on auditor ratification in the U.S. is normally a
routine, non-binding action, and the share of votes for (supporting) the auditor’s
engagement is in the 95% region or higher. Moreover, the voting results tend to have
relatively low variation across firms and years (Cunningham 2017; Glezen and Millar
1985; Liu et al. 2009). Accordingly, opponents of shareholder ratification of auditors
might argue that the voting results are not informative and, hence, that their disclo-
sure is meaningless. Supporting this notion, Cunningham (2017) observes no signif-
icant influence of financial restatements on auditor ratification votes, which would
also mean that shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection does not necessarily
capture shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. Thus, it remains questionable
whether the disclosure of auditor ratification votes actually informs shareholders
about earnings quality and, hence, is a matter of public interest. Therefore, this
study aims to examine if there is empirical evidence that shareholders’ satisfaction
with auditor selection is related to the shareholders’ assessment of earnings qual-
ity. This would imply that it is an informative earnings-related signal indicating
shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality.
Interestingly, the SEC (2009) emphasized the importance of the results of auditor
ratification votes by requiring its disclosure on Form 8-K effective from 2010. This
disclosure requirement implies the relevance of the outcome of auditor ratification
21 For example, see the petition for rulemaking (File No. 4–570) submitted to the SEC by the Cal-
ifornia State Teachers’ Retirement System (https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/
petn4-570.pdf; accessed on October 1, 2018).
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votes because the SEC’s goal is to ensure the provision and disclosure of important
information.22 Indeed, the study of Tanyi and Roland (2017) shows that dissenting
auditor ratification votes are associated with negative market reactions.23 Thus,
the auditor ratification vote seems to be important for shareholders. However, the
question of whether shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection is related to
the shareholders’ assessment of earnings quality has not been conclusively clarified.
If this were the case, the results of auditor ratification votes should be associated
with market reactions to reported unexpected earnings, which capture sharehold-
ers’ perceptions of earnings quality. Finally, the results of auditor ratification votes
could then be regarded as earnings-related information, and their disclosure could
represent a signal to the market. Thus, this association study examines the re-
lation between shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection and shareholders’
perceptions of earnings quality with the aim of closing the existing research gap.
Using an ERC model, the empirical evidence reveals that the decision-usefulness
of earnings is associated with the results of auditor ratification votes: the higher
the percentage of votes supporting an auditor’s engagement, the higher the ERC
and, hence, perceived earnings quality at the earnings announcement date.24 Fur-
thermore, this association appears to be stronger when firms are characterized by
higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Thus,
there is empirical support for the notion that the results of auditor ratification votes
are earnings-related information that might help shareholders to make informed
investment decisions.
This study contributes to the accounting and auditing literature in several ways.
First, the auditor ratification literature is extended by showing that the results of au-
ditor ratification votes are associated with market reactions to unexpected earnings,
and therefore, appears to provide crucial earnings-related information to sharehold-
ers. Thus, the findings support that even non-mandatory and non-binding votes
might benefit shareholders in making informed investment decisions. In particular,
22 See https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml; accessed on October 1, 2018.
23 Besides, the authors observe that also companies react to high voting dissent by auditor dis-
missal, which is also supported by the empirical findings of Barua et al. (2017).
24 Indeed, it is understandable that the research design might be regarded as somewhat
tautological if one assumes that shareholder voting on auditor ratification and the ERC are
measures of the same construct, i.e., perceived audit quality. However, this argument does not
contradict this study’s reasoning that the voting results might yield information about perceived
earnings quality. Finally, it is precisely the research question of this study whether the satis-
faction with auditor selection is a useful assessment on which conclusions about shareholders’
perceptions of earnings quality can be drawn.
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shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection might be regarded as an indicator of
the decision-usefulness of earnings. Second, it is examined how the ERC is related to
a comprehensive variable—shareholder votes in support of the auditor—which might
capture shareholders’ perceptions of the interaction of firm characteristics and the
auditor’s quality attributes in determining perceived earnings quality. Additional
analysis reveals that it also provides incremental earnings-related information be-
yond that of other publicly available audit-related information. Third, by creating a
direct link to shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality, this study corroborates
to the conclusion of Tanyi and Roland (2017) that the SEC’s requirement to disclose
the results of auditor ratification votes seems appropriate. Finally, it reinforces the
conjecture that “there is meaning to auditor ratification votes” (Mayhew 2017, 127),
despite the low number of dissenting votes on average. Thus, it might be legitimate
to more intensively debating policy recommendations regarding shareholder ratifi-
cation of auditors—as is the case, for example, in the recently issued SEC (2015)
Concept Release. The report by the ACAP (2008), which made a foray into this
domain, is a natural focal point in this regard.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section contains
the development of the two hypotheses. In section 4.3, the research design and
the sample selection procedure are explained. The descriptive statistics and the
empirical findings are discussed in section 4.4. Additional analyses are presented in
section 4.5. The chapter closes with a summary and an examination of the study’s
limitations.
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4.2 Hypotheses Development
4.2.1 Results of Auditor Ratification Votes: Earnings-Related Information?
As mentioned above, shareholder ratification of auditors in the U.S. is not manda-
tory, nor is the result binding. Moreover, the rates of votes in favor are generally
extremely high and tend to have relatively low variation across firms and years
(Cunningham 2017; Glezen and Millar 1985; Liu et al. 2009). Therefore, it is ques-
tionable whether the voting results really matter, especially if a considerable frac-
tion of shareholders are passive in director elections or auditor ratification votes
(Dao et al. 2008). In particular, it could be questioned whether the voting outcome
as an expression of shareholders’ satisfaction with managements’ auditor selection is
informative about shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality, and thus, represents
earnings-related information.
Even if a regulatory change (NYSE Rule 452) in 2010 led more companies to seek
shareholder ratification of auditors, procedural technicalities—this typically routine
matter helps companies to achieve quorums in their annual general meetings—might
have increased the importance of auditor ratification votes in recent years.25 In
short, there are several reasons why shareholders might not attach great importance
to the results of auditor ratification votes (Hermanson et al. 2009). Thus, it appears
unsurprising that the SEC (2003a) did not emphasize shareholders’ role in electing,
approving or ratifying the auditor but rather the role of the audit committee during
the implementation of SOX (Brown 2012).
Another picture emerges, however, if one considers current regulations and related
research. As previously mentioned, the SEC (2009) recently stressed the relevance
of the results of auditor ratification votes by requiring its disclosure on Form 8-K.
The SEC (2009) argues that the “disclosure of the voting results [...] would benefit
investors and the markets.” Consistently, Tanyi and Roland (2017) provide empiri-
cal evidence supporting the SEC’s opinion by finding a negative association between
dissenting auditor ratification votes and market reactions to the 8-K filings. This in-
dicates that shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection as expressed in auditor
ratification votes is very much an important signal to the market. Nevertheless, it is
of major interest whether this information is earnings-related and helps shareholders
to assess earnings quality. This existing research gap should be closed by creating a
25 See ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2010/06/more-shareholder-say-on-auditors/; ac-
cessed on October 1, 2018.
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direct link between auditor ratification votes and shareholders’ perceptions of earn-
ings quality.
The assumption that such a relation between shareholders’ satisfaction with au-
ditor selection and perceived earnings quality could exist, for one thing, is based
on the existing literature. Recent evidence suggests that audit quality-related is-
sues affect shareholders’ decisions regarding auditor ratification. For example, the
non-audit to audit fee ratio has a positive and significant effect on the percentage
of shareholder votes against auditor ratification (Raghunandan 2003). In a simi-
lar vein, Mishra et al. (2005) find that shareholders perceive various categories of
non-audit services differently. Another study notes that such empirical observations
depend on the composition of the audit committee (Raghunandan and Rama 2003).
Sainty et al. (2002) reveal, among other findings, that engagements of less-credible
auditors and going concern opinions affect the proportion of votes opposed to audi-
tor ratification. Partially conflicting with the results of Dao et al. (2008), no effect
is observed for variables relating to the auditor’s industry specialization or audit
tenure. There is also evidence that an adverse Section 404 internal control opin-
ion (Hermanson et al. 2009) and financial restatements (Liu et al. 2009) influence
shareholders’ voting behavior.26
The conjecture mentioned above could be supported by the fact that share-
holder voting on auditor ratification is one of the few or possibly the only op-
portunity for shareholders to express their views concerning the auditor (Marshall
2005; Sainty et al. 2002; Saul 1996). Furthermore, two recent studies point to con-
sequences associated with auditor ratification votes in terms of auditor dismissals
(Barua et al. 2017; Tanyi and Roland 2017). Thus, it appears reasonable that share-
holder activists and the ACAP (2008) demand mandatory shareholder ratification
of auditors.27
Why the voting results could be regarded as an indicator of not only perceived au-
dit quality, but also of perceived earnings quality is explained in more detail below.
The demand for auditing arose from the need for assurance as a result of informa-
tion asymmetries and agency conflicts (Cahan et al. 2009; Healy and Palepu 2001).
26 In contrast, Cunningham (2017) finds no significant association between financial restatements
and the results of auditor ratification votes. Furthermore, Son et al. (2017) cannot observe
higher votes against auditor ratification if the auditor receives an unfavorable PCAOB inspec-
tion report.
27 Consistent with this point, the SEC (2003a) clarified that although the audit committee’s
responsibility is to appoint the auditor (Exchange Act Rule 10A-3), this responsibility does not
conflict with or oppose shareholder ratification of auditors.
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Thus, the objective of external audits is to contribute to mitigating the agency prob-
lem by assuring sufficient earnings quality (Watts and Zimmerman 1983), which im-
plies that audited financial reports should provide decision-useful information. Fur-
ther, the two fundamental requirements of decision-useful information are relevance
and reliability (FASB 1978; FASB 2010).28 Assuming a given level of relevance,
an audit’s purpose is to safeguard an adequate degree of reliability (FASB 1978).
Consistently, the prior literature shows that shareholders’ perceptions of earnings
quality are influenced by perceived audit quality (Francis 2004).
Moreover, earnings quality also depends on pre-audit quality, which is influ-
enced by the innate characteristics and the reporting system of the company
(DeFond and Zhang 2014). Since management is responsible for the preparation
of the financial statements, it is also of central importance in this context. The
manager, therefore, has a decisive influence on both the quality of the unaudited
financial statements and the selection of the auditor (Mayhew 2017). If the auditor
does not try to reduce agency costs in the interests of the shareholders but acts in
favor of the management, earnings quality will be impaired (Sunder 2002). Since the
shareholders have the opportunity in this context to monitor the management by
voting on auditor ratification at the annual general meeting, shareholders’ satisfac-
tion with the selected auditor expressed in this vote should reflect a comprehensive
view of managers’ commitment to mitigating agency costs through high earnings
quality. Accordingly, shareholders will be satisfied with the auditor selection only
if, in their opinion, earnings quality is acceptable.
Thus, the results of auditor ratification votes interpreted as shareholders’
satisfaction with auditor selection should allow inferences regarding shareholders’
assessment of earnings quality. In turn, shareholders’ opinions regarding managers’
auditor selection would constitute earnings-related information whose disclosure
might help shareholders to make informed investment decisions. The alternative
form of Hypothesis 1 is stated as follows:
H1: Shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection—expressed by support-
ing auditor ratification votes—is positively associated with perceived earnings quality.
28 The term “reliability”, which is used throughout this thesis, is not entirely accurate under the
current nomenclature of the FASB (“faithful representation”). For a brief discussion on this
topic, please refer to FASB (2010).
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4.2.2 Results of Auditor Ratification Votes and Information Asymmetries
between Managers and Shareholders
A wide variety of studies focus on measuring the extent to which auditing can
effectively mitigate agency costs due to information asymmetries between man-
agers and shareholders by assuring sufficient earnings quality (Jensen and Meckling
1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1983).29 It is often argued that auditing enhances
the reliability of accounting information—i.e., earnings quality—because it acts as a
monitoring instrument and reduces information asymmetries between management
and shareholders (DeAngelo 1981b). Even if the importance of earnings quality dif-
fers for various groups of shareholders—e.g., major versus minor shareholders—the
common argument should hold for an average firm. However, some recent contri-
butions express general doubts concerning the extent to which accounting reports
provide new information to shareholders (Ball 2013) and whether earnings qual-
ity may have direct effects on a firm’s value (Zimmerman 2013). For instance,
Ball et al. (2012) show that audited financial reports and other disclosed private
information—such as voluntary management earnings forecasts—are complements
rather than substitutes.30
Nevertheless, if there is at least a second- or third-order effect of different levels
of earnings quality on firm values—as posited by Zimmerman (2013)—it is assumed
that the following reasoning holds: higher levels of information asymmetry mean
that the credibility of audited financial statements increases in importance (Kothari
2000). Moreover, this phenomenon can be explained by higher agency costs due
to more complicated monitoring of the manager. Accordingly, on the one hand,
the demand for assurance is higher and, on the other hand, the auditor ratification
vote as a monitoring mechanism gains importance. Therefore, it would make
sense for shareholders to consider the formation of opinions on the management’s
auditor selection more intensively. This could lead to the assumption that the
earnings-relation will be strengthened, which in turn would corroborate the view
that earnings quality is what drives shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection.
29 In addition to agency conflicts, other issues also determine the demand for audits (cf.
Francis et al. 2011).
30 Therefore, it is questionable whether the audited reported earnings fulfill a confirma-
tion function rather than to be a primary information source (Ball and Shivakumar 2008;
Gigler and Hemmer 1998). Contradicting this perspective, Basu et al. (2013) argue that re-
ported earnings represent a crucial source of new information.
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Thus, the second hypothesis in alternative form is as follows:
H2: The association between shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection
and perceived earnings quality is intensified by the level of information asymmetry
between managers and shareholders.
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4.3 Research Design and Sample Selection
4.3.1 Research Design
4.3.1.1 Conceptual Model
Since this study is interested in whether shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor se-
lection could be regarded as earnings-related information, the empirical research
design focuses on the earnings number. Therefore, a returns-earnings methodology
is used to answer the research question. The conceptual model is illustrated by the
predictive validity framework in Figure 4.1 (cf. Kinney and Libby 2002).
This study aims to contribute to answering the question of whether shareholders’
satisfaction with auditor selection is informative regarding shareholders’ perceptions
of earnings quality (link 1). It is essential to mention here that the research question
is not aimed at a causal influence of one concept on the other (Gow et al. 2016). Ac-
cordingly, no assumption is made regarding a direction of influence, which is shown
by the non-existent arrowhead in Figure 4.1 (link 1). Therefore, this chapter pro-
vides an association study that tests the existence of a relation between shareholders’
satisfaction with auditor selection and shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality.
To test this relation (link 5), operational measures for the theoretical concepts are
needed. As previously mentioned, shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection is
measured based on auditor ratification votes (link 2). The ERC is used to measure
perceived earnings quality (link 3). The measurement of the dependent variable
and the independent variable of interest will be discussed further in the following
subsections. In addition, important control variables affecting the independent and
dependent variables (link 4) are described alongside the model specification. Based
on the empirical evidence in link 5, conclusions regarding link 1 can be drawn.
Additionally, this study is interested in whether the relation between sharehold-
ers’ satisfaction with auditor selection and perceived earnings quality (link 1, H1 )
depends on the level of information asymmetry between managers and sharehold-
ers (link 6, H2 ). Thus, it is empirically tested whether the observed association of
link 5 is conditional on the level of information asymmetry between managers and
shareholders (link 8). Therefore, total strategic holdings and the dispersion of an-
alysts’ forecasts are used as empirical proxies for information asymmetries between
managers and shareholders (link 7).
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual Model: Shareholders’ Satisfaction with Auditor Selection
and Perceived Earnings Quality
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Figure 4.2: Timeline of Auditor Ratification Voting Date, Beginning of the Audit Process, Fiscal Year-end Date, and Earnings
Announcement Date
FY Et−1 EADt−1 V Dt ASt FY Et EADt V Dt+1 ASt+1 FY Et+1
Auditor Ratification Vote Market Reaction to Unexpected Earnings
Note:
V Dt
ASt
FY Et
EADt
Auditor ratification voting date for fiscal year t.
Beginning of the audit process for fiscal year t.
Fiscal year-end date of fiscal year t.
Earnings announcement date for fiscal year t.39
This study hypothesizes that the results of auditor ratification votes contain
earnings-related information that serves as an indicator of perceived earnings qual-
ity. However, it is an association study that does not make any assumptions about
the direction of the association between the dependent variable and the variable of
interest. Nevertheless, the timeline in Figure 4.2 illustrates the time sequence of
the measurement of the two variables. The auditor ratification vote takes place at
the voting date (V Dt). The vote occurs before the audit of the financial statement
begins (ASt).31 At a later date (i.e., the earnings announcement date, EADt), the
market reaction to unexpected earnings is observable, as is shareholders’ perception
of earnings quality.
The announcement date of the annual earnings is considered and chosen, as the
annual financial statements but not the quarterly reports are subject to statutory
audit. In addition, the selection of the auditor is forward-looking, and therefore,
examining the earnings announcement date subsequent to the auditor ratification
vote is the logical consequence, especially if one is interested in whether the voting
result is earnings-related information and whether its disclosure could help share-
holders to make informed investment decisions. For this to be the case, shareholders’
satisfaction with auditor selection—measured at the voting date—should be related
to shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality at the earnings announcement date.
4.3.1.2 Measure of Shareholders’ Satisfaction with Auditor Selection
Prior research indicates that the opportunity for shareholders to ratify an auditor
might be important, particularly because such a vote is one of the few—if not the
only—situation in which shareholders can express their assessment of the auditor
and possibly earnings quality (Marshall 2005; Sainty et al. 2002). In addition, a
regulatory change (NYSE Rule 452) in 2010 led more companies to seek shareholder
ratification of auditors because this typically routine matter helps companies to
reach quorums for their annual general meetings. Moreover, the voluntary auditor
ratification votes are considered as a sign of good corporate governance and were
conducted annually by over 90% of the Russel 3000 companies (Cunningham 2017).
In contrast, director elections do not necessarily take place at every annual general
meeting. Finally, the SEC’s requirement to disclose the annual general meetings’
voting results on Form 8-K makes it possible to conduct an investigation and thus
31 This should not be interpreted too literally since contemporary audits are often characterized
by a continuing audit process.
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offers an outstanding opportunity to shed more light on the views of shareholders.
This situation explains the great research interest that has recently been shown in
the Auditor Ratification Research Forum in the American Accounting Association
Journal Accounting Horizons (cf. Mayhew 2017).
Therefore, as previously mentioned, auditor ratification votes at annual general
meetings play a crucial role in this study. The variable VOTEFOR indicates share-
holders’ satisfaction with auditor selection. VOTEFOR equals the shareholder vot-
ing result in percentage terms with respect to the votes for (supporting) the auditor
ratification (Cai et al. 2009; Glezen and Millar 1985). Whether this clear measure of
shareholders’ satisfaction (Sainty et al. 2002) is related to perceived earnings quality
should be considered in this study. Therefore, shareholders’ perceptions of earnings
quality need to be measured.
4.3.1.3 Measure of Perceived Earnings Quality
The purpose of accounting is to provide information to users of financial statements
that is useful for their decision-making process (Dechow et al. 2010; Gaynor et al.
2016). High earnings quality in the sense of decision-usefulness is again funda-
mentally characterized by the relevance and reliability of the financial statement
information (FASB 1978; FASB 2010). Even if the qualitative characteristics of
decision-useful information and, hence, earnings quality are not directly observable,
market reactions to reported earnings make it possible to measure shareholders’ re-
lated perceptions (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lev
1989). On the basis of an event study, an attempt is made to measure how new
information, such as the earnings announcement, is reflected in shareholders’ market
reactions (Collins and Kothari 1989). The ERC then indicates the level of the price-
revision of the market’s previous expectations per unit of unexpected earnings—the
so-called earnings surprise (Kothari 2001). The ERC is thus derived directly from
shareholders’ investment decisions determining the capital allocation and describes
shareholders’ reliance on the reported earnings information.
Consequently, the ERC metric is a well-established measure of perceived earn-
ings quality in accounting and auditing research (Chen et al. 2010; Francis and Ke
2006; Krishnan and Ye 2005; Teoh and Wong 1993). A closer examination of the
studies in the field of auditing shows that perceived earnings quality is conditional
on various combinations of firm characteristics (e.g., board composition, the audit
committee, and internal controls) and auditor characteristics (e.g., Big N auditor,
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specialization, and independence). Therefore, it might be beneficial to have a com-
prehensive indicator—such as the results of auditor ratification votes—regarding
shareholders’ confidence in the reliability of financial statements. The underlying
open question is whether shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection expressed
in the auditor ratification vote captures shareholders’ perceptions of earnings qual-
ity. Although Tanyi and Roland (2017) observe a negative association between votes
against auditor ratification and market reactions, there is no evidence on whether
shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection constitutes earnings-related infor-
mation. Thus, using the ERC research methodology, this study tries to close this
research gap by focusing on the association of the results of auditor ratification votes
and the decision-usefulness of the earnings number.
4.3.1.4 Measure of Information Asymmetries between Managers and
Shareholders
Besides the primary question of whether there is an association between sharehold-
ers’ satisfaction with auditor selection and perceived earnings quality, this study is
interested in the moderating effect of the level of information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders. To examine how information asymmetries between
managers and shareholders influence the relation of VOTEFOR and the ERC, and
therefore, to test H2 , two different proxies are used.
The first variable refers to the firm’s ownership structure and, hence, the possi-
ble existence and complexity of information asymmetries. It might be argued that
ordinary shareholders face higher levels of information asymmetry than do major
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Major shareholders might have access to
non-public information sources (e.g., via appointed board members) and, as a re-
sult, are not as reliant on published audited financial reports (Ajinkya et al. 2005).
Therefore, agency costs depend on monitoring costs, which vary with the level of
ownership dispersion (Watts and Zimmerman 1979). This argument is also empiri-
cally supported by the prior literature, which finds a negative relation between con-
centrated ownership and earnings management (Albersmann and Hohenfels 2017).
The line of reasoning regarding H2 can thus be further specified: higher levels of
dispersed ownership mean that there are higher levels of information asymmetry in
principle, and as a result, that shareholders will demand that published financial
reports have higher levels of reliability. In line with this reasoning, Kothari (2000,
90) states: “Demand, and therefore supply, of quality financial information will be
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high if corporations are best described as owned by widely dispersed, individually
atomistic shareholders.” Accordingly, the results of auditor ratification votes should
become more important.
As an inverse measure of dispersed ownership and related information asymme-
tries, a variable called total strategic holdings (TSH ) is introduced. It is defined as
the percentage of total shares in issue not available to ordinary investors (percentage
of total shares in issue of 5% or more held strategically; Laksmana 2008). In other
words, it equals 1 minus free float. Besides, TSH could also be interpreted as a
measure for the presence of insiders (Leuz 2003).
The second variable (DOAF) refers to the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts—i.e.,
the standard deviation of the analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for the respective
fiscal year scaled by reported earnings for this fiscal year—and approximates infor-
mation asymmetries related to the firm’s disclosure policy and its informativeness
(Lang and Lundholm 1996).32 Higher levels of information asymmetry should lead
to increased disagreement among analysts and, hence, to an increase in the standard
deviation of analysts’ forecasts (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999). To partly
mitigate these information asymmetries, the market should demand higher levels of
credibility for available information (e.g., published financial reports) and, as argued
above, the results of auditor ratification votes thus gain relevance.
In conclusion, the association between shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor se-
lection and perceived earnings quality should be intensified by the level of informa-
tion asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Accordingly, the relation in
H1 is expected to be weaker when this inverse measure of information asymmetries
(TSH ) is higher and to be stronger for higher levels of DOAF.
4.3.1.5 Model Specification and Control Variables
Test of Hypothesis 1: Results of Auditor Ratification Votes: Earnings-
Related Information?
As mentioned above, a short-window event study is employed to measure the
market reaction to earnings surprises. Following prior research (Lev 1989), the price
reaction around a firm’s fiscal year-end earnings announcement is measured by CAR,
which represents the cumulative abnormal stock return over the Standard and Poor’s
32 The results presented later are qualitatively similar if the stock price deflates the standard
deviation of the analysts’ earnings forecasts according to Lang and Lundholm (1996).
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500 Composite return computed for the 3-day window, i.e., -1 trading day to +1
trading day relative to the earnings announcement date.33
To test the hypotheses, the variable SURP is introduced, which is defined as the
earnings surprise for the respective fiscal year. SURP is calculated as the reported
earnings per share for the respective fiscal year minus the mean analysts’ earnings per
share forecast for this fiscal year one week before the earnings announcement date,
scaled by the firm’s stock price 2 trading days before the earnings announcement
date. Furthermore, as mentioned above, VOTEFOR represents the shareholder
voting result in percentage terms with respect to the votes for (supporting) the
auditor ratification. Ultimately, the ERC is determined by the variable SURP, its
interaction with VOTEFOR, its interactions with the control variables described
below, and its interactions with industry and year dummies.
The model to test H1—concerning the question of whether the results of auditor
ratification votes are important market-related information—is specified as follows:
(4.1)
CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2V OTEFORit + β3V OTEFORit × SURPit
+
10∑
j=4
βjCONTROLit +
17∑
j=11
βjCONTROLit × SURPit
+
25∑
j=18
βjINDit +
33∑
j=26
βjINDit × SURPit
+
36∑
j=34
βjY EARit +
39∑
j=37
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit ,
where:
CONTROLit ={SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit,
CONTROLit = {ANALY STit}.
The set of control variables (CONTROL) is introduced to account for additional
firm characteristics (Balsam et al. 2003; Higgs and Skantz 2006; Teoh and Wong
1993). Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity (Atiase 1985).34 The market-to-book value of equity (MB) proxies
33 The calculation is based on the market model estimated over the 180-day window ending 21
trading days before the earnings announcement date. Following Bergh and Gibbons (2011),
a sufficiently long event window must be chosen to capture the market’s price response to
unexpected earnings. However, the window should also remain as short as possible to guard
against confounding events (McWilliams and Siegel 1997).
34 The use of the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for firm size according to Balsam et al.
(2003) does not alter the results presented later.
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for a firm’s growth opportunities (Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002). Following
Higgs and Skantz (2006), an indicator variable (MBNEG) controls for a negative
MB. A negative MB value is replaced with 0 because negative MB ratios are not
economically reasonable. With respect to a firm’s risk, two independent variables
are included in the regression. On the one hand, a firm’s financing structure is
represented by its leverage ratio (LEV ), which is calculated as total debt to total
capital plus short-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt (Baber et al.
2014).35 On the other hand, the beta factor (BETA) captures a firm’s systematic
risk (Collins and Kothari 1989).36 Further, an indicator variable (SURPNEG)—
equal to 1 for negative values of SURP, and 0 otherwise—is introduced because
shareholders capitalize unexpected negative and positive earnings differently (Basu
1997).37 It is also controlled for variations in a firm’s pre-disclosure environment
(Bhushan 1989; Teoh and Wong 1993), and the related variable is calculated as the
natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm (ANALYST ).
Finally, IND is a set of eight industry dummies based on the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) Division Structure as used by the U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety & Health Administration, and YEAR represents three year
dummies. The model is estimated using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
with standard errors clustered by firm. Table 4.1 shows the detailed variable
definitions.
35 The findings presented later remain the same if leverage is measured as total debt to common
equity (Francis and Ke 2006).
36 Including beta factors calculated over five years with monthly data at the fiscal year-end dates
instead of those from the market model regression leads to the same conclusions as made later
in the study.
37 In an untabulated regression, a loss indicator is included instead of SURPNEG as a robustness
check (Chen et al. 2014; Krishnan and Ye 2005).
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Table 4.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent Variable
CAR Cumulative abnormal stock return over the Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite re-
turn computed for the 3-day window, i.e., -1 trading day to +1 trading day relative
to the earnings announcement date. The calculation is based on the market model
estimated over the 180-day window ending 21 trading days before the earnings an-
nouncement date.
Variables of Interest
SURP Reported earnings per share for the respective fiscal year minus the mean analysts’
earnings per share forecast for this fiscal year one week before the earnings announce-
ment date, scaled by the firm’s stock price 2 trading days before the earnings an-
nouncement date.
VOTEFOR Shareholder voting result in percentage terms with respect to the votes for (support-
ing) the auditor ratification.
TSH Percentage of total strategic share holdings of 5% or more.
DOAF Standard deviation of the analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for the respective
fiscal year scaled by reported earnings for this fiscal year.
Control Variables
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
MB Market-to-book value, calculated as market value divided by book value of common
equity for firms with positive market-to-book values, and 0 otherwise.
MBNEG Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a negative market-to-book value, and 0
otherwise.
LEV Leverage, defined as long-term debt plus short-term debt plus the current portion of
long-term debt divided by total capital plus short-term debt plus the current portion
of long-term debt.
BETA Beta factor from the market model regression.
SURPNEG Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a negative earnings surprise (SURP), and
0 otherwise.
ANALYST Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm.
Fixed Effects Variables
IND Set of eight industry dummies based on the SIC Division Structure as used by the
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (https://
www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html; accessed on October 1, 2018).
YEAR Set of three year dummies.
Additional Analyses Variables
INDLEADER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is the national annual audit fee
market share leader in the firm’s industry, and 0 otherwise.
NAFAF Ratio of non-audit to audit fees.
AUDCH Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm changed its auditor, and 0 otherwise.
AUD Set of three auditor dummies.
Note: This table presents the variable definitions.
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Test of Hypothesis 2: Results of Auditor Ratification Votes and Informa-
tion Asymmetries between Managers and Shareholders
In contrast to Equation 4.1, the model to test H2 must include additional two-
and three-way interactions. These are excluded in the regression of H1 because it
is first focused on the marginal effect of VOTEFOR on the ERC. This effect can be
analyzed directly in Equation 4.1 and does not depend on other regressors, i.e., the
three-way interaction term, as is the case in Equation 4.2. Based on the discussion
concerning H2 , the following model is tested:
CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2V OTEFORit + β3V OTEFORit × SURPit
+ β4V OTEFORit × IAit × SURPit + β5IAit + β6V OTEFORit × IAit
+β7IAit × SURPit+
14∑
j=8
βjCONTROLit+
21∑
j=15
βjCONTROLit × SURPit
+
29∑
j=22
βjINDit +
37∑
j=30
βjINDit × SURPit
+
40∑
j=38
βjY EARit +
43∑
j=41
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit ,
(4.2)
where:
CONTROLit ={SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit,
CONTROLit = {ANALY STit}.
IA is a proxy for information asymmetries and the sets of further variables,
CONTROL, IND, and YEAR remain the same as in Equation 4.1. To examine how
information asymmetries (IA) between managers and shareholders influence the
effect of VOTEFOR on the ERC, two proxies introduced above (TSH and DOAF)
are used.
4.3.2 Sample Selection
The data for the sample are taken from four databases: Audit Analytics, Data-
stream, Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and Worldscope. First,
Audit Analytics is used. As the main variables of interest refer to auditor ratifica-
tion by shareholders, 15,703 firm-year observations from SEC registrants for fiscal
years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are initially obtained. In addition, Audit Analytics
provides information on other variables regarding auditors and formal information
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on financial statements (e.g., fiscal year-end date). Because this information is
taken from subdatabases of Audit Analytics, 10,395 firm-years are eventually ob-
tained. Datastream is the source for all financial market-related variables, such as
daily stock prices. Balance sheet and income statement data are collected from
Worldscope. Using both databases, the sample decreases by 472 observations. It is
commonly acknowledged that I/B/E/S typically causes the largest decline in sam-
ple size because its coverage tends to be biased toward larger firms.38 However, this
problem concerns information that is relevant to calculating the earnings surprise—
i.e., earnings per share and analysts’ forecasts—and the calculation of the variable
ANALYST.
The sample consists of 7,158 firm-years after merging all four databases. Subse-
quently, the sample decreases to 7,042 firm-years of 10-K filers. On the one hand,
significant inconsistencies in the dataset (e.g., overlapping dates regarding the vot-
ing date for the fiscal year and the earnings announcement date for the previous
fiscal year) are controlled for. On the other hand, firm-years with time lags greater
than 365 days between the auditor ratification vote and the earnings announcement
are deleted. This should ensure that the data related to auditor ratification remain
relevant with respect to time. In addition, 16 observations concerning penny stocks
are deleted because the literature shows that such stocks are frequently associated
with price anomalies (Ball et al. 1995; Bhardwaj and Brooks 1992). Moreover, the
analysts’ forecasts must be economically meaningful and approximate the market
opinion. Hence, analysts’ earnings forecasts are employed only if at least three
analyst estimates are available (Barron et al. 2002; Imhoff and Lobo 1992).39 Fi-
nally, 8 firm-years are lost because these firms report earnings per share of zero,
and hence, the variable DOAF could not be calculated. The final sample consists
of 6,621 firm-year observations from 2,359 different firms. Table 4.2 outlines the
sample selection procedure in Panel A and the sample composition by industry in
Panel B. Even if it differs slightly from other samples (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar
2008; Krishnan and Ye 2005), no industry is largely overrepresented.
38 There are further problems regarding I/B/E/S or, generally, in using analyst forecast data; see,
for example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) or Zhang (2006).
39 This step in the sample selection process also indirectly addresses possible problems of stale
forecasts. Nevertheless, this procedure might strengthen the sample’s large firm bias that is
already present from using I/B/E/S analyst forecast data. Therefore, as a robustness check, the
regressions of H1 and H2 are re-estimated based on a sample that includes the 397 firm-years
in question.
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Table 4.2: Sample Selection and Sample Composition by Industry
Panel A: Sample Selection
Firm-Years
Initial sample of SEC registrants with shareholder voting results for the ratification of
auditors for the fiscal years 2010, 2011, 2012 or 2013 in Audit Analytics.
15,703
Less: Firm-years with more than one shareholder voting (date) for the auditor ratifi-
cation in a respective fiscal year.
196
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data regarding other used variables from Audit Ana-
lytics.
5,112
10,395
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in Datastream. 466
9,929
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in Worldscope. 6
9,923
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in I/B/E/S. 2,765
7,158
Less: Firm-years with inconsistent data; e.g., a negative time lag between the voting
date and the earnings announcement date or filing date.
111
7,047
Less: Firm-years with a lag greater than 365 days between voting date and earnings
announcement date.
5
7,042
Less: Firm-years referring to penny stocks, i.e., the price 3 trading days before the
earnings announcement date is less than $1.
16
7,026
Less: Firm-years with fewer than three analysts following. 397
6,629
Less: Firm-years with announced earnings per share of zero. 8
Final sample 6,621
Panel B: Sample Composition by Industry
SIC Division Sample (%)
100–999 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0.20
1000–1499 Mining 6.46
1500–1799 Construction 1.80
2000–3999 Manufacturing 36.76
4000–4999 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 10.15
5000–5199 Wholesale Trade 1.95
5200–5999 Retail Trade 4.18
6000–6799 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 21.93
7000–8999 Services 16.57
Total 100
Note: This table presents the sample selection procedure (Panel A) and the sample composition by industry (Panel B).
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4.4 Empirical Analyses
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Certain aspects of the summary statistics warrant highlighting. The variables CAR
and SURP are both close to zero, whether focusing on the mean or the median. On
average, 98.30% of all shareholders vote for (supporting) the auditor’s engagement,
which is comparable to previous research. Although there is evidence that accep-
tance levels decreased at the beginning of the 2000s (Hermanson et al. 2009) and
that the auditor ratification vote gained increasing importance in the aftermath of
Enron (Raghunandan and Rama 2003), the sample does not confirm such trends.
The percentage of total shares in issue not available to ordinary investors varies be-
tween 0.00% and 69.00%, whereby approximately three-quarters of all observations
are characterized by free floats of at least 73.00% (equals a TSH of 27.00%). DOAF
ranges from 0.000 to 1.333. The median observation exhibits an untransformed
market value of equity of $1.517 billion. Apart from DOAF, the highest notice-
able skewness and kurtosis concern the variables MB (median: 1.980) and MBNEG
(median: 0.000), which signifies the possible influence of outliers. Less than 3%
of all the market-to-book ratios are negative, and therefore, MB is replaced with
0. LEV ranges from 0.000 to 1.459, indicating that the pooled sample contains
firms financed solely by equity and indebted firms. The beta’s mean equals 1.210.
Further, approximately 34% of all observations show a negative earnings surprise.
The median observation has approximately 9 analysts following the firm. Table 4.3
presents the summary statistics of the pooled sample.
In addition, Table 4.4 shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.
Except for the correlation between SIZE and ANALYST, an analysis of these values
does not indicate potential collinearity problems. Nevertheless, this simple proce-
dure may be insufficient. Because the two regressions (Equation 4.1 and Equation
4.2) include two- and three-way interactions, collinearity is present by construction.40
However, that is not problematic as long as the collinear variables are significant
and the F-statistic indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis that all coefficient
estimates are jointly zero (Brambor et al. 2006; Eilifsen and Knivsfla 2013).
40 Indeed, the variance inflation factors (VIF) indicate that possible collinearity problems might
be present. However, if all interaction terms and industry dummies in Equation 4.1—and,
therefore, the “constructed collinearity”—are excluded, the highest VIF is 2.43 for the SIZE
variable.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% Min. Max.
CAR 0.001 0.068 -0.033 0.001 0.036 -0.215 0.195
SURP 0.000 0.012 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.067 0.046
VOTEFOR 98.297 2.216 98.020 98.960 99.530 85.740 99.990
TSH 0.195 0.148 0.090 0.170 0.270 0.000 0.690
DOAF 0.080 0.186 0.011 0.023 0.063 0.000 1.333
SIZE 21.226 1.635 20.053 21.140 22.274 17.784 25.539
MB 3.222 4.016 1.250 1.980 3.470 0.000 27.590
MBNEG 0.029 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
LEV 0.349 0.288 0.110 0.332 0.518 0.000 1.459
BETA 1.210 0.424 0.915 1.167 1.482 0.320 2.370
SURPNEG 0.344 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ANALYST 2.371 0.608 1.792 2.303 2.890 1.386 3.638
n 6,621
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. The variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.4: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ( 8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) CAR 1.000
(2) SURP 0.164 1.000
(0.000)
(3) VOTEFOR -0.007 0.023 1.000
(0.578) (0.062)
(4) TSH -0.007 -0.009 0.141 1.000
(0.546) (0.487) (0.000)
(5) DOAF -0.019 -0.094 -0.007 0.026 1.000
(0.121) (0.000) (0.576) (0.036)
(6) SIZE 0.012 0.055 0.018 -0.248 -0.186 1.000
(0.337) (0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000)
(7) MB 0.006 -0.009 0.006 0.046 0.002 0.083 1.000
(0.615) (0.470) (0.635) (0.000) (0.884) (0.000)
(8) MBNEG -0.009 -0.008 0.020 0.005 0.016 -0.042 -0.139 1.000
(0.484) (0.526) (0.104) (0.683) (0.182) (0.001) (0.000)
(9) LEV 0.007 -0.046 0.009 -0.061 0.040 0.153 0.021 0.473 1.000
(0.571) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000)
(10) BETA -0.006 -0.014 -0.024 0.059 0.109 -0.138 0.008 0.027 -0.004 1.000
(0.617) (0.240) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.496) (0.026) (0.765)
(11) SURPNEG -0.242 -0.494 -0.016 0.010 0.127 -0.100 -0.015 0.024 0.063 0.044 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.186) (0.395) (0.000) (0.000) (0.211) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000)
(12) ANALYST 0.012 0.036 -0.004 -0.241 -0.117 0.746 0.075 -0.018 0.098 -0.024 -0.080 1.000
(0.333) (0.004) (0.719) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000)
Note: This table shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the pooled data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. The numbers in parentheses indicate two-tailed p-values. The variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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4.4.2 Multivariate Analyses
4.4.2.1 Results of Auditor Ratification Votes: Earnings-Related Information?
In essence, the question of interest in H1 is technically whether VOTEFOR is
related to the ERC. The ERC is given as the first derivative of Equation 4.1 with
respect to SURP.
ERC =
∂CAR
∂SURP
= β1+β3V OTEFORit+
17∑
j=11
βjCONTROLit+
33∑
j=26
βjINDit+
39∑
j=37
βjY EARit
(4.3)
Finally, the association between VOTEFOR and the ERC is mathematically
determined by the derivation of the ERC with respect to VOTEFOR.
(4.4)
∂ERC
∂V OTEFOR
= β3
The empirical outcome of β3 shown in Table 4.5 is positive (coefficient of 0.0583) and
significant (one-tailed p-value of 0.017). Thus, VOTEFOR is associated with the
ERC. Moreover, the economic relevance is also of interest. Therefore, the relative
change of the ERC for an average firm is computed for two cases: (1) a 1 percentage
point increase in VOTEFOR from its mean (from 98.30 to 99.30) and (2) an increase
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of VOTEFOR (from 98.02 to 99.53). In the first
case, the ERC changes from 0.7401 to 0.7984, an increase of approximately 7.88%.
In the latter case, the ERC increases by approximately 12.16%.
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression—Results of Auditor Ratification Votes: Earnings-Related Information?
Dependent Variable = CAR
Variable Coefficient Robust Std.
Err.
p-value
SURP -3.7006 3.2611 0.257
VOTEFOR -0.0001 0.0004 0.735
VOTEFOR×SURP 0.0583 0.0276 0.035
SIZE -0.0004 0.0008 0.591
MB -0.0001 0.0003 0.705
MBNEG -0.0138 0.0064 0.032
LEV 0.0110 0.0038 0.004
BETA -0.0013 0.0022 0.559
SURPNEG -0.0294 0.0020 0.000
ANALYST 0.0000 0.0022 0.998
SIZE×SURP 0.0097 0.0836 0.907
MB×SURP 0.0164 0.0229 0.474
MBNEG×SURP 0.4688 0.4088 0.252
LEV×SURP -1.2222 0.3276 0.000
BETA×SURP 0.1493 0.1795 0.406
SURPNEG×SURP -0.4517 0.2270 0.047
ANALYST×SURP 0.2803 0.2467 0.256
Intercept 0.0377 0.0453 0.406
Industry Effects: Yes
Year Effects: Yes
Clustered by: Firm
n 6,621
Adjusted R2 0.073
Prob > F 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regression based on the pooled data. The regression
model includes industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm. The regression model
also includes a set of interactions between SURP and the industry and year dummies that are omitted from
the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are
two-tailed. The following regression model is tested to provide evidence regarding H1 : CARit = α0 + β1SURPit +
β2V OTEFORit + β3V OTEFORit × SURPit +
∑
10
j=4
βjCONTROLit +
∑
17
j=11
βjCONTROLit × SURPit +∑
25
j=18
βjINDit +
∑
33
j=26
βjINDit × SURPit +
∑
36
j=34
βjY EARit +
∑
39
j=37
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit,
where: CONTROLit = {SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit, ANALY STit}. IND is a set
of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents three year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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At first glance, these figures may seem too high and may be put into perspective
when looking at the cumulative abnormal stock return. Thus, for the first case,
the CAR for an average firm with a positive earnings surprise in the amount of the
mean absolute SURP increases by approximately 1% and the stock price increases
by approximately 1 cent, which is quite respectable if one considers the small changes
in the results of auditor ratification votes (cf. Collins and Kothari 1989).41
This result shows that there is an association between VOTEFOR and the ERC.
In other words, an increased market response to earnings surprises occurs because
shareholders rely more heavily on reported information when votes for (support-
ing) auditor ratifications are higher. Accordingly, there appears to be evidence that
shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection allows inferences regarding share-
holders’ assessment of earnings quality. This finding implies that the results of audi-
tor ratification votes contain important earnings-related information, and therefore,
complements the study of Tanyi and Roland (2017).
4.4.2.2 Results of Auditor Ratification Votes and Information Asymmetries
between Managers and Shareholders
The same procedure—i.e., derivatives of Equation 4.2 with respect to SURP,
VOTEFOR, and finally, the proxy for IA—is also used to analyze H2 : Do dif-
ferent levels of information asymmetry influence the association in H1?42 For the
purpose of investigating the effect of TSH on H1, β4 of the regression in Table 4.6,
column (1) is examined (coefficient of -0.3370). The non-existence of the hypoth-
esized association can be rejected at a 1% significance level (one-tailed p-value of
0.009). In light of higher levels of information asymmetry, this finding provides evi-
dence that the results of auditor ratification votes are of particular interest for firms
characterized by higher levels of dispersed ownership.
41 This is based on a mean stock price 2 trading days before the earnings announcement date that
is used to scale SURP of $32.61, a mean absolute CAR of 4.89%, and a mean absolute SURP
of 0.006, resulting in the following calculation: 0.0583×0.0060.0489 ≈ 1% or 0.0583× 0.006× 32.61 ≈ 1
cent, respectively.
42 To capture the relation of VOTEFOR and the ERC (H1 ), the derivation of Equation 4.2 must
be considered: (∂CAR/∂SURP )∂V OT EF OR = β3 +β4IA. Here, the association between VOTEFOR and the
ERC depends, in addition, on the proxy for IA. The two coefficients (β3, β4) for each proxy
are jointly different from zero (Prob > F of 0.041 in the TSH model and 0.006 in the DOAF
model), and the calculation of the marginal effect of VOTEFOR on the ERC for an average
firm results in values of 0.0355 in the TSH regression and 0.0356 in the DOAF regression.
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Table 4.6: OLS Regressions—Results of Auditor Ratification Votes and Information Asymmetries between Managers and Shareholders
Dependent Variable = CAR
Information Asymmetry Proxy: Information Asymmetry Proxy:
TSH (1) DOAF (2)
Variable Coefficient Robust Std.
Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust Std.
Err.
p-value
SURP -7.8636 4.2904 0.067 -0.1133 3.5863 0.975
VOTEFOR 0.0000 0.0006 0.967 0.0001 0.0004 0.831
VOTEFOR×SURP 0.1011 0.0394 0.010 0.0189 0.0322 0.558
VOTEFOR×IA×SURP -0.3370 0.1433 0.019 0.2085 0.0950 0.028
IA 0.1265 0.3056 0.679 0.1774 0.1539 0.249
VOTEFOR×IA -0.0013 0.0031 0.674 -0.0018 0.0016 0.256
IA×SURP 34.6248 13.9619 0.013 -20.5963 9.2707 0.026
Control Variables: Yes Yes
Intercept: Yes Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm
n 6,621 6,621
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.074
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors
are clustered by firm. The regression models also include a set of interactions between SURP and the control variables, industry, and year dummies that are omitted from the table.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are tested to provide evidence regarding
H2 : CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2V OTEFORit + β3V OTEFORit × SURPit + β4V OTEFORit × IAit × SURPit + β5IAit + β6V OTEFORit × IAit + β7IAit × SURPit +∑
14
j=8
βjCONTROLit +
∑
21
j=15
βjCONTROLit × SURPit +
∑
29
j=22
βjINDit +
∑
37
j=30
βjINDit × SURPit +
∑
40
j=38
βjY EARit +
∑
43
j=41
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit, where
CONTROLit = {SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit, ANALY STit}. IA represents two different proxies for information asymmetries between managers and
shareholders: column (1) TSH and column (2) DOAF. IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents three year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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In addition to the influence of the ownership structure, DOAF—a measure of
information asymmetries due to variances in the informativeness of firms’ disclosure
policies—is examined. Analyzing the data in Table 4.6, column (2) shows that
the coefficient of VOTEFOR×DOAF×SURP is positive (0.2085) and significantly
different from zero (one-tailed p-value of 0.014). This result also indicates that
higher levels of information asymmetry—represented by larger standard deviations
of analysts’ forecasts—are accompanied by a greater importance of the results of
auditor ratification votes.
In summary, the results of auditor ratification votes are associated with the
decision-usefulness of reported earnings. Thus, shareholders’ satisfaction with au-
ditor selection could be regarded as earnings-related information, and its disclosure
seems to represent a signal to the market. Moreover, the observed association ap-
pears to be positively influenced by higher levels of information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders; in other words, the results of auditor ratification votes
as a signal of shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality might be of particular
interest for firms characterized by higher levels of dispersed ownership and disagree-
ment among analysts. Since high earnings quality is crucial to mitigating agency
costs by reducing information asymmetries, the fact that these information asymme-
tries have a moderating effect on the association observed in H1 might corroborate
the view that earnings quality is what matters to shareholders and is captured by
their satisfaction with auditor selection expressed in auditor ratification votes.
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4.5 Additional Analyses
4.5.1 Measurement of Shareholders’ Satisfaction with Auditor Selection
This section presents additional analyses to check the robustness of the findings
and to obtain confidence in the stated conclusions. For the sake of brevity, the
results are not tabulated in this section, with a few exceptions. To ensure that the
findings of this study are not driven by the specific measurement of shareholders’
satisfaction with auditor selection, the regressions are re-estimated using different
specifications of the experimental variable. First, the percentage of votes against
auditor ratification is used to proxy shareholders’ (dis)satisfaction with auditor se-
lection (Raghunandan 2003). Second, the variable of interest is defined as per-
centage of votes against or abstaining from auditor ratification (Mishra et al. 2005;
Raghunandan 2003; Raghunandan and Rama 2003; Sainty et al. 2002). Third, a
logarithm transformation of VOTEFOR is implemented to address the high skew-
ness of the voting outcome (Dao et al. 2008; Hermanson et al. 2009). In all three
cases, the stated conclusions remain the same.
Additionally, two further specifications of the measure of shareholders’ satisfaction
with auditor selection are tested. On the one hand, a variable indicating whether the
percentage of votes supporting auditor ratification is above the mean observation is
generated and included in the model instead of VOTEFOR. The results remain un-
changed except for the three-way interaction of VOTEFOR×DOAF×SURP which
is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, VOTEFOR is replaced by
a variable that divides the results of auditor ratification votes into different groups
(less than 90, and more than 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99% of votes sup-
porting auditor ratification). The findings of the main analyses are not altered.
4.5.2 Measurement of Perceived Earnings Quality
To check the robustness of the ERC model, all regressions are re-estimated by using
alternative calculations of CAR. Qualitatively similar results are found when CAR
is summed over other event windows, i.e., -2 to +2 and -3 to +3 trading days relative
to the earnings announcement date. However, for the -3 to +3 window, the three-
way interaction of VOTEFOR×DOAF×SURP is merely at the edge of significance
(one-tailed p-value of 0.105). Further, the empirical evidence is insensitive to the
selected market return index (Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite versus the Dow
Jones Industrial Average). The same applies when the respective variables refer to
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median analysts’ earnings forecasts rather than mean analysts’ earnings forecasts.
To prevent outlier problems, first, SURP is truncated at the 1% and 99% levels, and
second, a robust regression (weighting down estimates with large absolute residuals)
is estimated. Finally, it is controlled for a non-linear relation between SURP and
CAR, and following prior research (Subramanyam 1996; Wilson 2008), an interac-
tion between SURP and the absolute value of SURP is included in the regressions.
Furthermore, a loss indicator and its interaction with SURP are added to the model
(Chen et al. 2014). In all cases, the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
4.5.3 Alternative Model Specifications
In addition to the alternative measurement of the variable of interest and the de-
pendent variable, further changes are to be made to the model to gain an impression
of the sensitivity of these study’s findings.
First of all, TSH and DOAF are included in Equation 4.1 as control variables
since they are introduced in Equation 4.2; the results regarding H1 are qualitatively
unchanged. To control for outliers, all continuous variables in the main analyses
are winsorized. If non-winsorized data are used or if only the dependent variable
is winsorized (Dyckman and Zeff 2014), significant results for the regression of H2
using the proxy TSH are observable. However, the regression results are robust if
all independent variables are winsorized but not the dependent variable. Besides,
yearly winsorization of the continuous variables and winsorization at the 2.5th and
97.5th percentiles do not alter the results.
Furthermore, the industry fixed effects are based on the SIC Division Structure
as used by the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Adminis-
tration. The set of industry dummies in the main model is replaced by a set of SIC
dummies introduced by Frankel et al. (2002), two-digit SIC dummies, one-digit SIC
dummies, and an indicator variable equal to 1 for industries characterized by a high
exposure to litigation risk, and 0 otherwise (Rogers and Stocken 2005; Shu 2000).
In the first two cases, the results are nearly the same except for the three-way in-
teraction of VOTEFOR×TSH×SURP regarding H2—its one-tailed p-values equal
around 0.15. In the other cases, and if omitting industry fixed effects, all results are
qualitatively similar.
Besides, year-quarter fixed instead of year fixed effects are included to take the
seasonality in stock returns into consideration (Rozeff and Kinney 1976). In addi-
tion, it is controlled for potential time-invariant endogeneity (Chenhall and Moers
59
2007; Roberts and Whited 2013), and—except for DOAF—including firm fixed ef-
fects does not alter the stated conclusions. In the presented tables, standard errors
are clustered by firm which accounts for the correlation of standard errors within
the firm. If one also assumes correlation across firms, two-way clustering by firm
and time would be more appropriate (Gow et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the findings
are unchanged if standard errors are two-way clustered. Finally, the results remain
robust using the bootstrapping method for resampling to receive bootstrap standard
errors.43
4.5.4 Cases of Very High Voting Dissent on Auditor Ratification
It might be the case that the results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 are driven by observa-
tions with very high dissenting votes on auditor ratification. To determine whether
this is the case, the quartile of the sample’s lowest auditor ratification voting re-
sults is dropped. The results are qualitatively unchanged except for the three-way
interaction of DOAF, and it can be concluded that the results are robust to account-
ing for very high voting dissent on auditor ratification. Thus, even if shareholders’
dissatisfaction with auditor selection is moderate, it seems that differences in the
voting results still provide information regarding shareholders’ perceptions of earn-
ings quality.
4.5.5 Incremental Information of the Results of Auditor Ratification Votes
Beyond Other Audit-Related Information
It might be argued that the results of auditor ratification votes are “timely stale
information” and that other information regarding the company’s auditor is already
publicly available. Thus, even if one follows the reasoning presented above, it re-
mains questionable whether the results of auditor ratification votes capture only
other audit-related information or if it provides incremental information beyond
that contained in other audit-related information disclosures (Biddle et al. 1995;
43 Bootstrapping is the most common resampling method. This approach would also provide
correct standard errors for data that are not normally distributed (Deis and Hill 1998; Marais
1984). A number of 1,000 bootstrap replications is chosen and should provide reliable standard
errors (Wooldridge 2016).
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Hoskin et al. 1986). Therefore, the regression models include three additional vari-
ables, which represent publicly available information on audit-related issues.44
First, it is controlled for the effect of auditor industry specialization—measured
by an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is the national annual audit
fee market share leader in the firm’s industry, and 0 otherwise (INDLEADER)—
because there is evidence that the reliability of audited, reported earnings is per-
ceived to be higher if the auditor is an industry specialist (Balsam et al. 2003).45
Second, research has also shown that the ratio of non-audit to audit fees (NAFAF) is
associated with shareholders’ perceptions of audit quality and, eventually, earnings
quality (Eilifsen and Knivsfla 2013; Francis and Ke 2006; Higgs and Skantz 2006;
Krishnan and Ye 2005; Lim and Tan 2008). Third, if the firm changes its auditor—
measured by an indicator variable called AUDCH that is equal to 1 if the firm
changed the auditor, and 0 otherwise—shareholders’ perceptions of audited, re-
ported earnings could also change because the audit market is differentiated and
different audit firms supply different audit quality (Wei et al. 2015).
The regression result in Table 4.7, column (1) still supports H1 . Even if it is
controlled for further audit-related variables, VOTEFOR is associated with the ERC
(coefficient of 0.0574, one-tailed p-value of 0.020), which implies that the disclosure
of the results of auditor ratification votes provides incremental information beyond
that included in other publicly available audit-related information.
Examining the variables INDLEADER, NAFAF , and AUDCH shows an
interesting picture. The interactions with SURP and, hence, their effects on the
ERC are not significantly different from zero, which is not in conformity with the
coefficients’ predictions. Nevertheless, the finding for INDLEADER is in line with
prior research (Francis et al. 1999; Wallman 1996) arguing that audit research at the
office-level is more appropriate in this context, and Krishnan et al. (2013) demon-
strate that shareholders’ positive perceptions of auditor industry expertise exist
primarily for city-only or joint city-national industry leaders. Another explana-
tion might be that identifying auditor industry specialization could be costly for an
44 In this and the following subsection, the results of modified regressions of H1 are presented and
discussed. However, also the regressions to test H2 are re-estimated with the variables intro-
duced in both subsections. All stated conclusions are qualitatively unchanged and, therefore,
not tabulated.
45 Of all firm observations, 86.81% are audited by a Big 4 auditor, and every identified market
share leader in an industry belongs to one of the Big 4. Hence, an indicator variable referring
to Big 4 auditors is not included in the regression. However, a regression with a Big 4 indicator
instead of INDLEADER is performed; the Big 4 indicator is not significantly different from
zero. Besides, the following subsection takes a separate look at a subsample of Big 4 clients.
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average shareholder (Wei et al. 2015), and thus, it is not related to reported earn-
ings’ decision-usefulness.46 Furthermore, NAFAF could also be of limited usefulness
for an average shareholder, who is unaware of regulatory details concerning fee dis-
closure. Dickins and Higgs (2005) note that due to inconsistent and insufficient
disclosures among firms, the information is useful only if a shareholder has a deeper
understanding of the fee composition, which could at least be questionable for the
average shareholder. This might also partly explain the non-significant results of
Ghosh et al. (2009).47
To conclude, even if it is controlled for further audit-related variables, VOTEFOR
is associated with the ERC, which implies that shareholders’ satisfaction with au-
ditor selection is incrementally informative regarding perceived earnings quality be-
yond other publicly available audit-related information. Hence, there is empirical
support that VOTEFOR captures shareholders’ perceptions of further firm and au-
ditor characteristics that influence their assessment of earnings quality in addition
to those proxied by INDLEADER, NAFAF , and AUDCH .
46 The recent study of Audousset-Coulier et al. (2016) casts doubt on the validity of auditor
industry specialization measures, which includes this study’s measure.
47 The empirical evidence might also be explained by potential issues of “constructed collinearity”
due to the relatively large number of interactions in the ERC regression. As this statistical
problem cannot be completely ruled out, the empirical findings (i.e., the non-significance of
other audit-related variables) should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 4.7: OLS Regressions—Audit-Related Variables and Big 4 Sample
Dependent Variable = CAR
Audit-Related Variables (1) Big 4 Sample (2)
Variable Coefficient Robust Std.
Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust Std.
Err.
p-value
SURP -3.6487 3.2499 0.262 -2.7950 3.5547 0.432
VOTEFOR -0.0001 0.0004 0.767 -0.0003 0.0004 0.487
VOTEFOR×SURP 0.0574 0.2794 0.040 0.0629 0.0342 0.066
INDLEADER -0.0011 0.0020 0.575
INDLEADER×SURP 0.1561 0.2256 0.489
NAFAF 0.0002 0.0031 0.946
NAFAF×SURP -0.0196 0.3579 0.956
AUDCH -0.0068 0.0083 0.414
AUDCH×SURP 0.1133 0.7141 0.874
Control Variables: Yes Yes
Intercept: Yes Yes
Auditor Effects: No Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm
n 6,621 5,748
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.072
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed effects, and
standard errors are clustered by firm. The regression models also include a set of interactions between SURP and the control variables, industry, and year dummies
that are omitted from the table. In addition, the regression model in column (2) includes auditor fixed effects and the corresponding interaction terms with SURP. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are tested to provide ev-
idence regarding H1 : column (1) CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2V OTEFORit + β3V OTEFORit × SURPit + β4INDLEADERit + β5INDLEADERit × SURPit +
β6NAFAFit + β7NAFAFit × SURPit + β8AUDCHit + β9AUDCHit × SURPit +
∑
16
j=10
βjCONTROLit +
∑
23
j=17
βjCONTROLit × SURPit +
∑
31
j=24
βjINDit +∑
39
j=32
βjINDit × SURPit +
∑
42
j=40
βjY EARit +
∑
45
j=43
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit and column (2) CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2V OTEFORit + β3V OTEFORit × SURPit +∑
10
j=4
βjCONTROLit+
∑
17
j=11
βjCONTROLit × SURPit+
∑
20
j=18
βjAUDit +
∑
23
j=21
βjAUDit × SURPit+
∑
31
j=24
βjINDit+
∑
39
j=32
βjINDit × SURPit+
∑
42
j=40
βjY EARit+∑
45
j=43
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit, where: CONTROLit = {SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit, ANALY STit}. AUD is a set of three auditor dummies, IND is
a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents three year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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4.5.6 Analysis of Auditor Ratification Votes of Big 4 Auditors
The audit literature has shown that Big 4 auditors differ from non-Big 4 auditors
(DeFond et al. 2017). In particular, Big 4 auditors have incentives to provide higher
audit quality which is based on the litigation and reputation rational (DeAngelo
1981b; Dye 1993). In the context of this study, one might argue that shareholders
are always—and possibly only—satisfied if the management hires a Big 4 audit firm.
In line with this notion, Sainty et al. (2002) provide evidence that Big 4 auditors
receive a higher percentage of votes supporting auditor ratification.
Therefore, it would be interesting to know whether the findings above are also valid
for a sample of exclusively Big 4 clients. Consequently, 873 firm-years of non-Big 4
clients are deleted to avoid brand name effects (Craswell et al. 1995) and possible
auditor self-selection biases (Khurana and Raman 2006). Moreover, auditor fixed
effects and the corresponding interaction terms with SURP are included to rule out
that clients of a single audit firm drive the results.
Despite the sample decrease and loss of statistical power Table 4.7, column (2)
shows a positive and significant association of VOTEFOR×SURP and CAR (coeffi-
cient of 0.0629, one-tailed p-value of 0.033). Thus, the study’s results are not driven
solely by the choice of “high quality” Big 4 auditors since the association between
shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection and perceived earnings quality is
also observable within the sample Big 4 clients. This finding represents triangu-
lating evidence for the assertion that the results of auditor ratification votes can
be regarded as earnings-related information that might help shareholders to make
informed investment decisions.
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4.6 Summary and Limitations
At present, shareholder ratification of auditors in the U.S. is frequently a routine,
non-binding matter, which may seem surprising because it is one of the very few
ways for shareholders to express their views about a company’s auditor and, there-
fore, their satisfaction with auditor selection (Marshall 2005; Sainty et al. 2002). In
particular, it should be questioned whether shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor
selection allows inferences regarding shareholders’ assessment of earnings quality.
Nevertheless, the SEC (2009) emphasized the importance of the results of auditor
ratification by amending the disclosure requirements concerning this shareholder
voting result. If one of the SEC’s main objectives is to ensure the provision and
disclosure of important information to shareholders (SEC 2000a; SEC 2000b; SEC
2003b), this would imply that the results of auditor ratification votes constitute
important earnings-related information. However, little is known about sharehold-
ers’ interests in and perceptions of the auditor ratification process (Wei et al. 2015).
Especially, it remains unclear whether the results of auditor ratification votes are in-
formative about shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality and, hence, represent
an earnings-related signal to the market.
The empirical evidence presented in this study demonstrates that the results of
auditor ratification votes are associated with the decision-usefulness of reported
earnings. This finding implies that shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selec-
tion might capture shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. In addition, there
are indications that the association between shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor
selection and perceived earnings quality is intensified by the level of information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Further analyses show that even if
additional audit-related variables are controlled for, the results of auditor ratification
votes are still related to the ERC. The evidence hints to the fact that the results
of auditor ratification votes provide incremental information regarding perceived
earnings quality beyond that contained in other audit-related information.
To summarize, the findings suggest that it seems reasonable to disclose the results
of auditor ratification votes, as this study provides empirical evidence that these
results are important earnings-related information. Thus, this study corroborates
the suggestion of Mayhew (2017, 127) that “there is meaning to auditor ratification
votes." Finally, the idea that such shareholder votes are “more than a symbolic act”
(Saul 1996, 135) is supported.
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Whether it is economically meaningful to regulate this matter—i.e., the imple-
mentation of auditor ratification as a mandatory and/or binding agenda item at
shareholder meetings (Hermanson et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2009)—is beyond the scope
of this study, and further research is required to answer this question. Additionally,
the vast majority of listed firms—94% of Standard and Poor’s 500 in 2006 (ACAP
2008) and more than 90% of the Russel 3000 between 2009 and 2012 (Cunningham
2017)—seek shareholder ratification of auditors; however, the results are constrained
to these firms. As demonstrated in prior research, these firms may differ from those
that do not seek such votes (Dao et al. 2012; Krishnan et al. 2005; Mayhew and Pike
2004). Future research could address whether shareholders’ perceptions of earnings
quality differ for firms with shareholder ratification relative to those firms that do
not implement any shareholder ratification of auditors and how possible differences
could be explained.
Although the results are largely robust, further limitations are worth mention-
ing. The ERC framework is used to examining shareholders’ perceptions.48 Even
if the adjusted R2 values are relatively high compared with those of prior research
(Francis and Ke 2006; Higgs and Skantz 2006; Krishnan and Ye 2005; Lev 1989),
returns-earnings regressions are apparently associated with an omitted variable prob-
lem (Balsam et al. 2003; Dechow et al. 2010). Besides, the confidence in the result
of an event study depends, on the one hand, on the information efficiency of the cap-
ital market and, on the other hand, on whether the events are spread across the year
and whether there are no confounding events (Kothari 2001). The former is covered
by the assumption of at least semi-strong information efficiency for the U.S. market
(Fama 1998). The latter seems to be plausible at least against the background that
the earnings announcement dates of the different companies are dispersed over a
considerable period of time. The analysis of quarterly reports could be more prob-
lematic in this respect. Moreover, this could further exacerbate the aforementioned
big sample bias and lead to problems in the identification strategy. Eventually,
auditor ratification refers to the auditor of the annual financial statement, and ulti-
mately, only the annual financial statement is subject to a statutory audit. For this
reason, the quarterly reports are not examined, despite their possible advantage of
being more timely.
48 Therefore, this study focuses on equity investors. An approach to examine the perceptions of
debt investors might be to measure it via the cost of debt (Mansi et al. 2004). However, the
use of this methodology may be debatable (DeFond and Zhang 2014).
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Furthermore, there might be situations in which shareholders do not provide the
required instructions to their brokers regarding how to vote on this matter, i.e., the
cases of broker non-votes. However, such cases of reported broker non-votes concern-
ing shareholder auditor ratification are rare.49 These cases might be significant for
shareholder voting-related research questions, which makes this topic an interesting
one to examine in future studies.
Finally, this study primarily establishes an association between shareholders’ sat-
isfaction with auditor selection and perceived earnings quality, and the underlying
mechanism is not in the foreground. Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of this
study to make any statements regarding a causal relation. However, there is evi-
dence that the results of auditor ratification votes provide an indicator of sharehold-
ers’ perceptions of earnings quality. Even if the votes are informative beyond other
auditor-related information, it might be questionable whether they are also infor-
mative beyond further corporate governance factors or other voting results. Even if
this question is not directly examined due to a lack of data,50 the robust results of
the firm fixed effects model support this notion if one assumes that the firms’ cor-
porate governance factors are time-invariant.51 Moreover, including results of other
votes at the annual general meeting could lead to serious problems of collinearity
and endogeneity. Ultimately, even if no causal link can be established, the results of
this study indicate that shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor selection is related
to earnings quality and appears to matter.
49 In the sample, 161 out of 6,621 firm-years report a value for broker non-votes.
50 However, firm size, which should be related to corporate governance, is included in the model.
51 The results could also partially invalidate the previously mentioned omitted variable problem.
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5 Economic Importance of the Client: Do
Shareholders Care about Earnings Quality?52
“The objective of the ordinary audit of financial statements by the in-
dependent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with
which they present, in all material respects, financial position, results
of operations, and its cash flows in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles.”
The findings of the previous chapter support the notion that the results of auditor
ratification votes are informative about shareholders’ perceptions of earnings qual-
ity and, hence, represent important earnings-related information. This also might
imply, that shareholders deal with earnings quality and consider their vote on the
ratification of the selected auditor thoroughly. As can be seen from the above quo-
tation from the Auditing Standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), the auditor plays an important role in ensuring high earnings
quality (PCAOB 2017, AS.1001). In particular, the auditor serves as a monitoring
instrument providing assurance about the faithfulness of the financial statements.
However, this assurance function to alleviate the agency problem can only be fulfilled
successfully by an independent auditor. The importance of the auditor’s indepen-
dence is also illustrated by the direct reference in the first sentence of the General
Auditing Standards on the “General Principles and Responsibilities” cited above.
The meaning of independence is reinforced by the second auditing standard, which
explicitly deals with the topic of independence and contains the following quote
(PCAOB 2017, AS.1005):
52 This chapter is based on a working paper titled “Economic Importance of the Client: When
Do Shareholders Care about Auditor Independence?”, which is co-authored by Jacob Justus
Leidner. It was presented at the 26th Audit & Assurance Conference of the British Accounting
& Finance Association in Oxford, the 39th European Accounting Association Annual Congress
in Maastricht, the 78. Wissenschaftliche Jahrestagung des Verbandes der Hochschullehrer für
Betriebswirtschaft in Munich, the 2016 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in
New York, the 2017 American Accounting Association Auditing Section Midyear Meeting in Or-
lando, and the 9th European Auditing Research Network Symposium in Leuven. The reasoning,
results, and interpretations of this study might change after the submission and publication of
this doctoral thesis. The recent version of the paper is available upon request.
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“In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental
attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.”
However, the standard not only deals with independence in fact but also, and
maybe more importantly, independence in appearance. Eventually, shareholders in
particular are interested in an independent auditor, who—according to the PCAOB
(2017, AS.1005)—is “free from any obligation to or interest in the client.” By impli-
cation, a threat to auditor independence should cause concern among shareholders.
The confidence of shareholders and thus perceived auditor independence were sus-
tainably damaged by the accounting scandals surrounding Enron and WorldCom at
the beginning of the millennium (Fearnley et al. 2005; Krishnamurthy et al. 2006;
Largay 2002). In response, SOX was adopted in 2002 with the aim of regaining the
trust of shareholders by strengthening corporate governance. At the same time, an
attempt was made to ensure the auditor’s independence by, among other things,
restricting non-audit services (DeFond and Francis 2005).
In her seminal paper, DeAngelo (1981a) shows that auditor independence could
be threatened due to the economic bond between the auditor and the client. This
threat to independence could prevent the auditor from reporting a mistake despite
the ability to detect it. The consequence would be an insufficient audit quality and
a failure of the assurance function of auditing. In turn, this would lead to lower
earnings quality and thus higher agency costs, which should be negatively acknowl-
edged by shareholders. On the other hand, according to DeAngelo (1981b), there
are incentives based on the reputation rational for auditors to maintain their in-
dependence. Thus, the remaining clients—or more precisely, the expected future
quasi-rents of these clients—of an auditor serve as collateral (DeAngelo 1981b).53 A
substantial implication resulting from this finding is that larger auditors—assuming
constant client-specific quasi-rents—are, per se, more independent than smaller au-
ditors: for large auditors, the potential costs of losing one client as a consequence of
maintaining independence are less significant than the expected costs from losing (a
portion of) the collateral that serves as a bond against opportunistic behavior. Ac-
cordingly, the greater the auditor’s size, the smaller the probability that the auditor
will give up independence.
However, this consideration focuses exclusively on the auditor. What about the
independence of an auditor—regardless of auditor size—from an economically im-
53 However, regardless of whether the quasi-rents of all clients are identical, the average proportion
of the total quasi-rents of one client is smaller for larger auditors.
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portant client who represents a significant portion of the auditor’s future quasi-
rents? In addition, one could break down this question to the audit office-level,
since contracts with clients and decisions are considered to be made at the office-
level (Reynolds and Francis 2000; Wallman 1996). The economic dependence hy-
pothesis assumes that auditor independence is threatened for clients accounting for
a larger share of an auditor’s or an audit office’s future quasi-rents (DeAngelo 1981b;
Reynolds and Francis 2000). However, this does not take into account the increased
probability of losing other clients if a scandal concerning an economically impor-
tant client becomes public (Lys and Watts 1994; Stice 1991). Accordingly, this is
an interesting research topic that has become even more relevant in the context of
SOX.54
Beyond auditor independence in fact, which—despite partly mixed evidence—
does not seem to be endangered by the economic importance of the client, share-
holders’ perceptions regarding this issue should be of particular importance. After
all, shareholders make investment decisions in the capital market and are responsi-
ble for efficient capital allocation. Logically, the PCAOB (2017, AS.1005) mentions
in its General Auditing Standards:
“Likewise, an auditor with a substantial financial interest in a company
might be unbiased in expressing the opinion on the financial statements
of the company, but the public would be reluctant to believe that he was
unbiased. Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact;
they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their inde-
pendence.”
Therefore, it is of utmost economic relevance to know whether shareholders (still)
care about the auditor independence and, thus, earnings quality of economic im-
portant clients. This question is addressed in this study, which examines a Big 4
client sample in the U.S. ten years after the implementation of SOX. Thereby, the
study focuses on shareholders’ perceptions of the independence issues caused by the
economic importance of the client at the audit office-level.
In the context of such a research question, however, it is essential not to group all
companies, but to pursue a differentiated approach. Thus, Gaynor et al. (2016, 15)
note that earnings quality might depend to a large extent on client’s circumstances
54 SOX is generally regarded as a mere political sign with limited economic impact (Ball 2009;
DeFond and Francis 2005; Hart 2009; Li et al. 2008).
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and raise the following question in their literature review: “To what extent do
changing and differing economic situations affect [...] investors’ perceptions of audit
quality?” One obvious reason why shareholders’ concerns regarding economic im-
portance could vary across firms is differences in the financial condition of the clients.
Supporting this argument, a chief financial officer interviewed by Dichev et al. (2013,
27) opines that “the market is more likely to ask questions about earnings quality
when the firm is not doing well.”
Consequently, the focus of this study is not only on whether shareholders have a
negative perception of the economic importance of the client, but rather on whether
the economic dependence hypothesis applies irrespective of the client’s financial
condition. A gain of knowledge in this area should matter and be informative for
understanding shareholders’ opinions regarding auditor independence. This analysis
could also help to explain the mixed evidence in many areas of accounting and
auditing research (e.g., auditor industry specialization). Thus, this study is also
intended to provide important guidance for future differentiated research on earnings
quality.
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5.1 Introduction
Shareholders are one of the primary users of audited financial statements
(Khurana and Raman 2006; Lev and Ohlson 1982). Shareholders’ perceptions of
the credibility of those financial statements—i.e., earnings quality—depend on their
perceptions of the auditor’s independence. Thus, it is unsurprising that the SEC
has repeatedly noted that audit-related disclosures are meaningful for shareholders
in determining auditor’s independence and aid shareholders in making their invest-
ment decisions (SEC 2000a; SEC 2000b; SEC 2003b). For instance, disclosures
enable shareholders to reach an informed opinion regarding an auditor’s economic
dependence on a client. The related theory—referred to as the economic depen-
dence hypothesis—suggests that the economic importance of the client might be
a reason for threatened auditor independence due to an existing economic bond
caused by client-specific quasi-rents (DeAngelo 1981a; DeFond and Zhang 2014;
Reynolds and Francis 2000). Consequently, if information regarding an auditor’s
client dependence is of interest to shareholders, client dependence should influence
shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. Indeed, a few studies provide evi-
dence that auditor independence is perceived to be jeopardized (Ghosh et al. 2009;
Khurana and Raman 2006; Lim and Tan 2008). However, the circumstances un-
der which shareholders are concerned about an auditor’s economic dependence on
the client remain unclear. One reason that shareholders’ interest in auditor in-
dependence may differ across firms is the variation across firms’ financial condi-
tions. Research has demonstrated that the firm’s financial condition is, for instance,
related to errors in financial statements (Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1986), restate-
ments (Kinney and McDaniel 1989), or the likelihood of lawsuits against auditors
(DeFond et al. 2018; Stice 1991). Thus, this study’s focus is not merely on whether
shareholders perceive client importance to be negative, but also and more impor-
tantly, on whether those perceptions exist irrespective of the client’s financial con-
dition.
Based on a sample of 6,018 firm-years of 10-K filers audited by a Big 4 auditor
(2010 through 2014), this study reveals that shareholders’ perceptions of earnings
quality and, hence, of audit quality and auditor independence are negatively asso-
ciated with the auditor’s economic dependence on the client measured at the audit
office-level. This finding holds regardless of whether shareholders’ perceptions are
proxied by the ERC or the ex ante cost of equity capital. More critical, sharehold-
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ers seem to perceive a strong auditor-client economic bond as a threat to auditor
independence, especially for firms that are more likely to be financially distressed.
Additional analyses demonstrate that these findings are quite robust to different ap-
proaches to measuring perceived earnings quality and the financial condition of the
client. Further results derived from a model dividing the measure of the economic im-
portance of the client into two components—i.e., audit and non-audit fees—mainly
suggest that the audit fee component appears to be driving shareholders’ perceptions
of jeopardized independence.
This study contributes to the auditor independence literature focusing on the
association of an auditor’s economic dependence on the client with shareholders’
perceptions of earnings quality. This analysis provides supporting evidence for the
economic dependence hypothesis; client importance measured at the audit office-
level is negatively related to the decision-usefulness of earnings and positively asso-
ciated with the ex ante cost of equity capital—especially for clients in relatively poor
financial condition—given the current U.S. context. This could be interpreted as
indicating that shareholders might pay particular attention to auditor independence
issues due to client dependence if a firm is not in good financial shape. Further-
more, Hollingsworth and Li (2012) suggest that SOX partly mitigated shareholders’
concerns regarding an auditor’s economic dependence on the client. This study
completes the picture by showing that even several years after the implementa-
tion of SOX, client fee dependence remains an issue (Kao et al. 2014), at least for
firms in poor financial condition. In conclusion, this study shows that sharehold-
ers’ concerns regarding auditor independence might be conditional on the client’s
circumstances—such as the client’s financial condition. This suggestive analysis pro-
vides initial insights into this complex subject. Therefore, it might be of interest
to identify other client attributes that could influence shareholders’ perceptions of
audit-related issues, and further broad evidence on this topic could also assist in
better targeting future regulations.
The remainder of this part of the doctoral thesis is organized as follows: In the
next section, the related literature is outlined, and hypotheses are developed. Sec-
tion 5.3 describes the research design and the sample selection process. Section 5.4
presents the model specifications, the descriptive statistics, and the multivariate re-
sults. Section 5.5 contains several additional analyses. Finally, section 5.6 concludes
the chapter with a brief summary and a discussion of the study’s limitations.
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5.2 Hypotheses Development
5.2.1 Economic Importance of the Client and Perceived Earnings Quality
Attempts to define audit quality often refer to the seminal work of DeAngelo (1981b),
in which she suggests that audit quality is a market assessment of an auditor’s ex-
pertise and independence. Auditor independence is described by DeAngelo (1981a,
116) as “the conditional probability that, given a breach has been discovered, the
auditor will report the breach.” Auditor independence—which has a direct impact
on audit quality—is compromised if the audit opinion does not coincide with the au-
ditor’s findings and beliefs (Magee and Tseng 1990). Since the objective of external
audits is to safeguard the credibility of financial statements, threatened auditor in-
dependence has a negative impact on earnings quality. Nevertheless, auditors might
also have incentives to maintain their independence in that they wish to protect
their reputation and avoid litigation exposure (Bonner et al. 1998; DeAngelo 1981b;
Dye 1993; Lys and Watts 1994; Palmrose 1988; Watts and Zimmerman 1983).55
DeFond and Zhang (2014) note that threats to audit quality are generally charac-
terized by conflicting goals between an auditor’s expertise and independence. One
possible reason for threatened auditor independence and, hence, impaired earnings
quality, is the economic bond between the auditor and the client caused by client-
specific quasi-rents resulting from future audit and non-audit fees (Zhang 1999).
This economic bond can result in opportunistic behavior by the incumbent auditor,
which pursues its own (financial) interests and is interested in maintaining profitable
clients. These incentives are assumed to be stronger for those clients that account
for a larger share of an auditor’s revenues (DeAngelo 1981b; DeFond and Zhang
2014; Gul 1991). Following this reasoning—referred to as the economic dependence
hypothesis (Reynolds and Francis 2000)—client importance, defined as the client’s
share of the auditor’s (office’s) total revenues, is expected to have an overall neg-
ative impact on auditor independence. In this context, the Cohen Report of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) famously suggested
(AICPA 1978, 113): “When one or a few large clients supply a significant portion
of the total fees of a public accounting firm, the firm will have greater difficulty in
maintaining its independence.” However, auditors’ concerns regarding the poten-
tial loss of reputation as well as litigation risks are supposed to be greater for larger
55 For a literature review on auditor independence and audit quality, please refer to
Tepalagul and Lin (2015).
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clients (Lys and Watts 1994; Schmidt 2012; Stice 1991). Since large clients are more
visible (Fernando et al. 2010), auditors might have stronger incentives to maintain
their independence, which contradicts the reasoning of the economic dependence
hypothesis (Reynolds and Francis 2000).
Overall, prior studies provide evidence that actual auditor independence is
not compromised for economically important clients (Ashbaugh and Warfield
2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; DeFond et al. 2002; Gaver and Paterson 2007;
Kao et al. 2014; Kinney et al. 2004; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Li 2009;
Raghunandan et al. 2003; Reynolds and Francis 2000).56 However, the economic
bond between the auditor and the client might affect not only independence in fact,
but also independence in appearance. Moreover, the SEC (2000a) highlights the
importance of shareholders’ perceptions regarding auditor independence and states:
“If investors do not believe that the auditor is truly independent of the issuer, they
will derive little confidence from the auditor’s opinion and will be far less likely to in-
vest in the issuer’s securities. Fostering shareholders’ confidence, therefore, requires
not only that auditors actually be independent of their audit clients, but also that
reasonable investors perceive them to be independent.” In turn, shareholders’ per-
ceptions about auditor independence determine how useful they consider accounting
information.
Therefore, it is quite interesting that—in contrast to independence in fact—several
studies show that auditors’ independence from economically important clients is per-
ceived to be jeopardized. For instance, high non-audit fee ratios (Francis and Ke
2006; Krishnan and Ye 2005) and a high proportion of client fees to the auditor’s
total revenues (Ghosh et al. 2009) are negatively related to perceived earnings qual-
ity. Higgs and Skantz (2006) find only limited support for such an association but
observe a positive association between perceived earnings quality and unexpectedly
high audit and total fees. Lim and Tan (2008) show that if an auditor is an industry
specialist, it reduces the perceived threat to independence caused by fee dependence.
Khurana and Raman (2006) reveal a negative relation between the economic impor-
tance of the client and perceived earnings quality. Hollingsworth and Li (2012)
support this evidence for financial periods prior to SOX. Their results also indicate
that SOX has mitigated shareholders’ concerns regarding auditor independence due
to client importance issues. However, the study of Ghosh et al. (2009) does not
confirm that SOX had an effect. Therefore, these findings might lead one to ques-
56 Nevertheless, Frankel et al. (2002) reports contradictory results.
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tion whether shareholders continue to have a negative perception of the economic
importance of the client.57
In summary, and despite the weak evidence in studies addressing independence
in fact, shareholders’ concerns regarding auditor independence are held to increase
if the auditor-client economic bond is stronger. Hence, the first hypothesis in its
alternative form is stated as follows:
H1: The higher the economic importance of the client, the lower the perceived
earnings quality.
5.2.2 Economic Importance of the Client and the Client’s Financial Condition
The focus of this study is not only on whether shareholders have a negative percep-
tion of client dependence but rather on the circumstances under which shareholders
are concerned about the economic bond between the client and the auditor. In
particular, this study is interested in whether the economic dependence hypothesis
applies irrespective of the client’s financial condition, which is one circumstance un-
der which shareholders’ interest in auditor independence could vary among clients.
Firms under financial pressure might have stronger incentives to engage in “win-
dow dressing” to conceal their financial difficulties (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991;
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Kinney and McDaniel 1989). Further, those finan-
cially distressed firms may exert greater pressure on the auditor to treat them more
favorably because of their financial woes. Thus, one might expect that sharehold-
ers perceive client importance to be a particular threat to auditor independence
that could lead to lower earnings quality if a firm is financially stressed. In addi-
tion, Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) examine the relation between errors in finan-
cial statements and environmental factors and find that the probability of an error
occurring is higher for firms with greater liquidity difficulties and lower profitabil-
ity. Restatements are more likely to be disclosed if a firm’s financial status is weak
(Kinney and McDaniel 1989).
In contrast, research also indicates that the likelihood of lawsuits against an audi-
tor increases with the degree of the client’s financial distress because of the greater
57 An experiment further demonstrates that jurors perceive high client importance as a threat
to auditor independence (Brandon and Mueller 2006), which is also indirectly supported by an
archival paper (Schmidt 2012).
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incentives for claimants to recover their losses from the auditor (Baber et al. 1995;
DeFond et al. 2018; Stice 1991). This might also strengthen the auditor’s concerns
about reputation losses or litigation exposure and, thus, strengthen the auditor’s
incentives to remain independent. In line with this argument, Reynolds and Francis
(2000) state that financially distressed firms pose a higher risk to the auditor. The
authors also observe that a stronger auditor-client bond leads to a higher likelihood
of issuing conservative going concern opinions, and this effect is driven by the most
distressed 25% of the sample (Reynolds and Francis 2000). The results can be in-
terpreted to mean that reputation and litigation concerns dominate the economic
dependence hypothesis, and this interpretation is also supported by other studies’
outcomes (Gaver and Paterson 2007; Li 2009). Ultimately, it could also be argued
that auditor independence might be less likely to be compromised for financially
distressed clients since the auditor cannot earn quasi-rents resulting from future
fees if the client goes bankrupt. In contrast, the auditor does not want to provoke
bankruptcy through the self-fulfilling prophecy effect of a going concern opinion
(Carson et al. 2013; Matsumura et al. 1997; Shinde et al. 2013; Vanstraelen 2003).
This is likely to apply particularly to clients of economic importance.
Even if there are arguments for why auditor independence might not be compro-
mised by client importance issues for clients in poor financial condition, remember
the quote of the chief financial officer interviewed by Dichev et al. (2013, 27) who
notes that “the market is more likely to ask questions about earnings quality when
the firm is not doing well.” Therefore, it remains an open question whether share-
holders’ concerns regarding the economic bond between the client and the auditor
depend on the client’s financial condition.58 To better understand this issue and
begin filling this research gap, the second hypothesis in its alternative form is tested:
H2: The negative association between the economic importance of the client and
perceived earnings quality exists not irrespective of the client’s financial condition.
58 Only the footnote remark of Krishnan and Ye (2005) indicates that shareholders’ concerns
regarding non-audit services might be especially present for financially distressed clients. How-
ever, Schmidt (2012) is unable to experimentally demonstrate that a firm’s financial distress is
related to the perceptions of jurors.
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5.3 Research Design and Sample Selection
5.3.1 Research Design
5.3.1.1 Conceptual Model
To illustrate the research design, Figure 5.1 presents the conceptual model, which
constitutes a modification of the predictive validity model of Kinney and Libby
(2002). This study aims to examine whether (link 1; H1 ) and when (link 6; H2 )
the economic importance of the client is associated with perceived threatened audi-
tor independence and, therefore, reduced perceived earnings quality. The concept
of perceived earnings quality is used because it can be theoretically and empiri-
cally demonstrated that—in addition to an auditor’s expertise—an auditor’s incen-
tives for independence are related to shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality
(DeFond and Zhang 2014; Gaynor et al. 2016). The empirical proxies (link 3) for
shareholders’ perceptions—ERC and ex ante cost of equity capital—and further
control variables affecting the independent and dependent variables (link 4) are in-
troduced in the model specification in the following subsections. First, however, the
empirical measure of the economic dependence on the client is discussed (link 2).
Based on the empirical evidence of the association between the measure of the eco-
nomic importance of the client and the ERC or the ex ante cost of equity capital
(link 5), the conclusions regarding link 1 are drawn.
Furthermore, the study aims to empirically test (link 8) whether the association
hypothesized in H1 (link 1) exists irrespective of the client’s financial condition
(link 6, H2 ). Therefore, Altman’s Z-score is used to classify the financial condition
of the client (link 7).
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Model: Economic Importance of the Client and Perceived
Earnings Quality
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5.3.1.2 Measure of the Economic Importance of the Client
To test the economic dependence hypothesis, a proxy for the economic importance
of the auditor’s client is needed. Ideally, client importance is defined as the to-
tal quasi-rents of a specific client divided by the total quasi-rents of the audi-
tor. Because quasi-rents are unobservable, an alternative measure of client depen-
dence is required. A reasonable surrogate might be the total fees generated by a
specific client relative to the total fees earned from all clients (DeAngelo 1981b;
Reynolds and Francis 2000). Prior research has shown that examining the auditor-
client economic bond at the audit office-level might be superior to the national-
level approach (DeFond and Francis 2005; Francis 2006; Reynolds and Francis 2000;
Wallman 1996). Therefore, the measure of client dependence is defined as the total
fees paid by the client to the auditor divided by the total fees of the audit office
(IMPORTANCE).59
5.3.1.3 Measure of Client’s Financial Condition
To test H2, the firm’s financial condition must be measured. In this study, the
Altman’s Z-score is used (Altman 1968), as is common in the accounting and
auditing literature, to proxy for the firm’s financial distress (Begley et al. 1996;
Francis and Yu 2009; Litt et al. 2014; Peterson et al. 2015; Reynolds and Francis
2000; Stice 1991). This measure is chosen not only because it is established in the
accounting and auditing literature but also because it provides a categorization of
firms’ financial condition, which is introduced later. The original calculation of the
Altman’s Z-score (Altman 1968) is used here, as it targets listed manufacturing
firms in contrast to the more recent version in Altman (2000), which is estimated
for private firms. This approach also appears reasonable given that the largest
industrial group in the sample is the manufacturing industry (cf. Table 5.1, Panel
B). Consequently, Altman’s Z-score is computed according to the following formula
(Altman 1968; Altman 2000):
ALTZit = 1.2
WCit
TAit
+ 1.4
RETEARNit
TAit
+ 3.3
EBITit
TAit
+ 0.6
MVit
TLit
+ 1.0
SALESit
TAit
,
(5.1)
59 The total fees of an audit office are calculated by summing all fees received from SEC registrants
by the auditor in a certain (the audit office’s) core-based statistical area (CBSA). To determine
the auditor’s CBSA, the classification of the U.S. Census Bureau (https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/metro-micro.html; accessed on October 1, 2018) is used.
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whereWC equals working capital, TA represents total assets, RETEARN stands for
retained earnings, EBIT denotes earnings before interest and taxes,MV corresponds
to market value of equity, TL equals total liabilities, and SALES represents total
sales. Subsequently, firms are classified as either financially “safe” or financially
“non-safe” to distinguish between financially non-distressed and distressed firms.
As previously mentioned, this classification is based on Altman (1968). Technically,
the classification is represented by an indicator variable (ALTZS) equal to 1 if the
Altman’s Z-score ranges in the “safe” non-bankrupt zone with values greater than
or equal to 2.99, and 0 if the Altman’s Z-score ranges in the “gray” area (1.81 to
2.99) or in the bankrupt zone (values below 1.81).
5.3.2 Sample Selection
Table 5.1, Panel A illustrates the sample selection process. The sample’s data are
obtained from four databases: Audit Analytics, Datastream, I/B/E/S and World-
scope. The initial sample consists of U.S. SEC registrants with audit-related data
for the years 2010 through 2014 in Audit Analytics.60 This initial sample consists
of 42,745 firm-year observations, and it is used to compute client importance and
auditor industry specialization variables. A total of 23,408 firm-year observations
are lost for firms that are not covered by Datastream, I/B/E/S and Worldscope or
because inconsistent data are obtained from those databases. As a next step, 4,442
firm-years representing firms in the financial services industry (SIC codes 6000–6799)
are deleted. All financial market-related variables are taken from Datastream, and
Worldscope is the source of the balance sheet and income statement data. Due to
limited data availability, the sample decreases to 13,030 firm-years.
Next, I/B/E/S is used to obtain analyst forecast data. Because I/B/E/S has a
large firm bias and the sample must be constrained to firms with non-negative one-
year-forward mean analysts’ earnings forecasts and non-negative analysts’ earnings
growth forecasts to calculate the ex ante cost of equity capital, 5,714 firm-years
are lost. Subsequently, another 567 firm-years are excluded for the following two
reasons. First, eliminating penny stocks should protect the sample against biased
return data (i.e., price anomalies; Bhardwaj and Brooks 1992). Second, analysts’
earnings forecasts are only employed if at least three analysts’ estimates are avail-
60 The sample period starts in 2010 to avoid results being influenced by both the transition phase
for the implementation of SOX as well as the financial crisis (which is assumed to have ended
in mid-2009; see http://www.nber.org/cycles.html; accessed on October 1, 2018).
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able in I/B/E/S. This should ensure that the forecasts approximate market opinion
(Barron et al. 2002). Finally, 731 firm-years of non-Big 4 clients are deleted to con-
trol for brand name effects (Craswell et al. 1995) and to avoid auditor self-selection
bias (Khurana and Raman 2006). Moreover, Ghosh et al. (2009) posit that mea-
sures of client importance for the Big 4 are systematically different from those of
non-Big 4 firms. The final sample consists of 6,018 firm-year observations from 1,776
different firms. Table 5.1, Panel B illustrates the sample composition by industry.
Firms from the manufacturing industry represent the largest part of the sample
(45.49%).
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Table 5.1: Sample Selection and Sample Composition by Industry
Panel A: Sample Selection
Firm-Years
Initial sample of U.S. SEC registrants with audit-related data for the fiscal years 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013 or 2014 in Audit Analytics.
42,745
Sample used to compute client importance and auditor industry specialization 42,745
Less: Firm-years from firms not covered by Datastream, Worldscope and I/B/E/S, or
firm-years with inconsistent data.
23,408
19,337
Less: Financial firm-years (SIC codes 6000–6799). 4,442
14,895
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in Datastream. 1,159
13,736
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in Worldscope. 706
13,030
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in I/B/E/S, with a negative one-year-forward
mean analysts’ earnings forecast, or with negative analysts’ earnings forecast growth.
5,714
7,316
Less: Firm-years referring to penny stocks, i.e., the price is less than $1. 9
7,307
Less: Firm-years with fewer than three analysts following. 558
6,749
Less: Firm-years with non-Big 4 auditors. 731
Final sample 6,018
Panel B: Sample Composition by Industry
SIC Division Sample (%)
100–999 Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 0.28
1000–1499 Mining 5.32
1500–1799 Construction 1.83
2000–3999 Manufacturing 45.49
4000–4999 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 12.13
5000–5199 Wholesale Trade 3.84
5200–5999 Retail Trade 10.22
7000–8999 Services 20.89
Total 100
Note: This table presents the sample selection procedure (Panel A) and the sample composition by industry (Panel B).
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5.4 Model Specifications and Empirical Analyses
5.4.1 Earnings Response Coefficient
5.4.1.1 Earnings Response Coefficient—Model Specification and Control
Variables
DeFond and Zhang (2014, 279) interpret high (perceived) audit quality “as greater
assurance of high financial reporting quality.” Therefore, the objective of an
audit is not a self-purpose but is to ensure that the financial report is suffi-
ciently credible. Supporting this, prior studies remark that shareholders’ percep-
tions of earnings quality are influenced by perceived audit quality (Dechow et al.
2010; Eilifsen and Knivsfla 2013; Francis 2004; Li 2009). Theory and empiri-
cal evidence demonstrate that market reactions to unexpected earnings depend
on shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality, which are reflected in the ERC
(Dechow et al. 2010; Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Kormendi and Lipe 1987;
Lev 1989; Teoh and Wong 1993). Therefore, the well-established ERC metric is
used as a measure for perceived earnings quality and, thus, indirectly perceived
auditor independence (DeFond and Zhang 2014).61
Although the ERC is frequently used in the audit literature (Balsam et al.
2003; Francis and Ke 2006; Higgs and Skantz 2006; Krishnan and Ye 2005;
Teoh and Wong 1993), apart from Ghosh et al. (2009), there is little evidence con-
cerning whether shareholders have a negative perception of the economic impor-
tance of the client, defined as the proportion of (certain) client fees to the audi-
tor’s total revenues.62 In contrast to Ghosh et al. (2009), this study measures a
client’s economic importance at the audit office-level and not at the audit firm-
level. This might be more appropriate because contracts with clients and decisions
are (still) made at the office-level (Craswell et al. 2002; Francis 2006; Francis et al.
61 Since this study focuses on the independence of the auditor, the short-window market reaction to
the disclosure of the audited annual earnings information is examined, as in the study presented
in chapter 4. For further information on the relevance and design of the ERC methodology,
please refer to section 2.2 and section 4.3.
62 Further research regarding client importance is presented in the studies of Lim and Tan (2008)
and Lim and Tan (2010) analyzing independence in fact and appearance. However, the first
study uses non-audit fees and client importance measures at the audit firm-level to examine the
impact of industry expertise on the relation between fee dependence and (perceived) auditor
independence. The primary focus of the latter is audit tenure considering industry specialization
and client importance as moderating effects.
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1999; Reynolds and Francis 2000; Wallman 1996).63 Moreover, this work analyzes
whether the client’s financial circumstances condition shareholders’ perceptions.
To draw conclusions regarding the hypotheses, the following model is tested:
CARit = α0+ β1SURPit+ β2IMPORTANCEit+ β3IMPORTANCEit × SURPit
+
15∑
j=4
βjCONTROLit +
27∑
j=16
βjCONTROLit × SURPit
+
30∑
j=28
βjAUDit +
33∑
j=31
βjAUDit × SURPit
+
40∑
j=34
βjINDit +
47∑
j=41
βjINDit × SURPit
+
51∑
j=48
βjY EARit +
55∑
j=52
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit ,
(5.2)
where:
CONTROLit ={SPECIALit, AUDCHit, SECit, PCAOBit, POPULATIONit,
CONTROLit = {SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit,
CONTROLit = {ANALY STit}.
The variable being explained (CAR) represents the cumulative abnormal stock
return over the Russell 3000 return computed for the 3-day window, i.e., -1 trading
day to +1 trading day relative to the earnings announcement date.64 The variable
SURP denotes the earnings surprise for the respective fiscal year; it equals the
reported earnings per share for the respective fiscal year minus the mean analysts’
earnings per share forecast for this fiscal year one week before the earnings
announcement date, scaled by the firm’s stock price 2 trading days before the
earnings announcement date. This variable plays an important role because SURP
and its interaction terms determine the ERC. Hence, if one is interested in whether
economic dependence on the client is associated with the ERC, one must examine
the interaction of the proxy for the economic importance of the client with SURP .
63 Chen et al. (2010) examine client importance at the individual audit partner-level and its effect
on audit quality in a Chinese setting.
64 The calculation is based on the market model estimated over the 180-day window ending 21
trading days before the earnings announcement date. This event window (-1 trading day to
+1 trading day) is chosen because it must be sufficiently long to capture the market’s price
response to earnings’ surprises while remaining as short as possible to mitigate the influence of
potential confounding events (Bergh and Gibbons 2011; McWilliams and Siegel 1997).
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A set of variables (CONTROL) is introduced to control for additional auditor
and firm characteristics. The model controls for city-level industry specialization
(SPECIAL) because the results of Krishnan et al. (2013) imply that auditor spe-
cialization at the city-level is associated with shareholders’ perceptions of earnings
quality. To take possible different perceptions of long versus very short auditor-client
relationships into account, an indicator variable (AUDCH )—equal to 1 if a firm
changed its auditor in the respective fiscal year, and 0 otherwise—is included. Fur-
thermore, to guard against possible confounding city effects (DeFond et al. 2018),
two indicator variables and a continuous variable are introduced: SEC equal to
1 if the client is located in the same CBSA as an SEC office, and 0 other-
wise; PCAOB equal to 1 if the audit office is located in the same CBSA as a
PCAOB office, and 0 otherwise. The natural logarithm of the total population
in the audit office’s CBSA is represented by the variable POPULATION . Addi-
tionally, variables control for the following firm characteristics: firm size (SIZE ;
Balsam et al. 2003), growth opportunities (MB and MBNEG; Higgs and Skantz
2006), capital structure (LEV ; Baber et al. 2014; Francis and Ke 2006), systematic
risk (BETA; Collins and Kothari 1989), negative earnings surprises (SURPNEG;
Basu 1997; Krishnan and Ye 2005) and pre-disclosure environment (ANALYST ;
Teoh and Wong 1993). Finally, AUD is a set of three auditor dummies, IND is a set
of seven industry dummies based on the SIC Division Structure as used by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, and YEAR
represents four year dummies. Table 5.2 presents the variable definitions.
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Table 5.2: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
CAR Cumulative abnormal stock return over the Russell 3000 return computed for the
3-day window, i.e., -1 trading day to +1 trading day relative to the earnings an-
nouncement date. The calculation is based on the market model estimated over the
180-day window ending 21 trading days before the earnings announcement date.
COEC Ex ante cost of equity capital based on the PEG ratio model by Easton (2004).
Variables of Interest
SURP Reported earnings per share for the respective fiscal year minus the mean analysts’
earnings per share forecast for this fiscal year one week before the earnings announce-
ment date, scaled by the firm’s stock price 2 trading days before the earnings an-
nouncement date.
IMPORTANCE Total fees paid by the client to the auditor divided by total fees of the audit office.
ALTZS Indicator variable equal to 1 if the Altman’s Z-score based on Altman (1968) ≥ 2.99,
and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
SPECIAL Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor’s two-digit SIC-industry share is top-ranked
at the city-level based on the client’s CBSA, and 0 otherwise.
AUDCH Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm changed its auditor, and 0 otherwise.
SEC Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is located in the same CBSA as an SEC of-
fice, and 0 otherwise (https://www.sec.gov/page/sec-regional-offices; accessed
on October 1, 2018).
PCAOB Indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit office is located in the same CBSA as a
PCAOB office, and 0 otherwise (https://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/Contact.aspx;
accessed on October 1, 2018).
POPULATION Natural logarithm of the total population in the audit office’s CBSA (https://
www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/total-metro-and-micro-
statistical-areas.html; accessed on October 1, 2018).
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
MB Market-to-book value, calculated as market value divided by book value of common
equity for firms with positive market-to-book values, and 0 otherwise.
MBNEG Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a negative market-to-book value, and 0
otherwise.
LEV Leverage, defined as long-term debt plus short-term debt plus the current portion of
long-term debt divided by total capital plus short-term debt plus the current portion
of long-term debt.
BETA Beta factor from the market model regression.
SURPNEG Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a negative earnings surprise (SURP), and
0 otherwise.
ANALYST Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm.
RET Recent fiscal year stock return.
Fixed Effects Variables
AUD Set of three auditor dummies.
IND Set of seven industry dummies based on the SIC Division Structure as used by the
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (https://
www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html; accessed on October 1, 2018).
YEAR Set of four year dummies.
Additional Analyses Variables
AFIMP Audit fees paid by the client to the auditor divided by total fees of the audit office.
NAFIMP Non-audit fees paid by the client to the auditor divided by total fees of the audit
office.
Note: This table presents the variable definitions.
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5.4.1.2 Earnings Response Coefficient—Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.3 contains the descriptive statistics for all variables in the main regressions
except the auditor, industry, and year dummies. The average firm’s cumulative ex-
cess stock return over the Russell 3000 return ranges between -0.213 and 0.202 (mean
of 0.004). The earnings surprise is close to zero, whether concentrating on the mean
or the median. This finding can be interpreted to mean that, on average, firms’
reported earnings meet the latest analysts’ forecasts, and it might indicate that
firms attempt to avoid earnings surprises (Dichev et al. 2013). Moreover, approx-
imately 30.72% of all earnings surprises are negative. The untransformed market
value of equity of a median firm-year is approximately $2.168 billion. Only 2.11%
of the sample firms had an auditor change, which is quite low but comparable to
other studies (e.g., Barua et al. 2017). The sample includes firms financing all of
their activities from equity and retained earnings (LEV equals 0.000) and indebted
firms (maximum of LEV equals 1.443). The variables capturing a firm’s growth
opportunities—i.e., MB and MBNEG—exhibit the highest skewness and kurtosis,
and fewer than 2.80% of all firm-years have negative market-to-book ratios. The
mean observation of beta equals 1.076. Overall, 57.43% of all observations are clas-
sified as “safe” in terms of the firm’s financial condition as measured by Altman’s
Z-score. The median firm in the sample has approximately 12 analysts’ earnings
forecasts. The median sample firm is located in a comparatively equally large city
as in the Big 4 sample of DeFond et al. (2018), and the city population totals ap-
proximately 3,671,093 (versus 3,439,809). However, only 36.79% of all firm-years
are located in the same city as an SEC office. 50.73% of all audit offices are located
in the same city as a PCAOB office, which is, in contrast, higher than the corre-
sponding figure in the sample of DeFond et al. (2018). Considering all firm-years,
67.58% are audited by city-industry specialists; this percentage is very close to the
proportion of industry leaders at the city-level in Krishnan et al. (2013). Finally,
Table 5.3 also illustrates that on average, audit offices are quite dependent on clients.
Although the median (0.036) of the client dependence measure IMPORTANCE is
clearly lower than the mean (0.093), losing the median client would mean that an
audit office would lose approximately 4% of its total fees.
88
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
Mean Std.
Dev.
25% 50% 75% Min. Max.
CAR 0.004 0.071 -0.032 0.005 0.043 -0.213 0.202
COEC 0.108 0.043 0.081 0.098 0.125 0.036 0.271
SURP 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.028 0.019
IMPORTANCE 0.093 0.155 0.014 0.036 0.093 0.002 0.897
ALTZS 0.574 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
SPECIAL 0.676 0.468 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
AUDCH 0.021 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SEC 0.368 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
PCAOB 0.507 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
POPULATION 15.145 0.877 14.485 15.116 15.638 13.305 16.816
SIZE 21.626 1.497 20.526 21.497 22.615 18.661 25.709
MB 3.567 4.047 1.560 2.400 3.870 0.000 28.330
MBNEG 0.028 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
LEV 0.346 0.286 0.110 0.327 0.511 0.000 1.443
BETA 1.076 0.673 0.610 1.013 1.431 -0.215 3.385
SURPNEG 0.307 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ANALYST 2.509 0.588 2.079 2.565 2.996 1.386 3.664
RET 0.196 0.370 -0.035 0.148 0.361 -0.531 1.619
n 6, 018
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
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This study focuses on whether the economic dependence hypothesis applies irre-
spective of the client’s financial condition. Accordingly, firms are classified “safe”
or “non-safe” regarding their financial situation. Therefore, it is of special interest
whether the descriptive statistics differ for the “safe” sample and the “non-safe”
sample. Table 5.4 contains the descriptive statistics for the two subsamples. It can
be seen that not only the mean and median values of CAR, SURP , and COEC
but also 9 out of 13 control variables differ significantly when comparing the “safe”
sample and the “non-safe” sample. Firms that are more likely to be financially dis-
tressed thus have comparatively lower abnormal stock returns and higher ex ante
cost of equity capital while simultaneously achieving a lower unadjusted fiscal year
stock return. In addition, these firms are more heavily indebted and have on average
less MB and a higher rate of negative earnings surprises. All these findings seem
plausible.
In particular, auditors are on average significantly more economically dependent
on firms in the “non-safe” sample (with a mean of 0.111 compared to 0.080 in the
“safe” sample). This could be due, for example, to the fact that these clients face
higher risks and the auditors must conduct the audit more carefully and demand
a risk premium. In turn, this would lead to higher fees and thus higher economic
importance of the client. To rule out that this effect has a significant impact on the
results of the main analyses, this topic is dealt with again in the additional analyses
in subsection 5.5.4.
With regard to the following empirical test of H2 , further inferences can also be
made. The descriptive statistics show clear differences between the two subsamples.
This might indicate that the independent variables have different effects on share-
holder’s perceptions of earnings quality. Since this at least cannot be excluded, a
sample split is performed to allow different coefficients for all independent variables
for the samples of financially “safe” and “non-safe” firms.
90
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for the “Safe” Sample and “Non-Safe” Sample
Financial Condition: Financial Condition: Difference (1) vs. (2)
“Safe” Sample (1) “Non-Safe” Sample (2) p-value
Variable Mean Median Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon
Test
CAR 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.032
COEC 0.101 0.095 0.118 0.107 0.000 0.000
SURP 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055
IMPORTANCE 0.080 0.031 0.111 0.044 0.000 0.000
SPECIAL 0.665 1.000 0.690 1.000 0.036 0.036
AUDCH 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.866 0.866
SEC 0.369 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.848 0.848
PCAOB 0.498 0.000 0.520 1.000 0.103 0.103
POPULATION 15.149 15.084 15.138 15.263 0.630 0.557
SIZE 21.683 21.488 21.550 21.504 0.001 0.022
MB 4.033 2.870 2.939 1.870 0.000 0.000
MBNEG 0.013 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000
LEV 0.225 0.183 0.509 0.489 0.000 0.000
BETA 0.993 0.960 1.189 1.108 0.000 0.000
SURPNEG 0.268 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.000 0.000
ANALYST 2.526 2.565 2.485 2.485 0.007 0.010
RET 0.227 0.171 0.153 0.119 0.000 0.000
n 3,456 2,562
Note: This table compares the descriptive statistics for the “safe” sample in column (1) and “non-safe” sample in column (2). All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The third column presents two-tailed p-values from the t-test (Wilcoxon test) testing
the difference in means (medians). The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.5 presents the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the
pooled sample. Analyzing all correlation coefficients does not lead to serious con-
cerns regarding potential collinearity problems. Having said that, ERC models,
in general, can be problematic with respect to collinearity because the respective
regressions include many interaction terms, and hence, collinearity is present by con-
struction.65 However, this does not pose a major problem as long as the collinear
variables are significant and one rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficient esti-
mates are jointly zero (Brambor et al. 2006; O’Brien 2007).
65 The VIFs might hint at possible problems with collinearity. Nevertheless, excluding the inter-
action terms with the earnings surprise and the industry dummies results in a maximum VIF
of 2.72 for the variable POPULATION .
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Table 5.5: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) CAR 1.000
(2) COEC 0.006 1.000
(0.645)
(3) SURP 0.233 -0.055 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
(4) IMPORTANCE -0.002 -0.028 0.013 1.000
(0.878) (0.032) (0.322)
(5) ALTZS 0.026 -0.196 0.062 -0.098 1.000
(0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(6) SPECIAL -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 0.179 -0.027 1.000
(0.262) (0.258) (0.288) (0.000) (0.036)
(7) AUDCH -0.009 0.034 -0.023 -0.003 -0.002 -0.014 1.000
(0.479) (0.008) (0.072) (0.839) (0.866) (0.264)
(8) SEC -0.002 -0.059 0.001 -0.237 0.002 -0.213 0.005 1.000
(0.888) (0.000) (0.950) (0.000) (0.848) (0.000) (0.672)
(9) PCAOB -0.013 -0.004 -0.032 -0.338 -0.021 -0.142 -0.006 0.540 1.000
(0.322) (0.781) (0.014) (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.663) (0.000)
(10) POPULATION -0.020 -0.022 -0.013 -0.424 0.006 -0.186 -0.008 0.475 0.764 1.000
(0.115) (0.093) (0.302) (0.000) (0.630) (0.000) (0.530) (0.000) (0.000)
(11) SIZE -0.016 -0.348 0.033 0.264 0.044 0.117 -0.069 0.054 0.057 0.072 1.000
(0.226) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(12) MB 0.014 -0.148 -0.012 -0.031 0.134 -0.029 -0.010 0.107 0.015 0.031 0.193 1.000
(0.280) (0.000) (0.359) (0.016) (0.000) (0.025) (0.457) (0.000) (0.257) (0.018) (0.000)
(13) MBNEG 0.003 0.083 0.012 -0.003 -0.101 -0.037 -0.011 0.036 0.034 0.037 -0.006 -0.148 1.000
(0.835) (0.000) (0.358) (0.828) (0.000) (0.004) (0.411) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.630) (0.000)
(14) LEV -0.007 0.093 -0.045 0.122 -0.491 0.072 -0.011 0.019 0.050 0.037 0.142 0.129 0.510 1.000
(0.608) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.400) (0.149) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(15) BETA 0.030 0.379 0.008 0.012 -0.144 0.012 0.005 -0.082 -0.044 -0.057 -0.224 -0.112 0.049 0.061 1.000
(0.019) (0.000) (0.530) (0.336) (0.000) (0.342) (0.696) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(16) SURPNEG -0.249 0.113 -0.560 0.013 -0.100 0.023 0.010 -0.023 0.029 0.012 -0.088 -0.038 0.015 0.063 0.050 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.319) (0.000) (0.079) (0.439) (0.070) (0.025) (0.342) (0.000) (0.003) (0.233) (0.000) (0.000)
(17) ANALYST -0.005 -0.171 0.034 0.136 0.035 0.057 -0.068 0.019 0.024 0.029 0.734 0.148 0.017 0.081 -0.128 -0.083 1.000
(0.692) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.138) (0.063) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(18) RET 0.024 -0.178 0.058 -0.017 0.098 -0.005 0.024 0.027 -0.004 -0.003 0.077 0.189 0.017 -0.005 0.051 -0.068 -0.037 1.000
(0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) (0.696) (0.060) (0.038) (0.736) (0.835) (0.000) (0.000) (0.178) (0.682) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Note: This table shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the pooled data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The numbers in
parentheses indicate two-tailed p-values. The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
93
5.4.1.3 Earnings Response Coefficient—Multivariate Analyses
To analyze whether an auditor’s economic dependence on a client is related to share-
holders’ perceptions of earnings quality (H1 ), one must consider the coefficient of
the interaction term between SURP and the proxy for economic dependence on the
client.
Table 5.6, column (1) presents the results. The estimated coefficient of the inter-
action of IMPORTANCE with SURP is negative (coefficient of -2.6173), and the
null hypothesis can be rejected (p-value of 0.042, one-tailed test). Moreover, it is of
further interest whether this association is not only statistically significant but also
economically relevant. Therefore, the percentage change in the ERC for an average
firm is considered for two different scenarios: (1) an increase from the 25th percentile
(0.014) of IMPORTANCE to the 75th percentile (0.093) of IMPORTANCE , and (2)
an increase by one standard deviation (0.155) in IMPORTANCE from its mean
(from 0.093 to 0.248). For the first scenario, comparing the ERCs reveals that the
ERC for an average firm changes from 2.955 (low client importance) to 2.749 (high
client importance), a decrease of 6.96%. The second scenario reveals a 14.78% lower
ERC after increasing IMPORTANCE by one standard deviation. Thus, the associ-
ation of IMPORTANCE with the ERC is also of economic interest. There seems to
be evidence that shareholders perceive the economic importance of the client as a
threat to auditor independence.
Even if one considers the effects on the stock price for an average firm in dollars
(cf. Collins and Kothari 1989), the increase in the economic importance of the client
in the second scenario would lead to an approximately 5-cent decrease in the stock
price assuming a positive earnings surprise in the amount of the mean absolute
SURP.66 This suggests that shareholders consider earnings information to be less
useful for economic important clients.
66 This is based on a mean stock price 2 trading days before the earnings announcement date
that is used to scale SURP of $39.13 and a mean absolute SURP of 0.003. This results in the
following calculation: −2.6173× 0.155× 0.003× 39.13 ≈ −5 cent.
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Table 5.6: OLS Regressions—Earnings Response Coefficient and Economic Importance of the Client
Dependent Variable = CAR
Full Sample (1) Financial Condition: Financial Condition:
“Safe” Sample (2) “Non-Safe” Sample (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
SURP 9.2334 6.5679 0.160 4.8798 12.2963 0.692 14.2812 7.6538 0.062
IMPORTANCE -0.0001 0.0071 0.990 0.0058 0.0101 0.561 -0.0075 0.0101 0.455
IMPORTANCE×SURP -2.6173 1.5178 0.085 -0.2805 3.0542 0.927 -4.0904 1.9137 0.033
SPECIAL -0.0012 0.0021 0.563 -0.0029 0.0029 0.328 0.0010 0.0030 0.732
AUDCH -0.0055 0.0068 0.415 -0.0001 0.0085 0.987 -0.0127 0.0109 0.247
SEC -0.0005 0.0024 0.840 -0.0024 0.0035 0.496 0.0016 0.0033 0.637
PCAOB 0.0032 0.0029 0.270 0.0069 0.0042 0.100 -0.0013 0.0041 0.747
POPULATION -0.0025 0.0017 0.141 -0.0037 0.0023 0.112 -0.0010 0.0023 0.675
SIZE -0.0008 0.0011 0.474 -0.0010 0.0016 0.520 -0.0005 0.0015 0.730
MB 0.0003 0.0003 0.237 0.0000 0.0003 0.931 0.0007 0.0004 0.066
MBNEG -0.0008 0.0068 0.910 0.0029 0.0120 0.811 0.0025 0.0087 0.774
LEV 0.0040 0.0044 0.368 0.0061 0.0070 0.383 0.0021 0.0079 0.790
BETA 0.0017 0.0015 0.265 0.0027 0.0024 0.269 0.0016 0.0020 0.410
SURPNEG -0.0256 0.0024 0.000 -0.0256 0.0033 0.000 -0.0257 0.0034 0.000
ANALYST -0.0005 0.0025 0.858 0.0017 0.0035 0.628 -0.0027 0.0036 0.448
SPECIAL×SURP 0.5385 0.4590 0.241 1.1917 0.8338 0.153 0.3562 0.5267 0.499
AUDCH×SURP -0.9469 1.1792 0.422 -0.6675 2.0355 0.743 -0.7098 1.4298 0.620
SEC×SURP 0.1108 0.4566 0.808 0.3788 0.9144 0.679 0.1931 0.5031 0.701
PCAOB×SURP -0.1798 0.6326 0.776 -2.8270 1.2662 0.026 0.6555 0.7338 0.372
POPULATION×SURP 0.0101 0.3854 0.979 1.4309 0.6473 0.027 -0.6004 0.4766 0.208
SIZE×SURP -0.2512 0.2068 0.225 -0.8174 0.4237 0.054 -0.0841 0.2317 0.717
MB×SURP 0.0412 0.0610 0.499 0.1358 0.0803 0.091 -0.0144 0.0585 0.805
MBNEG×SURP 1.9224 1.2311 0.119 -8.1977 3.1287 0.009 1.6052 1.2789 0.210
LEV×SURP -2.9513 0.8855 0.001 -0.1273 1.8764 0.946 -2.5822 1.1386 0.024
BETA×SURP 0.0457 0.2544 0.857 -0.2383 0.6256 0.703 0.1726 0.2867 0.547
SURPNEG×SURP -1.3351 0.5390 0.013 -2.1762 0.9720 0.025 -1.0878 0.6773 0.109
ANALYST×SURP 1.1483 0.5125 0.025 1.1620 1.0158 0.253 1.3639 0.6060 0.025
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Table 5.6: OLS Regressions—Earnings Response Coefficient and Economic Importance of the Client (continued)
Dependent Variable = CAR
Full Sample (1) Financial Condition: Financial Condition:
“Safe” Sample (2) “Non-Safe” Sample (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
Intercept 0.0697 0.0296 0.018 0.0666 0.0396 0.093 0.0807 0.0412 0.050
Auditor Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 6,018 3,456 2,562
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.084 0.102
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression model includes auditor, industry, and year fixed ef-
fects, and standard errors are clustered by firm. The regression model also includes a set of interactions between SURP and the auditor, industry, and year dummies
that are omitted from the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regres-
sion model is tested: CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2IMPORTANCEit + β3IMPORTANCEit × SURPit +
∑
15
j=4
βjCONTROLit +
∑
27
j=16
βjCONTROLit × SURPit +∑
30
j=28
βjAUDit +
∑
33
j=31
βjAUDit × SURPit +
∑
40
j=34
βjINDit +
∑
47
j=41
βjINDit × SURPit +
∑
51
j=48
βjY EARit +
∑
55
j=52
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit, where:
CONTROLit = {SPECIALit, AUDCHit, SECit, PCAOBit, POPULATIONit, SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit, ANALY STit}. AUD is a set of three
auditor dummies, IND is a set of seven industry dummies, and YEAR represents four year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
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In addition, the regressions in Table 5.6, column (2) and column (3) address
the question of whether the economic dependence hypothesis applies irrespective
of the client’s financial condition (H2 ). Therefore, the sample is divided into two
subsamples based on the client’s financial condition: firms classified as “safe” and
firms classified as “non-safe” according to Altman’s Z-score. The sample split is
performed both to provide a simple and intuitive method and to allow different
coefficients for the sample of financially “safe” and “non-safe” firms. The latter is
justified by the fact that the influence of the variable of interest and the control
variables on perceived earnings quality are likely to differ for these two subsamples.
This topic was already mentioned during the hypothesis development and dealt with
in the context of the descriptive statistics.
The regression for the firms in sound financial health is shown in column (2)
of Table 5.6. Analyzing those firms with Altman’s Z-score values greater than or
equal to 2.99, no significant association between client dependence and the ERC
can be observed. An interpretation of this result might be that shareholders are
not concerned about possible independence issues stemming from stronger economic
bonds between the client and the auditor if the client is in a “safe” financial condition.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that economic dependence on the client is
negatively associated with the shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality if the
client is more likely to be financially distressed.
The estimate of the respective interaction term IMPORTANCE×SURP in
column (3) of Table 5.6 totals -4.0904 and is significant with a one-tailed p-value
of 0.016. Accordingly, the economic consequences for the two scenarios described
above are greater. The following effects can be observed for an average firm in the
“non-safe” subsample: a decline in the ERC by 17.06% for case (1) or 35.77% for
case (2), respectively.
Overall, the empirical evidence provides support for H1 and H2 , and it demon-
strates that shareholders’ concerns about auditor independence and earnings qual-
ity might be conditional on the client’s circumstances—such as the client’s financial
condition. Finally, the findings complement recent studies suggesting that the im-
plementation of SOX seems to have only somewhat mitigated (perceived) threats to
auditor independence (Hollingsworth and Li 2012; Kao et al. 2014).
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5.4.2 Ex Ante Cost of Equity Capital
5.4.2.1 Ex Ante Cost of Equity Capital—Model Specification and Control
Variables
Another common measure of perceived earnings quality and, hence, perceived
auditor independence is the cost of equity capital (DeFond and Zhang 2014;
Khurana and Raman 2004; Krishnan et al. 2013; Lambert et al. 2007). Thanks to
the auditor’s ability to mitigate agency problems caused by information asymme-
tries between managers and shareholders through the assurance of high earnings
quality (Watts and Zimmerman 1983), the cost of equity capital should decrease
with more credible financial information due to reduced information risk. Although
Hollingsworth and Li (2012) and Khurana and Raman (2006) examined a positive
relation between economic dependence on the client and the ex ante cost of equity
capital, which might, however, be partly alleviated by the implementation of SOX,
it still remains unclear whether this association exists irrespective of the client’s
financial condition.
In accordance with prior studies, the PEG ratio (price/earnings ratio divided by
short-term earnings growth) approach of Easton (2004) is employed. Here, the ex
ante cost of equity capital is estimated by calculating the implied expected rate of
return on equity capital assuming no future changes in abnormal earnings growth
and no future dividends.67 Therefore, only data for the one- and two-year-forward
analysts’ earnings forecast and the price per share are required. Thus, the PEG
ratio has not only become popular in the accounting literature but also among
analysts when building their stock recommendations (Easton 2004). Furthermore,
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) conclude that the PEG ratio approach dominates
other existing models.68 Due to these advantages, the Easton (2004) model is used
67 To check the robustness of the results, the ex ante cost of equity capital is also estimated
by calculating the implied expected rate of return on equity capital assuming only no future
changes in abnormal earnings growth (MPEG ratio; Easton 2004; Khurana and Raman 2006).
The sample declines to 5,099 firm-years because analysts’ dividend forecasts are needed for
the calculation; this study’s findings remain unchanged. Another approach to estimating the
ex ante cost of capital (assuming no abnormal earnings growth) is to use the inverse of the
forward price/earnings ratio (PE ratio). If this proxy for the dependent variable is used, the
coefficient of IMPORTANCE is always significant—irrespective of the firm’s financial condition.
Nevertheless, this topic is dealt with again during the additional analyses in subsection 5.5.2.2,
and further approaches to calculating ex ante cost of equity capital are used.
68 For a detailed discussion of the different models used to calculate the ex ante cost of equity
capital, please refer to Botosan and Plumlee (2005).
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throughout the main analyses:
(5.3)COECit =
√
EPS2it − EPS1it
Pit
,
where COEC represents the client-specific ex ante cost of equity capital, EPS1
denotes the one-year-forward mean analysts’ earnings per share forecast at fiscal
year-end, EPS2 is the two-year-forward mean analysts’ earnings per share forecast
at fiscal year-end, and P defines the fiscal year-end price per share.
The following model is examined:
(5.4)
COECit = α0 + β1IMPORTANCEit +
12∑
j=2
βjCONTROLit
+
15∑
j=13
βjAUDit +
22∑
j=16
βjINDit +
26∑
j=23
βjY EARit + εit ,
where:
CONTROLit ={SPECIALit, AUDCHit, SECit, PCAOBit, POPULATIONit,
CONTROLit = {SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, RETit}.
As in Equation 5.2, auditor, industry, and year fixed effects are included,
and the control variables (CONTROL) are nearly the same. However, instead of
the variables SURPNEG and ANALYST, this model additionally controls for a
firm’s total risk measured by its recent fiscal year stock return (RET ).
5.4.2.2 Ex Ante Cost of Equity Capital—Descriptive Statistics
Because the ERC and the ex ante cost of equity capital regressions are based on
the same sample, one may refer to the discussion of the descriptive statics in sub-
section 5.4.1.2. However, some further points are in order. The mean of COEC
equals 0.108, which is quite similar to the results of prior studies (e.g., Easton 2004;
Khurana and Raman 2004; Krishnan et al. 2013). Apart from SPECIALIST and
PCAOB, all variables are significantly correlated with COEC . RET is positively
skewed with a mean of 0.196 and a median of 0.148. The sample’s average firm-
year’s ex post stock return is higher than its implied cost of equity capital for the
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fiscal year, which might not be surprising because the U.S. market—e.g., Russell
3000—exhibited a notable increase between 2009 and 2013.
As mentioned above, the mean value of COEC is higher for firms classified as
financially “non-safe”, while their RET is lower compared to firms in the “safe”
sample (cf. Table 5.4).
5.4.2.3 Ex Ante Cost of Equity Capital—Multivariate Analyses
Referring to column (1) of Table 5.7, the estimated coefficient of IMPORTANCE of
0.0083 is significant (p-value of 0.032, one-tailed test). Thus, an auditor’s economic
dependence on the client is positively related to COEC . The assessment of the
economic relevance is much more intuitive here. An increase in IMPORTANCE by
one standard deviation leads to an increase in the ex ante cost of equity capital of
0.13 percentage points which corresponds to an increase of approximately 1% for an
average firm, since the mean value of COEC totals 0.108. Comparing COEC for an
average firm with low client importance (0.014) and high client importance (0.093)
results in an increase in the cost of capital of 0.07 percentage points.
Focusing on H2 , the regression results draw a clear picture (column (2) versus
column (3) of Table 5.7). Shareholders have a negative perception of client depen-
dence. However, this effect can only be observed in the subsample of firms that
are more likely to be in financial distress (coefficient of IMPORTANCE of 0.0158;
p-value of 0.015, one-tailed test). Looking at the economic significance, an increase
in IMPORTANCE by one standard deviation now even leads to an increase in the
ex ante cost of equity capital of 0.24 percentage points.
To conclude, the results of the ex ante cost of equity capital model are qualitatively
similar to those of the ERC model. Shareholders seem to have a negative perception
of the economic importance of a client. However, this applies in particular to clients
that are more likely to be in financial distress, and these empirical results indicate
that shareholders’ perceptions of auditor independence are conditional on clients’
circumstances.
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Table 5.7: OLS Regressions—Ex Ante Cost of Equity Capital and Economic Importance of the Client
Dependent Variable = COEC
Full Sample (1) Financial Condition: Financial Condition:
“Safe” Sample (2) “Non-Safe” Sample (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
IMPORTANCE 0.0083 0.0045 0.065 -0.0004 0.0046 0.938 0.0158 0.0073 0.030
SPECIAL 0.0006 0.0014 0.687 0.0007 0.0015 0.632 -0.0002 0.0025 0.949
AUDCH 0.0058 0.0034 0.085 0.0034 0.0037 0.352 0.0093 0.0058 0.110
SEC -0.0003 0.0017 0.860 -0.0015 0.0019 0.407 0.0006 0.0028 0.840
PCAOB 0.0002 0.0023 0.924 0.0033 0.0023 0.159 -0.0029 0.0037 0.426
POPULATION 0.0016 0.0013 0.206 -0.0005 0.0013 0.706 0.0047 0.0022 0.035
SIZE -0.0086 0.0006 0.000 -0.0061 0.0006 0.000 -0.0112 0.0009 0.000
MB -0.0001 0.0002 0.420 -0.0004 0.0002 0.054 0.0001 0.0003 0.667
MBNEG 0.0048 0.0062 0.442 -0.0031 0.0097 0.751 0.0151 0.0077 0.050
LEV 0.0191 0.0030 0.000 0.0097 0.0038 0.011 0.0089 0.0061 0.145
BETA 0.0162 0.0012 0.000 0.0098 0.0014 0.000 0.0195 0.0016 0.000
RET -0.0167 0.0015 0.000 -0.0106 0.0018 0.000 -0.0217 0.0027 0.000
Intercept 0.2381 0.0227 0.000 0.2272 0.0209 0.000 0.2427 0.0444 0.000
Auditor Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 6,018 3,456 2,562
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.210 0.373
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression model includes auditor, industry, and year fixed ef-
fects, and standard errors are clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The follow-
ing regression model is tested: COECit = α0 + β1IMPORTANCEit +
∑
12
j=2
βjCONTROLit +
∑
15
j=13
βjAUDit +
∑
22
j=16
βjINDit +
∑
26
j=23
βjY EARit + εit, where:
CONTROLit = {SPECIALit, AUDCHit, SECit, PCAOBit, POPULATIONit, SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, RETit}. AUD is a set of three auditor dummies, IND is a
set of seven industry dummies, and YEAR represents four year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
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5.5 Additional Analyses
5.5.1 Measurement of the Economic Importance of the Client
5.5.1.1 Audit Fee and Non-Audit Fee Measure
Although the client-specific total fees to the total fees of all clients of an audit office
might be the most appropriate measure of economic dependence, the components of
the total fees generated by a client—i.e., audit and non-audit fees—should also be
examined. This would make it possible to find out which component is driving the
observed effect, and therefore, would provide additional interesting insights. Thus,
the total fees are divided into two components: audit and non-audit fees. AFIMP
representing audit fees, and NAFIMP representing non-audit fees paid by the client,
both divided by the total fees of the audit office.
Table 5.8 presents the results for the returns-earnings model. Column (1) of
Table 5.8 reveals that only the earnings surprise interaction with AFIMP is sig-
nificantly different from zero (p-value of 0.023, one-tailed test) and has a negative
coefficient of -4.3654. An increase by the inter-quartile range (25th to 75th per-
centile) of AFIMP for an average firm decreases the ERC by 9.34%. Moreover,
the results regarding H2 are presented in column (2) and column (3) of Table 5.8.
The coefficient of AFIMP×SURP is significant (one-tailed p-value of 0.016) for the
respective regression for the subsample of companies with Altman’s Z-score below
2.99; NAFIMP×SURP is always insignificant. The outcome suggests that audit
fee dependence might drive shareholders’ negative perceptions of client dependence.
The two following arguments could explain this finding. First, auditor independence
is primarily of interest to shareholders if the auditor provides audit services rather
than non-audit services. This reasoning is also consistent with the experimental
study conducted by Gul (1991) indicating that audit fees are the driver of bankers’
perceptions of auditor independence. Second, there is some evidence that non-audit
services decreased after the implementation of SOX (Ghosh et al. 2009; Li 2009),
and hence, the importance of non-audit fees plus their relative contribution to client
dependence issues is also expected to decline.
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Table 5.8: OLS Regressions—Earnings Response Coefficient and Economic Importance of the Client Proxied by AFIMP and NAFIMP
Dependent Variable = CAR
Full Sample (1) Financial Condition: Financial Condition:
“Safe” Sample (2) “Non-Safe” Sample (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
SURP 9.8199 6.5647 0.135 4.5891 12.3573 0.710 15.3042 7.7864 0.050
AFIMP -0.0056 0.0112 0.615 -0.0093 0.0166 0.576 -0.0055 0.0158 0.728
NAFIMP 0.0225 0.0331 0.496 0.0769 0.0465 0.098 -0.0296 0.0497 0.551
AFIMP×SURP -4.3654 2.1952 0.047 -2.4177 4.0093 0.547 -5.9482 2.7688 0.032
NAFIMP×SURP 7.6366 8.2277 0.353 11.1024 18.2749 0.544 7.3107 9.9835 0.464
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes
Intercept: Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 6,018 3,456 2,562
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.084 0.102
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression model includes auditor, industry, and year fixed effects, and
standard errors are clustered by firm. The regression model also includes a set of interactions between SURP and the control variables, auditor, industry, and year dummies that
are omitted from the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression model is tested:
CARit = α0 + β1SURPit + β2AFIMPit + β3NAFIMPit + β4AFIMPit × SURPit + β5NAFIMPit × SURPit +
∑
17
j=6
βjCONTROLit +
∑
29
j=18
βjCONTROLit × SURPit +∑
32
j=30
βjAUDit +
∑
35
j=33
βjAUDit × SURPit +
∑
42
j=36
βjINDit +
∑
49
j=43
βjINDit × SURPit +
∑
53
j=50
βjY EARit +
∑
57
j=54
βjY EARit × SURPit + εit, where:
CONTROLit = {SPECIALit, AUDCHit, SECit, PCAOBit, POPULATIONit, SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, SURPNEGit, ANALY STit}. AUD is a set of three
auditor dummies, IND is a set of seven industry dummies, and YEAR represents four year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
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In contrast, the results for AFIMP and NAFIMP in Table 5.9, column (1) are
both insignificant. Thus, an auditor’s economic dependence on the client is positively
related to COEC only if it is measured as the percentage of the total fees generated
by a client relative to the total fees earned from all clients. Moreover, AFIMP
and NAFIMP are not related to COEC if the client is in a good financial shape
(column (2) of Table 5.9). However, for clients in relatively poor financial condition
(column (3) of Table 5.9), the non-audit fee proxy for client dependence is positively
(coefficient of 0.0522) and significantly (p-value of 0.073, one-tailed test) associated
with the firm’s ex ante cost of equity capital. This finding seems not to accord with
the results of the ERC model and raises the question of whether or why the models
provide contradictory evidence.69 However, further analyses show that this finding
is not entirely robust but rather reveal results that are in accordance with the ERC
model. In sum, the analyses predominantly suggest that audit fee dependence might
drive shareholders’ concerns about the economic importance of the client.
69 The reason for this might be that the ERC—in broad terms—measures shareholders’ percep-
tions of the quality of audited financial reports and does not directly address related issues
of non-audit services. In addition, the ERC measures perceptions of the past, e.g., whether
auditor independence was maintained during the audit of the financial statement. In contrast,
the ex ante cost of equity capital refers to the future. Further, NAFIMP might imply that the
incumbent auditor provides a high level of non-audit services. A high level of non-audit ser-
vices might, in turn, indicate that the firm has recently undertaken risky projects (e.g., internal
restructuring activities) that affect a firm’s future development. Thus, more risky projects can
lead to higher non-audit services provided by the auditor and, therefore, higher NAFIMP due
to the auditor’s involvement in project planning and organization. Ultimately, this reasoning
may explain why NAFIMP is positively related to the ex ante cost of capital.
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Table 5.9: OLS Regressions—Ex Ante Cost of Equity Capital and Economic Importance of the Client Proxied by AFIMP and NAFIMP
Dependent Variable = COEC
Full Sample (1) Financial Condition: Financial Condition:
“Safe” Sample (2) “Non-Safe” Sample (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
AFIMP 0.0059 0.0071 0.407 0.0047 0.0075 0.531 0.0099 0.0112 0.378
NAFIMP 0.0229 0.0238 0.336 -0.0242 0.0255 0.344 0.0522 0.0359 0.146
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes
Intercept: Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 6,018 3,456 2,562
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.210 0.374
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression model includes auditor, industry, and year fixed effects, and
standard errors are clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regres-
sion model is tested: COECit = α0 + β1AFIMPit + β2NAFIMPit +
∑
13
j=3
βjCONTROLit +
∑
16
j=14
βjAUDit +
∑
23
j=17
βjINDit +
∑
27
j=24
βjY EARit + εit, where:
CONTROLit = {SPECIALit, AUDCHit, SECit, PCAOBit, POPULATIONit, SIZEit,MBit,MBNEGit, LEVit, BETAit, RETit}. AUD is a set of three auditor dummies, IND is a
set of seven industry dummies, and YEAR represents four year dummies. The variables are as defined in Table 5.2.
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5.5.1.2 National-Level-Based Measure
The literature suggests the use of office-level measures in audit research because
the auditor’s office is the decision-making unit (Francis et al. 1999; Wallman
1996). According to this, the appropriate measure of the economic importance
of the client should be based on office-level information (DeFond and Francis 2005;
Reynolds and Francis 2000). However, to examine whether client dependence at the
national-level is also perceived to compromise auditor independence, all regressions
are re-estimated using national-level-based measures of the economic importance
of the client. Regarding the results of the ERC-related regressions no significant
coefficient of the national-level-based measure of the economic importance of the
client is found.70 Thus, the empirical evidence does not support that shareholders
perceive client importance at the national-level to be an issue of independence if
perceptions are measured with the ERC metric, and this contradicts the findings of
Ghosh et al. (2009). These results are also in contrast with the results of the ex ante
cost of equity capital regressions. IMPORTANCE is always—i.e., irrespective of a
firm’s financial condition—significantly positively related to COEC . That client de-
pendence at the national-level is perceived negatively by shareholders accords with
other studies’ results (Hollingsworth and Li 2012; Khurana and Raman 2006).
In summary, mixed—i.e., model-dependent—evidence regarding whether share-
holders also perceive client importance at the national-level to be a threat to audit
independence is found. Therefore, these results may corroborate the idea that the
office-level approach is superior to the national-level approach in audit research
because shareholders’ concerns regarding economic dependence on the client are
primarily observable for office-level measures.
5.5.2 Measurement of Perceived Earnings Quality
5.5.2.1 Alternative Specifications of the Earnings Response Coefficient Model
The ERC has several advantages as a measure of perceived earnings quality. How-
ever, there might be some considerable noise in ERC estimates (DeFond and Zhang
2014). To address this problem, several alternative analyses are performed.
First, sensitivity checks regarding the calculation of CAR include the use of differ-
ent event windows, i.e., -2 to +2 and -3 to +3 trading days relative to the earnings
announcement date, and different benchmark indices, i.e., the Dow Jones Indus-
70 For the sake of brevity, all further results in this section are not tabulated.
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trial Average or the Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite are chosen instead of the
Russell 3000. Second, outliers of SURP might influence the results (Gipper et al.
2015), and, instead of winsorizing SURP , the variable is truncated at the 1% and
99% levels, a robust regression is performed,71 and SURP is calculated based on
median analysts’ earnings forecasts instead of mean analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Eventually, non-linearity in the market’s responsiveness to earnings is considered.
Therefore, the regressions are re-estimated with an interaction between SURP and
the absolute value of SURP (Chen et al. 2014; Subramanyam 1996; Wilson 2008).
Additionally, a variable indicating negative earnings and a corresponding interaction
term with SURP are included in the model (Chen et al. 2014). The findings of this
study are affected by none of the previous sensitivity analyses.
5.5.2.2 Alternative Approaches to Calculating the Ex Ante Cost of Equity
Capital
The calculation of the ex ante cost of equity capital used throughout the study
is based on Easton (2004). This method assumes no future changes in abnor-
mal earnings growth and no future dividends.72 Therefore, only data regarding
the one- and two-year-forward analysts’ earnings forecasts and the price per share
are required. Consequently, due to the simple calculation, this measure became
very popular in the accounting and auditing literature (Hollingsworth and Li 2012;
Khurana and Raman 2006). Moreover, this approach leads to a comparatively low
sample drop due to the unneeded data, for example, data regarding estimates
about future dividends or long-term earnings growth.73 Nevertheless, alternative
approaches to compute the ex ante cost of equity capital are used to check the
sensitivity of the findings.
71 The robust regressions are also performed for the COEC model with qualitatively same results.
72 This applies to the PEG ratio approach. The assumptions and findings for the PE ratio and
MPEG ratio approach of Easton (2004) are discussed in the respective footnote in subsection
5.4.2.1 and are not a subject for further discussion here.
73 However, to avoid loss of data, the dividends per share and, therefore, the dividend payout
ratio is computed for t = 0 and assumed to be constant (Krishnan et al. 2013).
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Therefore, two further models are used to calculate the ex ante cost of equity
capital: (1) the model according to Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005),74 and (2)
the model introduced by Claus and Thomas (2001).75
Using the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, all results remain qual-
itatively unchanged. The regression using the ex ante cost of equity model of
Claus and Thomas (2001) as the dependent variable shows the following picture:
IMPORTANCE is significant in all three samples. However, the corresponding coef-
ficient in the model of firms that are more likely to be financially distressed is almost
twice as large compared to the coefficient in the “safe” sample. Although there is
a considerable model-dependent decline in sample size—down to 1,564 observations
for the “non-safe” sample using the Claus and Thomas (2001) model—in sum, the
findings do not contradict the reasoning of this study. On the contrary, they show
that shareholders care about auditor independence due to client importance issues,
especially for clients in financial distress.
5.5.3 Measurement of Client’s Financial Condition
The Altman’s Z-score was chosen for several reasons, in particular, because it pro-
vides a classification of the client’s financial condition. Nevertheless, it should be
examined whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the measure of the firm’s
74 This model is also used by Gode and Mohanram (2003) or Krishnan et al. (2013) and is cal-
culated as follows: COECOJN= a+
√
a2 + EP S1P (
EP S2−EP S1
EP S1
− g), where a = 0.5(g +DPR),
COECOJN is the ex ante cost of equity capital according to Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(2005), EPS1 denotes the one-year-forward analysts’ earnings per share forecast, EPS2 is the
two-year-forward analysts’ earnings per share forecast, P defines the price per share, DPR rep-
resents the dividend payout ratio, and g equals the long-term earnings growth rate which is
assumed to be the expected inflation rate (Daske et al. 2008; Li and Mohanram 2014). There-
fore, the 10-year breakeven inflation rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is used to
capturing the expected inflation rate. In this respect, the procedure deviates from the literature
where g is set to risk-free rate minus 3% (Gode and Mohanram 2003; Krishnan et al. 2013).
This is due to the fact that low risk-free rates during the sample period applying this formula
would lead to negative long-term earnings growth. On the one hand, this appears implausible
and, on the other hand, leads to problems in the calculation of the ex ante cost of equity capital.
By further checks, however, it was ensured that the obtained results should not be sensitive to
the chosen approach.
75 This approach is, for example, implemented by Li and Mohanram (2014) and the ex
ante cost of equity capital is derived from the following equation: P = BPS +∑5
t=1
EP St−COECCT×BP St−1
(1+COECCT )t +
(EP S5−COECCT×BP S4)×(1+g)
(COECCT−g)(1+COECCT )5 , where COECCT is the ex ante
cost of equity capital according to Claus and Thomas (2001), P defines the price per share,
BPS is book value per share, EPSt are the t-year-forward analysts’ earnings per share fore-
cast, BPSt are the t-year-forward analysts’ book value per share forecast, and g equals the
long-term earnings growth rate which in turn equals the expected inflation rate (https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIEM; accessed on October 1, 2018).
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financial condition. Thus, all regressions are re-analyzed using three alternative
measures of the firm’s financial condition.
The first measure of financial distress used in other studies (e.g., Kim and Park
2014; Robin and Zhang 2015) is the Ohlson O-score (Ohlson 1980). To examine
H2 , the sample is divided at the median of the Ohlson O-score.76 Analyzing all
regressions leads to the conclusion that the findings are not altered if the Ohlson
O-score is employed.
The second alternative proxy for the client’s financial condition is the score from
Zmijewski (1984), which is also used in studies such as DeFond et al. (2002).77 For
this study, firms are categorized as more likely to be financially distressed if the
Zmijewski score is greater than the sample median. The findings from the ERC
model are qualitatively similar to the results of the main analyses. However, the
results for the ex ante cost of equity capital regression vary, since IMPORTANCE
is significantly positively (p-value of 0.092, two-tailed test) related to COEC in the
“safe” sample.
Third, a sample split based on the median of the probability of bankruptcy follow-
ing Hopwood et al. (1994) as the proxy for firm’s financial condition is performed.78
The results are generally in line with the story told by this study. However, the
one-tailed p-value for the coefficient of IMPORTANCE×SURP totals merely 0.131.
In contrast to the classification given by Altman (1968) but in line with the
approaches above, the sample is divided at the median of Altman’s Z-score as an-
other robustness check. The results remain unchanged. Overall, the alternative ap-
76 The Ohlson O-score is calculated as follows: −1.32 − 0.407LNTAit + 6.03
T Lit
T Ait
− 1.43W CitT Ait +
0.0757CLitCAit − 2.37
NIit
T Ait
− 1.83F F OitT Lit + 0.285INTWOit − 1.72OENEGit − 0.521
NIit−NIit−1
|NIit|+|NIit−1|
,
where LNTA equals the natural logarithm of GNP price-level index deflated total assets (GNP
deflator set to 100 in 2009), TL denotes total liabilities, TA represents total assets, WC corre-
sponds to working capital, CL equals current liabilities, CA is current assets, NI denotes net
income, FFO means funds from operations, INTWO is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net
income over the last two years is negative, and 0 otherwise, and OENEG is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if total liabilities are greater than total assets, and 0 otherwise (Ohlson 1980).
77 The Zmijewski score can be calculated as follows: −4.336−4.513NIitT Ait −5.679
T Lit
T Ait
+0.004CAitCLit ,
where NI equals net income, TA equals total assets, TL denotes total liabilities, CA represents
current assets, and CL denotes current liabilities (Zmijewski 1984).
78 The probability of bankruptcy according to Hopwood et al. (1994) with the mentioned adjust-
ment is calculated as follows: −7.322− 15.756NIitT Ait + 0.973
CAit
SALESit
− 1.677CAitCLit + 5.985
CAit
T Ait
−
9.145CASHitT Ait + 4.224
LT Dit
T Ait
+ 0.214ln(SALES), where NI equals net income, TA represents
total assets, CA denotes current assets, SALES equals total sales, and CL represents current
liabilities, CASH represents Cash, and LTD is long-term debt. In line with prior literature an
adjusted intercept of -7.322 instead of the incorrect original constant of 5.565 in Hopwood et al.
(1994) is used in the analysis (Geiger and Raghunandan 2001; Ratzinger-Sakel 2013).
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proaches strengthen the confidence in this study’s finding that shareholders perceive
a high economic importance of the client especially as a threat to auditor indepen-
dence if the client is more likely to be financially distressed. This finding seems plau-
sible particularly against the background of the conclusion of Dichev (1998, 1133)
that Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson O-score “are likely to complement each other well
for sensitivity analysis” and “are quite accurate in predicting bankruptcy.”79
5.5.4 Alternative Model Specifications
In addition to the measurement of the dependent and experimental variables, further
modifications are made to the model to strengthen the confidence in this study’s
conclusions.
First, it might be the case that the proxy for the economic importance of the client
is simultaneously an indicator of financial distress and, thus, firm’s risk. In turn,
higher risk of bankruptcy might be associated with a lower ERC and a higher ex
ante cost of equity capital. The differences in the descriptive statistics between both
samples presented in Table 5.4 could support such reasoning. However, the fact that
the results presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 show that the effect primarily exists
within the sample of financially “non-safe” firms might contradict this reasoning.
Nevertheless, to rule out this explanation for the observed results regarding the
economic importance of the client, as a first step, ALTZS is also included in the
regression of the full sample. The results are qualitatively unchanged. To exclude
that the variable does not reflect a continuous effect of the financial situation within
the subsamples, a continuous variable representing the Altman’s Z-score is included
in both models in all three samples. This also does not alter the results. Therefore,
there is support for the notion that it is the economic importance of the client that
affects shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality, in particular in the context of
firms that are more likely to be financially distressed.
Furthermore, it should be checked whether the selected winsorization influences
the results (Dyckman and Zeff 2014). Therefore, the regressions are re-estimated
with non-winsorized variables, winsorized independent but not dependent variables,
yearly winsorized variables, and winsorized variables at the 2.5th and 97.5th per-
centiles. Overall, the regression results do not alter the stated conclusions of this
79 The reasons given are the derivation of the models using different methods, variables, samples,
and time periods (Dichev 1998). Begley et al. (1996) also highlights the performance of the
Ohlson O-score as an indicator of financial distress.
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study. In addition, the industry fixed effects based on the SIC Division Structure
as used by the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Adminis-
tration are replaced by industry effects based on Frankel et al. (2002), the two-digit
SIC, and the one-digit SIC. Qualitatively similar results are observed. Furthermore,
industry fixed effects are omitted, or it is controlled for industries characterized by
a high exposure to litigation risk by including an indicator variable. The results
are nearly the same except for the interaction term IMPORTANCE×SURP in the
ERC model for the full sample (one-tailed p-values equal to approximately 0.125).
Finally, the results remain robust when including quarter fixed effects, clustering
two-way by firm and time, and bootstrapping, respectively.80
5.5.5 The Influence of Audit Office Size
The empirical evidence presented in this study might be caused by audit office size
effects because prior research suggests a relation between office size and audit quality
(Francis and Yu 2009). To address this issue, all regressions are re-estimated while
including a variable approximating audit office size. This variable is calculated as
the natural logarithm of the sum of the total fees paid by all firms in the sample to
an audit office in the respective fiscal year. Referring to the ERC model, significant
results are only found for the sample of financially distressed firms, which supports
H2 . Focusing on the ex ante cost of equity capital model, the interpretations of the
regressions regarding the client dependence proxy IMPORTANCE are not altered.
Ultimately, it might be of interest that—similar to Krishnan et al. (2013)—the office
size proxy is significantly correlated with the client dependence proxy (correlation
coefficient of -0.563). In contrast to Krishnan et al. (2013), a significantly positive
relation between office size and COEC is found.
Indeed, it can be argued that smaller auditors or audit offices are more likely to be
economically dependent on a client. As a consequence, shareholders’ doubts regard-
ing auditor independence might be greater for smaller audit offices (Craswell et al.
2002; Li 2009), and those offices could drive the findings above. Thus, all regressions
are re-estimated while excluding all audit offices with fewer than twelve clients; in
other words, the smallest quartile of offices in the sample is dropped. If the respec-
tive firm-years are excluded, no significant relation between all proxies for client
dependence and the ERC is found. On the basis of the ERC model, it might be
concluded that smaller offices cause the observed association between client depen-
80 For explanations of these sensitivity analyses, please refer to subsection 4.5.3.
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dence and shareholders’ perceptions of auditor independence. However, a differ-
ent picture emerges when examining the ex ante cost of equity capital regressions:
IMPORTANCE is significantly positively related to COEC . A final remark is in
order: if one assumes that the ERC and ex ante cost of equity capital measure the
same construct—shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality—then the mixed evi-
dence might be explained by potential issues of “constructed collinearity”—because
of a relatively large number of interaction terms—in ERC regressions, which is more
likely to be a problem if the sample size decreases considerably.
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5.6 Summary and Limitations
The study examines whether and when the Big 4 auditor-client economic bond is
perceived to be a threat to auditor independence and, hence, reduces perceived
earnings quality.
This analysis measures the economic importance of the client by the fees paid
by the client to the auditor divided by the total fees of the auditor’s office be-
cause the office-level approach might be superior to the national-level approach
(Reynolds and Francis 2000). Consistent with the economic dependence hypothe-
sis, a sample of 6,018 firm-year observations from 1,776 different 10-K filers for the
years 2010 through 2014 reveals that an auditor’s economic dependence on a client
is negatively related to shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. Foremost, the
results show that this association applies predominantly to the subsample of clients
that are more likely to be financially distressed. The findings are insensitive to the
proxy employed for shareholders’ perceptions, i.e., the ERC or ex ante cost of equity
capital. This can be interpreted to mean that shareholders are primarily concerned
about the economic importance of clients that are more likely to be in a financially
difficult situation.
The study offers interesting insights into when shareholders have a negative per-
ception of an auditor’s economic dependence on a client. The findings collectively
suggest that shareholders still perceive the economic importance of the client as
a threat to auditor independence. Therefore, this study complements Kao et al.
(2014), who consider independence in fact, and Hollingsworth and Li (2012), who
examine the ex ante cost of equity capital around the implementation of SOX. This
study’s results suggest that SOX seems to mitigate threats to auditor independence
only to a certain extent, and it might be of interest for the legislator to reconsider
recent regulation concerning the economic importance of clients, particularly for fi-
nancially distressed firms. Substantial further research regarding an economically
reasonable regulatory intervention is required, and it must be emphasized that this
study provides only initial evidence that shareholders’ perceptions might be condi-
tional on a client’s circumstances. Therefore, the suggestive findings could motivate
future research to examine other client circumstances, especially because little atten-
tion has been devoted to this issue in the context of perceived auditor independence
and perceived earnings quality.
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Some limitations of this study should also be discussed. First, the ERC and the
ex ante cost of equity capital are relatively indirect proxies for shareholders’ per-
ceptions of earnings quality and, thus, perceived auditor independence because the
perceived quality of earnings information is supposed to have a merely second-order
effect on the firm’s value (Zimmerman 2013).81 However, there are also some major
advantages of the perception-based measures used in this study such as their com-
prehensive and continuous character and the direct relation between shareholders’
perceptions and economic practice (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Second, the ex ante
cost of equity capital is estimated by calculating the implied expected rate of re-
turn on equity capital, meaning that the study is restricted to firms with positive
one-year-forward analysts’ earnings forecasts and earnings growth forecasts. Future
research could address the question of whether shareholders’ perceptions of audit-
related questions differ for firms with negative earnings growth forecasts and how
such differences might be explained. Third, the study’s sample is restricted to Big 4
auditors, and further research could address shareholders’ perceptions of the client
dependence of non-Big 4 auditors, especially because non-Big 4 auditors are usually
excluded from the analyses.
Fourth, the proxies for the economic importance of the client consider the audit
office’s total fees. However, the sample’s total audit office fees cover only the fees
of audited listed clients and not those of clients that are not audited, but that re-
ceived non-audit services. Therefore, the audit office’s total fees could be downward
biased, and the measure of client importance might be upward biased. Moreover,
internal information on the costs of audit and non-audit services could contribute to
solving the aforementioned problem of the unobservability of client-specific quasi-
rents. Fifth, there is a lack of evidence on whether and how shareholders estimate
auditor independence in practice, and it is questionable whether they can determine
the ratio of the total fees paid by the client to the total fees of the audit office
(Dickins and Higgs 2005). Nevertheless, the aim here is to find a suitable proxy
that reflects shareholders’ assessment of auditor independence, regardless of how
these perceptions are formed. What is more, the results—shareholders’ concerns
regarding auditor independence are primarily found at the office-level—support the
recent conclusions that office-level measures are of more interest in audit-related
research (Francis et al. 1999; Wallman 1996). This might therefore also apply to
81 For studies discussing the advantages, limitations, and critical assumptions of the used measures
refer for example to Dechow et al. (2010) or Kothari (2001).
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audit studies examining shareholders’ perceptions. Finally, although this study is
based on the relevant literature with regard to the independent control variables,
it would be beneficial to include further corporate governance factors that are not
covered by firm size and the auditor-related variables in the model.
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6 Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction
with the Management Board and the Supervisory
Board—Evidence from German Annual General
Meetings82
“Let me now move on to the main subject I want to discuss with you
today: The need for high quality accounting standards. While this may
seem miles removed from investor education, it really isn’t. Educated
investors need relevant, useful information to make their investment de-
cisions – and that is what high quality accounting standards deliver.”
This is how Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the SEC, began his speech at
the Inter-American Development Bank, from which also the quotation at the very
beginning of this dissertation is taken (Levitt 1998, 79). The enormous importance
that Levitt attaches to earnings quality for shareholders’ decision-making is obvious.
The two previous studies dealt with shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality in
the U.S. context. The study presented in this chapter aims to identify the importance
shareholders attach to earnings quality. In order to examine whether shareholders
actually consider earnings quality to be of such importance, as the above quotation
of Levitt suggests, the voting results at the annual general meetings of German
Prime Standard companies are analyzed.
While in the first two studies the focus is on shareholders’ satisfaction with auditor
selection and auditor independence, this study focuses on shareholders’ perceptions
regarding the board of the company. Especially, shareholders’ satisfaction expressed
82 This chapter is based on a working paper titled “Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction
with the Management and Supervisory Boards—Evidence from German Annual General Meet-
ings”, which was presented at the GSLES Doctoral Workshop in Oberjoch, the 39thAmerican
Accounting Association 2017 Southeast Region Meeting in Miami, the 40th European Account-
ing Association Annual Congress in Valencia, the 79. Wissenschaftliche Jahrestagung des Ver-
bandes der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft in St. Gallen, and the Annual Accounting
Conference in Berlin. The reasoning, results, and interpretations of this study might change
after the submission and publication of this doctoral thesis. The recent version of the paper is
available upon request.
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at the discharge of the management board and the supervisory board at general
meetings of capital market-oriented companies is investigated. In particular, this
study is interested in whether earnings quality influences shareholders’ satisfaction
with the management board and the supervisory board of a company.
The relevance of the question arises again from the existing agency problem. As
principals, the shareholders delegate the stewardship of the company to the manage-
ment, which is the agent and has information advantages. To ensure that the man-
agement does not take advantage of the existing information asymmetries, the share-
holder elects a supervisory board. The supervisory board takes a monitoring role
over the management to represent the interests of shareholders (Eulerich et al. 2014).
To mitigate information asymmetries and the resulting potential agency costs, the
management must report to both the shareholders and the supervisory board about
the stewardship of the company (Healy and Palepu 2001; Lev and Ohlson 1982;
Mayhew 2017; Wagenhofer and Ewert 2015). To do so, management must prepare
financial statements in accordance with the accounting standards. Only in this case
would accounting contribute to solving the agency problem by reducing information
asymmetries. However, the accounting standards allow the management accounting
discretion, which can be used opportunistically by the management by engaging
in earnings management to maximize their benefit at the expense of shareholders
(Christie and Zimmerman 1994; He and Yang 2014). Preventing this situation is
the responsibility of the supervisory board, which in turn has the opportunity to
form an audit committee. The audit committee monitors the financial reporting pro-
cess and proposes an independent auditor, who is to be elected by the shareholders
at the annual general meeting.
Accordingly, the provision of reliable information by management plays an es-
sential role in solving the agency problem. In theory, the quality of the financial
statements—i.e., earnings quality—must be adequate from the shareholders’ point
of view. Moreover, sufficient earnings quality is seen as a fundamental necessity for
the functioning of capital markets (Healy and Palepu 2001; Levitt 1998). Thus, nu-
merous studies address the topic of earnings quality, its definition, measurement and
influencing factors (Gaynor et al. 2016). In the existing literature, however, there
are also voices that attach less importance to earnings quality or to the improvement
of earnings quality for shareholders’ decision-making (Ball 2013; Zimmerman 2013).
Consequently, it would be of particular interest to have some insights into share-
holders’ view of the importance of earnings quality. Especially, it would be useful to
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know whether earnings quality plays such an important role for shareholders that it
influences their satisfaction with the company and its representative bodies.
Besides the mechanisms mentioned above to mitigate agency problems, share-
holder monitoring is a fundamental aspect of corporate governance (Van der Elst
2011). Shareholder monitoring occurs to a great extent at the company’s annual
general meetings, where shareholders can vote on corporate decisions and directly
communicate with the company’s board (Poulsen et al. 2010; Van der Elst 2011).
Moreover, the EU (2017) highlighted the relevance of shareholder involvement as a
cornerstone of corporate governance by its directive regarding the encouragement of
long-term shareholder engagement to ensure the competitiveness of European capital
market-oriented companies. Consequently, shareholder voting outcomes at annual
general meetings have attracted growing attention in the finance and accounting lit-
erature, which is far from being fully exploited in an international context (Cai et al.
2010).
In particular, the annual general meetings in the German context offer an excellent
opportunity to gain an understanding of shareholders’ opinions. More specifically,
the mandatory shareholder voting on the discharge of members of the management
board and the supervisory board enables the measurement of shareholders’ satisfac-
tion with the company’s representative bodies. This is the case despite the generally
overwhelming majority of votes supporting the discharge of the board members,83 as
shown by anecdotal evidence from the annual general meetings of Volkswagen AG
before and after the diesel car scandal.84 While the members of the management
board and the supervisory board were discharged with almost 100% of all votes in
the year before the scandal, the dissenting votes amounted to over 2% in the follow-
ing year, which represents an immense relative increase and, thus, a clear expression
of shareholders’ dissatisfaction.85
The discharge of the board is obligatory and thus, in contrast to other votes such
as the election of the supervisory board, takes place every year. Moreover, this vote,
which exists in only a few other countries besides Germany, brings a further advan-
83 The same can be observed in almost every shareholder vote at annual general meetings in the
EU and the U.S. (cf. Cai and Walkling 2011; Mayhew 2017; Mendoza et al. 2010).
84 See https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/business/volkswagen-is-ordered-to-
recall-nearly-500000-vehicles-over-emissions-software.html and https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/international/volkswagen-diesel-car-scandal.
html; accessed on October 1, 2018.
85 See https://www.volkswagenag.com/de/InvestorRelations/shareholder-meetings/
2015.html and https://www.volkswagenag.com/de/InvestorRelations/shareholder-
meetings/agm-2016.html; accessed on October 1, 2018.
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tage.86 It offers the opportunity to differentiate between shareholders’ satisfaction
with the two parts of the company’s board: the management board and the super-
visory board. Therefore, this study not only aims to investigate whether earnings
quality influences shareholders’ satisfaction with a company’s management board
and supervisory board but also, in particular, distinguishes between the satisfaction
with these two bodies of the company in order to investigate the responsibility for
earnings quality from shareholders’ perspective.
This step, in turn, will allow conclusions to be drawn as to whether shareholders’
dissent due to inadequate earnings quality is aimed at the management board—to
which they entrusted the stewardship of the company—or to the supervisory board—
which, as the shareholders’ direct representative, has the task of monitoring the man-
agement. Furthermore, this chapter examines how different firm characteristics—
i.e., information environment, performance, or audit committee existence—affect
shareholders’ view on the importance of earnings quality. Finally, knowing whether
shareholders consider earnings quality to be relevant and which corporate body
shareholders hold responsible for earnings quality will offer useful insights for fu-
ture research on accounting and the agency problem. Thus, this research project
is intended to contribute to an in-depth understanding of shareholders’ opinions re-
garding earnings quality and, ideally, to the justification of accounting and, hence,
accounting research.
86 Examples of countries with a discharge of board members in place are Belgium and the Nether-
lands (Van der Elst 2011).
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6.1 Introduction
Shareholder voting “as an effective mechanism for exercising governance around
the world” (Iliev et al. 2015, 2167), has attracted growing attention in recent years
(Yermack 2010). Due to the “increased access to the boardroom” (Cai and Walkling
2011, 299), a fundamental understanding of shareholders’ opinions has become vital
(Krause et al. 2014). In this context, Cai et al. (2010) call for further research on
shareholder voting—notably in international settings—to better align owner and
manager interests. In addition, shareholders are considered the primary users of
financial statements (Khurana and Raman 2006; Lev and Ohlson 1982). Therefore,
a systematic understanding of shareholders’ preferences regarding financial reporting
quality is of particular importance, especially for accounting research.
Given the increased attention devoted to shareholder voting and motivated by the
above-mentioned critical issue for the accounting literature, this study answers the
question of whether shareholders’ confidence in the company and, in particular, its
representative bodies is related to earnings quality. To do so, this study considers
the German environment, which is characterized by mandatory shareholder ballots
on the discharge of the management board and the supervisory board. Since this
vote has to take place at every annual general meeting, it provides comprehensive
information about shareholders’ satisfaction with the company’s board and does
not face selection bias issues. Moreover, it makes it possible to differentiate between
shareholders’ opinions about the management board and the supervisory board.
A large part of the accounting literature addresses the definition, measurement,
and determinants of earnings quality (cf. Dechow et al. 2010; Gaynor et al. 2016).
Moreover, there is an extensive ongoing discussion on the functions and usefulness
of accounting earnings (e.g., Ball 2013; Basu et al. 2013; Zimmerman 2013). First,
it is vital to understand, whether shareholders’ satisfaction is affected by earnings
quality. Furthermore, knowing which corporate body shareholders hold responsible
for earnings quality would offer an interesting point of orientation for future research
and regulation.
Shareholder votes at the annual general meeting have excellent potential to an-
swer these questions because the ballots directly reflect shareholders’ opinions re-
garding the members of the board (Cai et al. 2010). Although it might not be
costless for shareholders to vote their shares, it should be less expensive than “vot-
ing with their feet” by selling their shares (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009; Dao et al.
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2008; Parrino et al. 2003). Although an increasing number of studies have examined
agenda items at annual general meetings such as auditor ratification or say-on-pay
votes in the last decade,87 the existing literature on the election—and, particularly,
the discharge—of board members should be expanded.88 Despite the manifold share-
holder votes and the opportunities associated with studying them, the literature
using European settings almost exclusively considers questions concerning say-on-
pay.89 To overcome this gap, this study exploits the German setting by analyzing
the above-mentioned shareholder vote on the discharge of the management board
and the supervisory board to provide valuable insights into the relevance of earnings
quality to shareholders.
On the basis of a sample of 1,237 observations from companies listed in the
German Prime Standard, this study reveals that the magnitude of discretionary
accruals—as an inverse measure of earnings quality—is positively related to share-
holders’ dissatisfaction with the members of the corporate board—measured by votes
against the discharge of the management board and the supervisory board at the
annual general meeting. Moreover, this association is greater in magnitude and sig-
nificance in the model examining the discharge of the management board, which
could be interpreted to mean that shareholders primarily blame the management
board for inferior earnings quality caused by discretionary accruals.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It extends the
emerging research on shareholder voting by examining the hitherto almost un-
explored discharge of the management board and the supervisory board in Ger-
many and offers new insights into the determinants of shareholder voting out-
comes. Similar to other shareholder votes around the world, firm visibility, perfor-
mance and ownership characteristics determine the voting outcomes. The significant
findings—although, on average, few shareholders vote against the discharge of board
87 For studies on auditor ratification votes, see, for example, Mishra et al. (2005), Raghunandan
(2003), Raghunandan and Rama (2003), or Sainty et al. (2002). For examples of studies on
say-on-pay votes, see Cai and Walkling (2011), Ertimur et al. (2013), Ferri and Oesch (2016),
Kimbro and Xu (2016), or Krause et al. (2014). For a literature review on say-on-pay votes,
see Obermann and Velte (2018).
88 For studies dealing with the determinants of director elections, see, for example, Cai et al.
(2009), Ertimur et al. (2018), Fischer et al. (2009), Gal-Or et al. (2018), or Ye et al. (2013). For
a literature review on shareholder voting, see Cai et al. (2010) or Yermack (2010). Also worth
mentioning is the comprehensive study by Sauerwald et al. (2016), which examines shareholder
votes—including the discharge of the management board—of European listed companies from
15 countries.
89 For studies using a German setting, see, for example, Eulerich et al. (2014). As an example of
studies in the UK, see Ferri and Maber (2013).
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members—corroborate the view that shareholder votes represent a valuable indica-
tor of shareholders’ satisfaction. The study contributes to the accounting literature
by showing that earnings quality is associated with shareholders’ satisfaction with
the management board and the supervisory board members. The fact that earnings
quality seems to affect shareholders’ actions emphasizes the relevance of earnings
quality. Moreover, the findings indicate that shareholders predominantly hold the
management board responsible for earnings quality since the results concerning the
discharge of the supervisory board are less pronounced in comparison. Therefore,
this study extends the corporate governance literature by providing a deeper under-
standing of shareholders’ perceptions of a company’s board.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section describes
the specific characteristics of the German setting and the hypothesis development.
The research design and the sample selection are illustrated in section 6.3. Sec-
tion 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics and the multivariate analyses. Section
6.5 contains additional analyses, and the study concludes with a summary and a
presentation of its limitations in section 6.6.
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6.2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development
6.2.1 The Specific Characteristics of the German Setting
In this section, before developing the hypotheses, it is necessary to provide some
information about the characteristics of the German setting. According to the Ger-
man Companies Act and the German Corporate Governance Code, listed German
companies have to implement a two-tier board system. This board structure con-
sists of the management board and the supervisory board. Thus, there is a clear
separation between the executive board members and the supervisory board, which
is advantageous for this study and enables a differentiated analysis. Despite the
formal differences between German and U.S. board structures, the two systems are
converging.90
The main tasks of the management board are the direction and legal represen-
tation of the company and the management of the day-to-day operational business
(§§ 76 (1) and 78 (1) AktG). Therefore, it is comparable to the executive directors,
including the chief executive officer, in the U.S. (Elston and Goldberg 2003). Similar
to executives in the U.S., the responsibilities of the management board also include
bookkeeping (§ 91 (1) AktG) and the preparation of financial statements (§ 264 (1)
German Commercial Code, HGB). Moreover, the management board is obliged to
regularly report to the supervisory board (§ 90 (1) AktG).
The supervisory board, which is elected by the shareholders at the annual general
meeting,91 appoints and monitors the management board (§§ 84 (1) and 111 (1)
AktG). Thus, the members of the supervisory board are considered the counterpart
to the independent board directors in the U.S. (Elston and Goldberg 2003), espe-
cially since SOX has enhanced the monitoring role of directors to reduce agency
costs.92 The supervisory board members—who cannot simultaneously be members
of the management board (§ 105 (1) AktG)—should represent the interests of the
company’s shareholders (Cai et al. 2010). The monitoring role of the supervisory
board also includes the review of financial statements (§ 171 (1) AktG). In particu-
90 This is corroborated by the view that the U.S. board system is gradually becoming a two-tier
system (Calkoen 2012).
91 According to § 101 (1) AktG, the members of the supervisory board are elected by the annual
general meeting unless they are to be elected as employee supervisory board members in accor-
dance with the German Co-Determination Act. Therefore, it consists of representatives of the
shareholders, employees, and occasionally, banks. The members of the supervisory board may
hold several mandates and do not work full-time for the company (Albersmann and Hohenfels
2017).
92 Regarding the monitoring role of the board of directors, please refer to Fama and Jensen (1983).
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lar, the supervisory board can establish an audit committee (§ 107 (3) AktG), which
monitors target-oriented the financial reporting process and proposes an indepen-
dent auditor (Albersmann and Hohenfels 2017). Moreover, financial statements are
subject to the approval of both the management board and the supervisory board
(§ 172 AktG).
An additional task of the chair of the supervisory board is to preside over the
annual general meeting, which has to be convened by the management board within
eight months after the end of the fiscal year (§§ 120 (1) and 121 (1) AktG). The an-
nual general meeting allows shareholders to fulfill their complementary monitoring
role and mitigate agency problems. Among other items, German companies’ annual
general meetings include votes on the following resolutions (§ 119 (1) AktG): the
appropriation of the balance sheet profit, the election of supervisory board members,
the election of the auditor and the discharge of the members of the management
board and the supervisory board.93 Thus, the responsibilities of the German an-
nual general meeting and its agenda items—except for the discharge of the board
members—are comparable to annual general meetings in other countries.
However, the discharge of the members of the management board and the su-
pervisory board provides an opportunity for exciting research. Because votes to
discharge the management board and the supervisory board are separate, it is pos-
sible to differentiate between shareholders’ opinions about the management board
and the supervisory board. Moreover, the discharge of the members of the board
is a mandatory item on the agenda of every annual general meeting (§§ 119 (1)
number 3 and 120 (1) AktG). Although, or maybe because this vote has no bind-
ing legal effects—for example, a change in board members or the exclusion of their
liability—it should allow valuable insights into shareholders’ perceptions. In sum,
the German setting provides a clear measure of shareholders’ satisfaction with the
management board and the supervisory board.
6.2.2 Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Management
Board and the Supervisory Board
In their literature review, Dechow et al. (2010, 344) define earnings quality and of-
fer the following insight: “Higher quality earnings provide more information about
the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision
made by a specific decision-maker.” Accordingly, high quality financial statements
93 Furthermore, it includes situational or voluntary agenda items such as say-on-pay votes.
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should be of great importance to shareholders—who are the main decision-makers
(Khurana and Raman 2006; Lev and Ohlson 1982)—as they rely on decision-useful
information and are likely to be willing to invest only in companies with reliable
accounting (Levitt 1998). Moreover, only reliable accounting information can miti-
gate the agency costs entailed in information asymmetries—due to the separation of
ownership and control—between the company’s representative bodies and its share-
holders. The earnings number is a material source of information (Basu et al. 2013;
Nichols and Wahlen 2004), and shareholders should be interested in having high
earnings quality because it allows them to make the best possible decisions.
Contradicting this perspective, Ball (2013) raises serious doubts regarding whether
financial statements provide new decision-useful information for shareholders. Fur-
thermore, Zimmerman (2013) states that earnings quality has, at best, a second-
order effect on firm value. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that accounting decisions
may not affect shareholders’ wealth, which could indicate that earnings quality might
be of minor importance to shareholders. However, decision-usefulness as a criterion
for earnings quality is not constrained to the consideration of valuation decisions
(Dechow et al. 2010). Accounting numbers, such as earnings, have further func-
tions: for example, they play a fundamental role in contracting. Hence, there are
substantial reasons that earnings quality should be relevant to shareholders’ satis-
faction and, moreover, sufficiently important to be reflected in shareholders’ actions.
A major channel for shareholders to express their satisfaction is shareholder vot-
ing at the annual general meeting. Thus, the accounting literature, as well as other
studies, have examined these shareholder votes to draw conclusions about share-
holders’ preferences. Studies in accounting primarily focus on auditor ratification
votes. The empirical evidence reveals that shareholders’ satisfaction with the audi-
tor is related to auditor size and independence (Mishra et al. 2005; Raghunandan
2003; Sainty et al. 2002). Although evidence on the outcome of financial statements
is rare and limited to financial restatements (Liu et al. 2009) or going concern opin-
ions (Sainty et al. 2002), it provides first indications that shareholders might con-
sider earnings quality to be relevant. In contrast, Cunningham (2017) observes
no significant association between the results of auditor ratification votes and re-
statements. Though, higher abnormal discretionary accruals lead to a higher likeli-
hood to receive an “against” recommendation from the proxy advisor (Cunningham
2017). The proxy advisors, in turn, influence the voting behavior of the sharehold-
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ers (Cunningham 2017).94 In addition, the influence of earnings management on
shareholders’ dissent is supported by the findings of Kimbro and Xu (2016).
Nevertheless, almost no studies specifically address the question of whether earn-
ings quality affects shareholders’ satisfaction with the company’s board and, in par-
ticular, whether the management board and the supervisory board are held respon-
sible for earnings quality.95 Two exceptions dealing with the topic of director elec-
tion with a focus on earnings quality are Gal-Or et al. (2018) and Ye et al. (2013).
Ye et al. (2013) investigate director election votes and their association with ma-
terial weaknesses in internal controls and financial restatements in SOX Section
404 reports.96 Gal-Or et al. (2018) examine determinants of shareholder elections
of audit committee members.97 Although these studies might indicate that earn-
ings quality influences shareholders’ actions, the empirical findings relate primarily
to shareholders’ satisfaction with the audit committee. Thus, further research is
needed to better understand shareholders’ related opinions. The German setting
with the corresponding benefits described above provides a perfect opportunity to
conduct such research.
Assuming that earnings quality is relevant to shareholders, it remains unclear
which body of the board shareholders hold accountable for insufficient earnings
quality. The main reasons why shareholders seem likely to blame the members of
the management board for low earnings quality can be derived from the role of the
management board. The management board is responsible for leading the company
and preparing financial statements. In this context, the accounting standards allow
the management certain discretion that they can exploit either for the benefit of the
94 Regarding the influence of proxy advisors in the European context, please refer to
Hitz and Lehmann (2017).
95 In some director election papers, only a control variable indicating accounting restatements is
included (Cai et al. 2009; Ertimur et al. 2018). However, earnings quality is not the focus of
the mentioned studies, and this approach allows only a black-and-white view on shareholders’
opinions.
96 The authors observe a positive association between votes withheld from management director
election and internal control problems. In contrast, financial restatements influence solely the
results of audit committee directors’ votes.
97 The authors provide evidence that elections of audit committee members are influenced by
accounting expertise and the ability to monitor the financial reporting process. In particular,
they find an influence of restatements and excessive audit fees on the voting outcome but
observe no significant effect regarding discretionary accruals. However, Gal-Or et al. (2018)
focus mainly on audit committee members and are interested in the variation across individual
independent directors. In contrast, the present study makes use of the advantageous German
setting and analyzes shareholders’ satisfaction with the management board and the supervisory
board as a whole.
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shareholders or opportunistically (He and Yang 2014; Watts and Zimmerman 1990).
Therefore, the management board is responsible for installing a functioning internal
control system and ensuring high earnings quality (Cohen et al. 2004). Furthermore,
the management board is obliged to sign a balance sheet oath (§ 264 (2) HGB).
For a long time now, the management board’s compensation has been fre-
quently conditional on the company’s economic success—measured by accounting
earnings—to mitigate the agency problem (Ball 2009; Watts and Zimmerman 1978;
Watts and Zimmerman 1990). However, this approach could in turn raise agency is-
sues in terms of moral hazard. Thus, the management board has not only the oppor-
tunity but also the incentives to exercise discretion in the application of accounting
in their favor (Dechow et al. 1996; He and Yang 2014; Healy 1985; Holthausen et al.
1995). In turn, earnings management should create shareholder dissatisfaction
since—according to Haw et al. (2011, 517)—“it is a practice that potentially un-
dermines the credibility of financial statements, and such statements are a critical
attribute of useful accounting information in well-functioning capital markets.”
Ultimately, and despite the existence of the supervisory board and external
auditors, the level of earnings quality should affect shareholders’ satisfaction with
the management board. To examine this presumption, the following alternative
hypothesis is tested:
H1: There is a positive association between earnings quality and shareholders’
satisfaction with the management board.
To ensure that the management board is not exploiting information asymme-
tries, (independent) supervisory board members are considered a fundamental com-
ponent of corporate governance and influence the quality of financial information
(Carcello et al. 2011; Eisenhardt 1989; Gaynor et al. 2016; Healy and Palepu 2001).
Within the framework of agency theory, it is the task of the shareholder-appointed
supervisory board to alleviate agency problems due to the separation of ownership
and control (He and Yang 2014; Healy and Palepu 2001; Mayhew 2017). In par-
ticular, the supervisory board should constrain opportunistic earnings management
by the management board (Albersmann and Hohenfels 2017). Therefore, it could
also be argued that shareholders might hold the supervisory board accountable for
issues related to earnings quality. The supervisory board members are ultimately
the representatives of the shareholders and should execute their monitoring function
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conscientiously to effectively reduce information asymmetries (Balachandran et al.
2012; Cai et al. 2010; Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan 2012; Fischer et al. 2009).98
Their area of responsibility includes the review and approval of financial statements
explicitly. Furthermore, the supervisory board has to ensure the independence of the
external auditor. To do so, they have the authority to create an audit committee,
which oversees the financial reporting and internal control process.
It is hypothesized that shareholders will hold their representatives—the supervi-
sory board—responsible for earnings quality if they fail to safeguard shareholders’
welfare by mitigating agency problems. Therefore, the second hypothesis is
formulated in its alternative form as follows:
H2: There is a positive association between earnings quality and shareholders’
satisfaction with the supervisory board.
98 Tian (2014) presents a caveat to this view.
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6.3 Research Design and Sample Selection
6.3.1 Research Design
6.3.1.1 Conceptual Model
The conceptual model of this study is exemplified by the predictive validity frame-
work in Figure 6.1 (cf. Kinney and Libby 2002). The primary objective of this
study is to answer the question of whether earnings quality is related to sharehold-
ers’ satisfaction with the management board and the supervisory board (link 1). To
test this relation (link 5), empirical proxies for the theoretical concepts of earnings
quality and shareholders’ satisfaction with the management board and the supervi-
sory board are needed. The measure of earnings quality is based on discretionary
accruals (link 2). Shareholders’ satisfaction with the members of the board is mea-
sured by voting results at the annual general meeting (link 3). Both proxies, as
well as additional control variables (link 4), are discussed in detail in the following
subsections. Based on the empirical model in link 5, the hypothesized association
can be tested.
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual Model: Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with
the Management Board and the Supervisory Board
Theoretical
Concepts
Operational
Measures
Earnings Quality
Independent
Variable
Absolute Value of
Discretionary Accruals
Shareholders’ Satisfaction
with the
Management Board
and the
Supervisory Board
Dependent
Variable
Discharge of the Board
Voting Results
Further Firm
Characteristics
Control
Variables
1
2
5
3
4
6.3.1.2 Measure of Earnings Quality
First, a proxy for earnings quality is needed to test the hypotheses. In general,
earnings consist of two components: accruals and cash flows. The consideration
of accruals differentiates accrual accounting from pure cash flow accounting
(Francis et al. 2005). Accruals can be subdivided into discretionary and non-
discretionary (normal) components. Whereas normal accruals might reflect the
company’s real underlying economics, discretionary accruals are considered an
undesirable distortion of the information provided by reported earnings and,
thus, a surrogate for poor earnings quality (Dechow et al. 2010). The measures
of discretionary accruals are intended to directly capture managerial discretion
and accounting system issues, and therefore, they are of particular importance
for accounting research (Dechow et al. 2010). In this study, earnings quality is
proxied by absolute discretionary accruals taken from the performance-adjusted
modified Jones model introduced by Kothari et al. (2005), as is common in
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the accounting literature. The normal portion of accruals is estimated based on
the following cross-sectional industry-year-specific regression model in Equation 6.1:
(6.1)
ACCt
TAt−1
= α0+ β1
1
TAt−1
+ β2
∆REVt −∆RECt
TAt−1
+ β3
PPEt
TAt−1
+ β4ROAt−1+ εt ,
where ACC is total accruals, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items minus
cash flow from operations, TA is total assets, ∆REV is the change in revenues,
∆REC equals the change in accounts receivable, PPE is net property, plant, and
equipment, and ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items scaled
by lagged total assets.
Following Kothari et al. (2005), the intercept is included to mitigate omitted vari-
able problems, account for heteroscedasticity, and increase test power.99 All regres-
sion models are estimated for each industry-year combination using the Fama and
French 12-industry classification,100 where a minimum of 10 industry-year observa-
tions is required.101 The absolute value of the regression’s residual (DACC ) is used
to measure earnings quality.
6.3.1.3 Measure of Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Management Board and
the Supervisory Board
Although scant, prior research has made increasingly frequent use of shareholders’
voting decisions to proxy for their satisfaction (Cai et al. 2009; Sainty et al. 2002;
Ye et al. 2013). In sum, the findings of the previous literature indicate that voting
results should, in general, reflect shareholders’ satisfaction. According to Ye et al.
(2013), voting results represent a direct measure of shareholders’ confidence in the
company and its representative bodies. Furthermore, the costs shareholders face
when voting their shares should be relatively low (Dao et al. 2008). This study
focuses on shareholders’ satisfaction with the management board and the supervisory
board, which is obtained from the shareholder vote on the discharge of the members
of the management board and those of the supervisory board, respectively.
99 Re-estimating the model with no constant does not alter the results presented later in the study.
100 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_
ind_port.html; accessed on October 1, 2018.
101 Using a lower (higher) threshold of 5 (20) observations in an industry-year combination does
not affect the findings of this study. The same applies if a minimum of 15 observations is
required following Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014).
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The results of the discharge votes—which are held at the annual general meeting—
are chosen because they make it possible to capture satisfaction with both compo-
nents of the German board system, while only the supervisory board is elected by
shareholders. In contrast to the supervisory board election, the discharge of the
members of the management board and the supervisory board has to take place
every year. This helps to avoid sample selection bias issues and represents an even
more important advantage of the German setting. Since this mandatory item on
the agenda of the annual general meeting has no binding consequences, it is a clear
measure of shareholders’ satisfaction. For the empirical analyses, the natural log-
arithm of 1 plus the percentage of votes against the discharge of the management
board (VOTEMB) and the supervisory board (VOTESB) is used to measure share-
holders’ (dis)satisfaction.102 The logarithm transformation is implemented because
of the considerable skewness of the voting results, and is common in the prior voting
literature (Dao et al. 2008; Hermanson et al. 2009). The modification (natural log-
arithm of 1 plus the percentage of votes) helps to avoid truncation of the variables
at the minimum result of zero votes against the discharge of the board.
6.3.1.4 Model Specification and Control Variables
Shareholders’ satisfaction with the management board and the supervisory board
members might be influenced by numerous factors. Therefore, control variables
are introduced following the voting literature. Cai et al. (2009) provide evidence
that directors of poorly performing companies receive fewer supporting votes in un-
contested director elections. In turn, shareholders’ dissatisfaction with the board
due to unsatisfactory performance can lead to protest votes (Balachandran et al.
2012; Del Guercio et al. 2008). Therefore, the industry-adjusted earnings be-
fore interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by lagged total assets
(ADJROA) introduced by Cai et al. (2009) is included in the regression models to
control for accounting-based performance. The industry-adjusted one-year stock re-
turn (ADJRET ) should account for market-based performance (Dao et al. 2008;
Raghunandan 2003).103 Additionally, a loss indicator (LOSS ; Hermanson et al.
2009), book-to-market value (BTM ), an indicator variable for a negative book-
102 In rare cases of an individual discharge of board members, the mean value of votes against
the discharge is used to calculate the dependent variables. The findings of this study are not
sensitive to this choice and hold when taking the median observation.
103 Following the literature, ADJROA and ADJRET are adjusted by subtracting the respective
industry median. The choice of the industry mean does not change the later findings.
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to-market value (BTMNEG), and the Altman’s Z-score (ALTZ ) based on Altman
(1968) are included in the model. To address the general mood in the run-up to
the vote, the cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) during the week before the
annual general meeting is introduced.104 The variable DELAY is introduced to
indicate whether the annual general meeting takes place later than usual since an
unexpected delay typically indicates some disagreements or problems within the
company (Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007). This situation occurred, for example,
when Volkswagen AG postponed its annual general meeting following the diesel car
scandal.105 Factors directly related to the voting at the annual general meeting
such as voter turnout (TURNOUTMB/TURNOUTSB)—equaling the represented
capital entitled to vote—or cases of an individual discharge of board members
(INDDMB/INDDSB) might also influence the voting outcome (Sauerwald et al.
2016). The natural logarithm of market value of equity (SIZE) is included to con-
trol for firm size (Balachandran et al. 2012).106 Larger firms receive greater pub-
lic attention and, therefore, are more likely to be subject to “vote-no” campaigns
(Cai and Walkling 2011; Liu et al. 2009; Sauerwald et al. 2016). The same applies
to firms listed in one of the largest German equity indices, for which the indicator
variables DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TECDAX are introduced. These variables can
also be regarded as a measure of corporate governance since companies listed in one
of those indices have to act in compliance with certain standards (Ratzinger-Sakel
2013). Another measure of firm visibility is the age of the firm (AGE ; Kong et al.
2017). Finally, financial leverage (LEV ) and total strategic share holdings (TSH )
are also controlled for because ownership characteristics should influence the out-
come of shareholder votes (Dao et al. 2008; Gordon and Pound 1993; Raghunandan
2003; Sauerwald et al. 2016; Shleifer and Vishny 1997).107
104 CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return over the Prime All Share return computed for
the 5-day window, i.e., -5 trading days (one week) to -1 trading day relative to the date of the
annual general meeting. The market model parameters are estimated over the 180-day window
ending 21 trading days before the date of the annual general meeting. In additional robustness
checks, the event window is extended to -20 trading days (one month) relative to the date of the
annual general meeting, and the annual general meeting date is included in the event window.
Furthermore, the CDAX instead of the Prime All Share is chosen as the benchmark index.
105 See https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/business/international/volkswagen-
earnings-emissions.html; accessed on October 1, 2018.
106 The use of other proxies for firm size—i.e., the natural logarithm of total assets, revenues or
employees—does not alter the conclusions stated later in the study.
107 Both variables (LEV and TSH ) are also used by Krishnan and Ye (2005) as proxies for agency
costs.
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Ultimately, the association between the empirical measures of earnings quality
and shareholders’ satisfaction with the members of the management board and the
supervisory board can be observed. Therefore, the following model based on the
variables described above is tested:
V OTEit = α0 + β1DACCit + β2SIZEit + β3AGEit + β4LOSSit + β5ADJROAit
+ β6ADJRETit + β7CARit + β8ALTZit + β9LEVit + β10BTMit
+ β11BTMNEGit + β12TSHit + β13TURNOUTit + β14INDDit
+ β15DELAYit + β16DAXit + β17MDAXit + β18SDAXit
+ β19TECDAXit +
27∑
j=20
βjINDit +
32∑
j=28
βjY EARit + εit ,
(6.2)
where VOTEMB (VOTESB), TURNOUTMB (TURNOUTSB), and INDDMB
(INDDSB) are included in the management board (supervisory board) regression.
The models include industry and year fixed effects—IND represents eight indus-
try dummies;108 YEAR is a set of five fiscal year dummies109—and are estimated
with OLS regressions. Moreover, standard errors are clustered by firm.110 All con-
tinuous independent variables throughout the study are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles to mitigate the outlier problem.111 Since the author is interested
in substantial or even extreme shareholder dissatisfaction and winsorization would
diminish variation in the dependent variable, the voting results are not winsorized
in the main models (Cunningham 2017).112 Table 6.1 provides information about
the variable definitions.
108 To compute industry fixed effects, the 12-industry classification by Fama and French (http://
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.
html; accessed on October 1, 2018) is used. The results presented later remain unchanged if
the two-digit SIC code industry classification is used or if omitting industry fixed effects.
109 Using dummies indicating the year in which the annual general meeting took place would not
change the conclusions stated later in the study. The same applies if year-quarters are included
in the model regardless of whether they refer to the fiscal year-end or the annual general
meeting.
110 This study’s findings remain robust if standard errors are clustered two-way by firm and time.
111 The findings of this study presented later are not altered using yearly winsorization of the
continuous variables or winsorization at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
112 However, the evidence presented later remains unchanged if VOTEMB and VOTESB are win-
sorized, too.
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Table 6.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
VOTEMB Natural logarithm of 1 plus the percentage of votes against the discharge of the
management board.
VOTESB Natural logarithm of 1 plus the percentage of votes against the discharge of the
supervisory board.
Variable of Interest
DACC Absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets, estimated
based on the performance-adjusted modified Jones model introduced by Kothari et al.
(2005).
Control Variables
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
AGE Natural logarithm of the firm’s age in years, calculated based on the date the firm
was incorporated in Worldscope.
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization, and 0 otherwise.
ADJROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by lagged total
assets adjusted by the industry median.
ADJRET One-year stock return adjusted by the industry median.
CAR Cumulative abnormal stock return over the Prime All Share return computed for the
5-day window, i.e., -5 trading days to -1 trading day relative to the date of the annual
general meeting. The calculation is based on the market model estimated over the
180-day window ending 21 trading days before the date of the annual general meeting.
ALTZ Altman’s Z-score based on Altman (1968).
LEV Leverage, defined as total debt divided by total assets.
BTM Book-to-market value, calculated as book value divided by market value of common
equity at the date of the annual general meeting for firms with positive book-to-
market values, and 0 otherwise.
BTMNEG Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a negative book-to-market value, and 0
otherwise.
TSH Percentage of total strategic share holdings of 5% or more at the date of the annual
general meeting.
TURNOUTMB Percentage of voter turnout at the discharge of the management board.
TURNOUTSB Percentage of voter turnout at the discharge of the supervisory board.
INDDMB Indicator variable equal to 1 in cases of an individual discharge of the members of
the management board, and 0 otherwise.
INDDSB Indicator variable equal to 1 in cases of an individual discharge of the members of
the supervisory board, and 0 otherwise.
DELAY Indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual general meeting takes place 30 days after
the end of the median period of time between annual general meeting and fiscal
year-end of the firm, and 0 otherwise.
DAX Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the DAX, and 0 otherwise.
MDAX Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the MDAX, and 0 otherwise.
SDAX Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the SDAX, and 0 otherwise.
TECDAX Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the TecDAX, and 0 otherwise.
Fixed Effects Variables
IND Set of eight industry dummies according the 12-industry classification by
Fama and French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html; accessed on October 1, 2018).
YEAR Set of five year dummies.
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Table 6.1: Variable Definitions (continued)
Variable Definition
Additional Analyses Variables
TACC Absolute value of total accruals, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items
minus cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets.
FCERROR Absolute value of the mean analysts’ earnings per share forecast error of the respective
fiscal year scaled by price per share.
EPS1SD Standard deviation of the one-year-forward analysts’ earnings per share forecasts at
the date of the annual general meeting scaled by price per share.
AC Indicator variable equal to 1 if an audit committee exists, and 0 otherwise.
MBSIZE Number of management board members.
SBSIZE Number of supervisory board members.
MEETINGS Number of supervisory board meetings.
SOP Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has adopted a say-on-pay vote in one of the
three most recent annual general meetings, and 0 otherwise.
CGDEVIATION Number of deviations from the German Corporate Governance Code (https://www.
dcgk.de/en/code.html; accessed on October 1, 2018).
POSRET Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a higher one-year stock return than the
industry median, and 0 otherwise.
ANALYST Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm.
Note: This table presents the variable definitions.
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6.3.2 Sample Selection
The data on the voting results at the annual general meetings are hand-collected
by the author, which was possible because listed companies are obligated to publish
the voting results of the annual general meeting on their website within one week
(§ 130 (6) AktG). The remaining data for the main empirical analyses, including the
determination of discretionary accruals, are obtained from Datastream and World-
scope.113 The sample contains the German companies listed in the German Prime
Standard, the market index with the highest publicity and transparency standards
(Leuz 2003). This ensures comparability across the companies in the sample.
During the annual general meeting seasons from 2010 through 2015, 466 different
companies were listed in the German Prime Standard, resulting in an initial sample
of 2,196 firm-year observations.114 After deleting firm-years from foreign companies,
double listings, and preference shares with restricted voting rights, 1,874 firm-years
remain. Moreover, 185 firm-year observations are excluded from companies that
were not listed in the German Prime Standard at the date of the annual general
meeting or for which an unambiguous matching of the annual general meeting and
the corresponding IFRS financial statement was not possible.115 Subsequently, all
financial firm-years (SIC codes 6000–6799) are dropped, resulting in a loss of 206
observations. Moreover, 35 firm-years with inadequate voting data are excluded.
This also includes firm-years where the voter turnout was not observable. Finally,
in total, 211 firm-years are lost because of a lack of data in Worldscope or Datas-
tream and due to the requirement of at least 10 observations in each industry-year
combination to determine discretionary accruals. The final sample consists of 1,237
firm-year observations from 278 different companies from 9 of the 12 Fama and
French industry portfolios. Table 6.2 outlines the detailed sample selection process
(Panel A) and the composition by industry (Panel B).
113 I/B/E/S is the source of the analyst forecast data used throughout the additional analyses and
also causes a decline in the sample size observable in some of the regressions presented in Table
6.6, Table 6.7, Table 6.9, and Table 6.10. The data to generate the corporate governance vari-
ables are hand-collected from financial statements and declarations on the German Corporate
Governance Code.
114 Thus, the sample period starts after the financial crisis and changes in German accounting
regulations (Bigus and Hillebrand 2017).
115 This also includes very few cases of gaps between the fiscal year-end and the annual general
meeting of more than one year.
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Table 6.2: Sample Selection and Sample Composition by Industry
Panel A: Sample Selection
Firm-Years
Initial sample of all constituents of the German Prime Standard for the calendar years
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.
2,196
Less: Firm-years from foreign companies (ISIN country code other than “DE”). 185
Less: Firm-years from preference shares and double listings. 137
1,874
Less: Firm-years from companies that were not listed in the German Prime Standard
at the date of the annual general meeting.
120
Less: Firm-years for which an unambiguous matching of the annual general meeting to
the corresponding IFRS financial statement was not possible.
65
1,689
Less: Financial firm-years (SIC codes 6000–6799). 206
1,483
Less: Firm-years with inadequate voting data. 35
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in Worldscope. 48
Less: Firm-years with a lack of data in Datastream. 19
Less: Firm-years of industry-year combinations with less than 10 observations. 144
Final sample 1,237
Panel B: Sample Composition by Industry
Industry Classification Firm-Years Sample (%)
Consumer Non-Durables 43 3.48
Consumer Durables 64 5.17
Manufacturing 279 22.55
Chemicals and Allied Products 20 1.62
Business Equipment 375 30.32
Telephone and Television Transmission 10 0.81
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 112 9.05
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 132 10.67
Other 202 16.33
Total 1,237 100
Note: This table presents the sample selection procedure (Panel A) and the sample composition by industry (Panel B).
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6.4 Empirical Analyses
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics. The untransformed mean percentage
of votes against the discharge of the management board is 2.05%, and the median
observation is 0.12%. The disapproval obtained from the discharge of the supervi-
sory board members, with a mean value of 2.52% and a median value of 0.31%, is
somewhat higher. Although comparison with other shareholder votes around the
world should be treated with caution, similar to director elections or auditor ratifi-
cation votes in the U.S., the percentage of votes supporting the discharge of board
members is very high, and there seems to be no substantial variation in the votes
(Cai et al. 2009; Dao et al. 2008; Raghunandan 2003; Sainty et al. 2002; Ye et al.
2013). Moreover, the voting results exhibit relatively high skewness, which is also
in line with the voting literature and supports the logarithm transformation of the
dependent variables VOTEMB and VOTESB.
The mean value of the absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals—scaled by
lagged total assets—is 0.056. The mean untransformed market value equals 3.286
billion e. The average firm is covered in Worldscope for approximately 16 years,
and 23.52% of the sample make losses. The mean earnings before interest, taxes, de-
preciation, and amortization scaled by lagged total assets equals 0.098. The median
one-year stock return totals 12.83%, which is lower than the mean value of 18.31%.
The mean and median cumulative abnormal stock return during the month before
the annual general meeting are both close to zero. The median value of ALTZ equals
2.810, which is just below the critical threshold of 2.99 to be considered financially
“safe” according to Altman (1968). The percentage of strategical holdings of a me-
dian firm-year observation is 44.00%, and the mean value of LEV totals 18.17%. The
book-to-market value of an average firm totals 0.677, and 1.70% of the observations
have a negative book-to-market value. The mean voter turnouts during the dis-
charge of the management board and the supervisory board are both slightly above
50%, which is in line with the findings from prior literature (Mendoza et al. 2010;
Schmidt 2017). Both types of board members face individual discharge approxi-
mately every tenth annual general meeting. Approximately half of all companies
are listed in one of the primary indices: DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX.
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Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Dev.
25% 50% 75% Min. Max.
VOTEMB 2.054 7.739 0.012 0.117 0.832 0.000 99.806
VOTESB 2.518 7.266 0.032 0.307 1.797 0.000 99.806
DACC 0.056 0.055 0.017 0.039 0.076 0.001 0.285
SIZE 3.286 10.525 0.065 0.224 1.429 0.007 70.613
AGE 15.771 10.238 9.934 13.255 17.485 1.507 42.367
LOSS 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ROA 0.098 0.163 0.065 0.116 0.162 -0.660 0.484
RET 0.183 0.435 -0.097 0.128 0.401 -0.716 1.778
CAR 0.001 0.045 -0.021 -0.001 0.023 -0.128 0.170
ALTZ 3.226 3.676 1.842 2.810 4.013 -10.989 19.740
LEV 0.182 0.157 0.045 0.159 0.269 0.000 0.735
BTM 0.677 0.529 0.351 0.546 0.847 0.000 3.333
BTMNEG 0.017 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TSH 40.959 26.254 18.000 44.000 61.000 0.000 90.000
TURNOUTMB 51.721 23.024 35.840 51.892 69.790 2.020 93.960
TURNOUTSB 51.672 21.984 36.470 52.030 67.910 3.650 93.026
INDDMB 0.108 0.311 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
INDDSB 0.105 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
DELAY 0.051 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
DAX 0.080 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MDAX 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SDAX 0.117 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TECDAX 0.105 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
n 1, 237
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled data. All continuous variables other than VOTEMB and VOTESB
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions: VOTEMB represents the untransformed percentage of votes
against the discharge of the members of the management board. VOTESB equals the untransformed percentage of votes against
the discharge of the members of the supervisory board. SIZE equals the untransformed market value of equity in billion e. AGE
represents the untransformed age of the firm in years, based on the date the firm was incorporated in Worldscope. ROA represents
unadjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by lagged total assets. RET represents the
unadjusted recent one-year stock return at the date of the annual general meeting. All other variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.4 shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. The corre-
lation coefficients of the independent variables do not lead to serious concerns about
collinearity.116 However, the proxy for firm size (SIZE) is noticeably related to firm
age (AGE), LOSS, and the membership variables DAX and MDAX. Furthermore,
ADJROA is related to the indicator LOSS and ALTZ. Nevertheless, the VIFs sup-
port the conclusion that there is no material issue of collinearity, as all VIFs are
considerably below the critical value of 10.117
116 There is a strong correlation between the both (dis)satisfaction measures VOTEMB and
VOTESB. The same applies to TURNOUTMB (INDDMB) and TURNOUTSB (INDDSB).
Because they are not simultaneously included in the model, this does not represent a problem.
117 The mean VIFs of the main models explaining the discharge of the management board and the
supervisory board are 2.42.
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Table 6.4: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1)VOTEMB 1.000
(2)VOTESB 0.689 1.000
(0.000)
(3)DACC 0.182 0.070 1.000
(0.000) (0.014)
(4)SIZE -0.101 0.011 -0.284 1.000
(0.000) (0.686) (0.000)
(5)AGE 0.028 0.134 -0.174 0.398 1.000
(0.320) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(6)LOSS 0.249 0.158 0.213 -0.313 -0.109 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(7)ADJROA -0.239 -0.134 -0.160 0.268 0.070 -0.632 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
(8)ADJRET -0.210 -0.132 -0.105 0.152 0.068 -0.240 0.271 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000)
(9)CAR 0.005 0.007 0.041 -0.043 -0.028 0.003 -0.004 -0.054 1.000
(0.869) (0.814) (0.151) (0.127) (0.334) (0.915) (0.890) (0.057)
(10)ALTZ -0.219 -0.113 -0.054 0.140 -0.037 -0.244 0.376 0.132 0.034 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.235)
(11)LEV 0.151 0.081 -0.021 0.136 0.086 0.097 -0.074 -0.073 -0.021 -0.373 1.000
(0.000) (0.004) (0.451) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.463) (0.000)
(12)BTM 0.193 0.063 0.040 -0.250 -0.192 0.088 -0.094 -0.273 0.065 -0.156 0.025 1.000
(0.000) (0.027) (0.159) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.386)
(13)BTMNEG 0.151 0.042 0.156 -0.156 -0.046 0.193 -0.318 -0.081 -0.031 -0.315 0.302 -0.144
(0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.271) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(14)TSH -0.191 -0.225 -0.023 -0.118 -0.107 -0.050 0.065 0.002 0.002 0.084 -0.037 0.027
(0.000) (0.000) (0.427) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.021) (0.945) (0.938) (0.003) (0.192) (0.351)
(15)TURNOUTMB -0.223 -0.071 -0.212 0.315 0.160 -0.092 0.076 0.087 -0.029 0.042 0.026 -0.216
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.305) (0.143) (0.354) (0.000)
(16)TURNOUTSB -0.113 -0.195 -0.103 0.200 -0.084 -0.118 0.156 0.058 -0.006 0.118 -0.010 -0.056
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.845) (0.000) (0.721) (0.050)
(17)INDDMB 0.219 0.135 0.060 0.061 0.119 0.150 -0.124 -0.024 0.036 -0.161 0.129 0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.402) (0.208) (0.000) (0.000) (0.671)
(18)INDDSB 0.088 0.118 0.003 0.113 0.130 0.077 -0.043 0.007 0.009 -0.104 0.049 0.008
(0.002) (0.000) (0.918) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.130) (0.801) (0.761) (0.000) (0.087) (0.765)
(19)DELAY 0.170 0.085 0.063 -0.185 -0.042 0.175 -0.203 -0.075 -0.040 -0.139 0.081 0.043
(0.000) (0.003) (0.026) (0.000) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.157) (0.000) (0.005) (0.126)
(20)DAX 0.035 0.055 -0.149 0.580 0.301 -0.093 0.050 0.017 0.013 -0.060 0.123 -0.025
(0.222) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.080) (0.540) (0.640) (0.035) (0.000) (0.377)
(21)MDAX 0.018 0.068 -0.153 0.426 0.197 -0.100 0.092 0.003 -0.094 0.046 0.086 -0.091
(0.518) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.915) (0.001) (0.104) (0.002) (0.001)
(22)SDAX -0.014 0.056 -0.060 0.057 -0.066 -0.072 0.118 0.036 0.015 0.047 0.048 -0.046
(0.629) (0.049) (0.036) (0.044) (0.020) (0.012) (0.000) (0.200) (0.589) (0.097) (0.094) (0.109)
(23)TECDAX -0.039 0.001 0.060 0.112 -0.060 -0.028 0.061 -0.048 0.013 0.139 -0.121 -0.114
(0.172) (0.975) (0.036) (0.000) (0.035) (0.317) (0.031) (0.093) (0.644) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 6.4: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients (continued)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
(1)VOTEMB
(2)VOTESB
(3)DACC
(4)SIZE
(5)AGE
(6)LOSS
(7)ADJROA
(8)ADJRET
(9)CAR
(10)ALTZ
(11)LEV
(12)BTM
(13)BTMNEG 1.000
(14)TSH 0.029 1.000
(0.311)
(15)TURNOUTMB -0.056 0.401 1.000
(0.050) (0.000)
(16)TURNOUTSB -0.039 0.402 0.449 1.000
(0.176) (0.000) (0.000)
(17)INDDMB 0.135 0.035 0.105 0.127 1.000
(0.000) (0.214) (0.000) (0.000)
(18)INDDSB 0.016 0.008 0.158 0.137 0.720 1.000
(0.570) (0.790) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(19)DELAY 0.140 0.081 0.001 0.057 0.120 0.029 1.000
(0.000) (0.004) (0.972) (0.044) (0.000) (0.316)
(20)DAX -0.039 -0.222 0.047 0.007 0.099 0.113 -0.055 1.000
(0.173) (0.000) (0.098) (0.819) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054)
(21)MDAX -0.040 -0.087 0.177 0.116 0.013 0.017 -0.080 -0.128 1.000
(0.161) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.658) (0.542) (0.005) (0.000)
(22)SDAX -0.048 0.025 0.111 0.093 0.027 0.047 -0.062 -0.107 -0.158 1.000
(0.092) (0.378) (0.000) (0.001) (0.349) (0.097) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000)
(23)TECDAX -0.045 -0.155 -0.038 -0.083 -0.052 -0.057 -0.031 -0.101 -0.149 -0.125 1.000
(0.113) (0.000) (0.186) (0.004) (0.070) (0.044) (0.269) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: This table shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the pooled data. All continuous variables other than VOTEMB and VOTESB are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. The numbers in parentheses indicate two-tailed p-values. The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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6.4.2 Multivariate Analyses
The multivariate results presented in Table 6.5, column (1) reveal the following
picture: Dissatisfaction with management board members is positively associated
with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The one-tailed p-value is 0.002, and
therefore, the earnings quality proxy is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient
is 1.5024, which means that increasing the absolute discretionary accruals by one
standard deviation totaling 0.055 results in a more than 10% increase in the votes
against the discharge of the management board for an average firm.118
The results shown in Table 6.5, column (2) regarding the determinants of the votes
against the discharge of the supervisory board are weaker. The one-tailed p-value
equals 0.082, and thus, the influence of the absolute discretionary accruals measures
is only on the verge of significance at the 10% level. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coefficient (0.8064) is just over half that of the coefficient of the management board
regression.119 The same applies to the economic effect, which equals an increase in
votes against the discharge of the supervisory board of approximately 6% for an
average firm if DACC increases by one standard deviation (0.055).120 Implementing
a seemingly unrelated regression model reveals that the coefficients are statistically
different from one another.121
118 This is based on a mean untransformed VOTEMB of 2.054. Solving ln(2.054 +
∆VOTEMB+1) = ln(2.054 + 1) + 0.055 × 1.5024 = 1.1991 results in the following calcula-
tion: ∆VOTEMB= eln(2.054+1)+0.055×1.5024 − 1 − 2.054 = 0.2631. This figure is equivalent to
a change of 0.26312.054 = 12.81%. Since the economic effect can be determined only indirectly due
to the selected transformation of the dependent variable, this topic is addressed again in the
additional analyses in subsection 6.5.2.
119 This finding can also be observed throughout the robustness checks and the additional analyses.
120 Having a mean untransformed VOTESB of 2.518, the change equals ∆VOTESB=
eln(2.518+1)+0.055×0.8064 − 1− 2.518 = 0.1595 or 0.15952.518 = 6.33%, respectively.
121 This finding also holds for the alternative measures of earnings quality, except analysts’ forecast
dispersion, which are presented in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7.
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Table 6.5: OLS Regressions—Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Management Board and the Supervisory Board
Dependent Variable
VOTEMB (1) VOTESB (2)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
DACC 1.5024 0.5199 0.004 0.8064 0.5774 0.164
SIZE -0.0269 0.0267 0.315 -0.0435 0.0311 0.163
AGE 0.0730 0.0422 0.085 0.1285 0.0460 0.006
LOSS 0.1745 0.0800 0.030 0.1899 0.0872 0.030
ADJROA -0.1765 0.2146 0.411 -0.0351 0.2481 0.888
ADJRET -0.1676 0.0566 0.003 -0.1363 0.0586 0.021
CAR -0.1200 0.5099 0.814 0.2161 0.5251 0.681
ALTZ -0.0132 0.0090 0.143 -0.0024 0.0085 0.781
LEV 0.2557 0.2154 0.236 0.1827 0.2307 0.429
BTM 0.2237 0.0917 0.015 0.1092 0.0847 0.199
BTMNEG 0.3040 0.3134 0.333 -0.0301 0.2994 0.920
TSH -0.0040 0.0012 0.001 -0.0044 0.0014 0.002
TURNOUT -0.0048 0.0013 0.000 -0.0055 0.0018 0.003
INDD 0.4188 0.1228 0.001 0.2679 0.1329 0.045
DELAY 0.3873 0.1274 0.003 0.3152 0.1303 0.016
DAX 0.2271 0.1641 0.168 0.3590 0.1907 0.061
MDAX 0.2656 0.1105 0.017 0.4100 0.1255 0.001
SDAX 0.1600 0.1038 0.124 0.3781 0.1371 0.006
TECDAX 0.0598 0.1062 0.574 0.1353 0.1329 0.309
Intercept 0.4355 0.2666 0.103 0.2983 0.2675 0.266
Industry Effects: Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm
n 1,237 1,237
Adjusted R2 0.246 0.165
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed ef-
fects, and standard errors are clustered by firm. All continuous variables other than VOTE are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported
p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are tested for the satisfaction with the management board and the supervisory board, respectively:
V OTEit = α0 + β1DACCit + β2SIZEit + β3AGEit + β4LOSSit + β5ADJROAit + β6ADJRETit + β7CARit + β8ALTZit + β9LEVit + β10BTMit + β11BTMNEGit +
β12TSHit + β13TURNOUTit + β14INDDit + β15DELAYit + β16DAXit + β17MDAXit + β18SDAXit + β19TECDAXit +
∑
27
j=20
βjINDit +
∑
32
j=28
βjY EARit + εit,
where IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents five year dummies. VOTEMB (VOTESB), TURNOUTMB (TURNOUTSB), and INDDMB (INDDSB) are in-
cluded in the management board regression model in column (1) and the supervisory board regression model in column (2), respectively. The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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In addition to the observed association of the experimental variable with share-
holder votes against the discharge of the management board and the supervisory
board, some additional findings are noteworthy. First, the firm’s age and member-
ship in one of the largest performance indices, particularly MDAX, has a negative
impact on shareholder votes. A greater public presence and visibility and, thus, a
higher risk of “vote-no” campaigns might be a reason for the observed relation.
Furthermore, and in line with the literature on shareholder voting in the U.S.,
the industry-adjusted one-year stock return (ADJRET ) has a positive influence on
shareholders’ satisfaction with both the management board and the supervisory
board. The opposite is true for the variable LOSS, which also indicates that per-
formance matters to shareholders. If the firm’s annual general meeting takes place
later than expected, which could be interpreted as indicating some problems within
the firm, shareholders’ dissatisfaction is also higher. However, the industry-adjusted
accounting-based performance (ADJROA) and the short-term cumulative abnormal
stock return obtained from the market model (CAR) are not significantly associated
with votes against the discharge of the board members.
The relative number of shares held strategically has a negative effect on votes
against the discharge of board members. This could be explained by greater agency
costs between shareholders and managers for higher levels of free float (number of
shares not held strategically). Finally, dissenting votes are lower for annual general
meetings with higher voter turnout—votes against losing relative power—and higher
if there is an individual discharge of board members.
In summary, the empirical findings support the assumption that the outcome of
votes to discharge board members in Germany represents shareholders’ satisfaction,
which is comparable to other votes around the world. More important, earnings
quality—which is measured by the magnitude of discretionary accruals—seems to be
a material driver of shareholders’ dissatisfaction with the management board and the
supervisory board. However, the results regarding the discharge of the supervisory
board are not as strong in magnitude and significance as in the management board
model. This could be interpreted to mean that shareholders especially blame the
management board for inferior earnings quality caused by discretionary accruals.
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6.5 Additional Analyses
6.5.1 Measurement of Earnings Quality
6.5.1.1 Alternative Approaches to Calculate Absolute Discretionary Accruals
To ensure that the findings of this study are not driven by the choice of a partic-
ular model to calculate discretionary accruals, alternative approaches to calculate
absolute discretionary accruals are examined.122 Thus, the normal portion of accru-
als is estimated based on the cross-sectional industry-year-specific regression model
following Jones (1991), as well as the modified Jones model by Dechow and Sloan
(1995). To consider firm-specific factors, the performance-adjusted modified Jones
model used throughout the main analyses is estimated while including firm and
year fixed effects following Kothari et al. (2016). Although the main conclusions
of this study are not sensitive to the different specifications, in contrast to the re-
sults regarding the dissatisfaction with the members of the management board, the
one-tailed p-values of the coefficients on DACC in the supervisory board models
total only approximately 0.15. The application of the procedure estimating discre-
tionary accruals based on samples with similarity in firm size instead of industry, as
proposed by Ecker et al. (2013), leads to comparable results.
6.5.1.2 Alternative Measures of Earnings Quality
Although the use of discretionary accrual-based measures of earnings quality
is a common approach in the accounting literature, it is not free from criti-
cism (cf. Dechow et al. 2010). Therefore, three alternative proxies are used
to measure earnings quality. First, the absolute value of total accruals scaled
by lagged total assets (TACC ), which might be more accessible to sharehold-
ers, is used (Cameran and Francis 2017; Dechow et al. 2011). Since earnings
quality is an important consideration for financial analysts (Salerno 2014), the
two other proxies are linked to analysts’ forecast accuracy and analysts’ fore-
cast dispersion (Bryan and Tiras 2007; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lang et al. 2003;
Leuz and Wysocki 2016). On the one hand, the absolute value of the mean analysts’
earnings per share forecast error deflated by stock price (FCERROR) might be re-
lated to the reliability of the reported earnings.123 On the other hand, the standard
122 For the sake of brevity, the results are not tabulated in this section unless described otherwise.
123 Using the median analysts’ earnings per share forecast instead leads to similar results.
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deviation of the one-year-forward analysts’ earnings per share forecasts deflated by
the stock price (EPS1SD) should additionally reflect disagreement among analysts
as an indicator of information asymmetries (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999;
Leuz 2003). Since all three variables are inverse measures of earnings quality, a
positive association with shareholder votes against the discharge of the members of
the management board and the supervisory board would be in line with the main
results.
Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 show the corresponding results, and the coefficients of
the earnings quality proxies have the predicted positive sign in all models. Apart
from the impact of TACC on VOTESB, considering one-tailed p-values, all effects
are significant at the 5% level or better. Therefore, the alternative measures provide
triangulating evidence for this study’s assertion that earnings quality is relevant to
shareholders and influences their satisfaction. The finding that shareholders seem to
predominantly hold the management board responsible for earnings quality is also
supported.
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Table 6.6: OLS Regressions—Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Management Board: Alternative Measures of Earnings Quality
Dependent Variable = VOTEMB
Earnings Quality Proxy: Earnings Quality Proxy: Earnings Quality Proxy:
TACC (1) FCERROR (2) EPS1SD (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
EQ 1.1785 0.4208 0.005 2.2933 0.6528 0.001 4.9194 1.8626 0.009
Intercept: Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 1,237 1,100 968
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.228 0.206
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are
clustered by firm. All continuous variables other than VOTEMB are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are
tested: V OTEMBit = α0 + β1EQit + β2SIZEit + β3AGEit + β4LOSSit + β5ADJROAit + β6ADJRETit + β7CARit + β8ALTZit + β9LEVit + β10BTMit + β11BTMNEGit +
β12TSHit + β13TURNOUTMBit + β14INDDMBit + β15DELAYit + β16DAXit + β17MDAXit + β18SDAXit + β19TECDAXit +
∑
27
j=20
βjINDit +
∑
32
j=28
βjY EARit + εit, where
IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents five year dummies. EQ represents three different alternative earnings quality proxies: column (1) TACC, column (2) FCERROR,
and column (3) EPS1SD. The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.7: OLS Regressions—Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Supervisory Board: Alternative Measures of Earnings Quality
Dependent Variable = VOTESB
Earnings Quality Proxy: Earnings Quality Proxy: Earnings Quality Proxy:
TACC (1) FCERROR (2) EPS1SD (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
EQ 0.4747 0.3991 0.235 1.0093 0.5491 0.067 4.0375 1.9965 0.044
Intercept: Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 1,237 1,100 968
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.166 0.177
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are
clustered by firm. All continuous variables other than VOTESB are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are
tested: V OTESBit = α0 + β1EQit + β2SIZEit + β3AGEit + β4LOSSit + β5ADJROAit + β6ADJRETit + β7CARit + β8ALTZit + β9LEVit + β10BTMit + β11BTMNEGit +
β12TSHit + β13TURNOUTSBit + β14INDDSBit + β15DELAYit + β16DAXit + β17MDAXit + β18SDAXit + β19TECDAXit +
∑
27
j=20
βjINDit +
∑
32
j=28
βjY EARit + εit, where
IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents five year dummies. EQ represents three different alternative earnings quality proxies: column (1) TACC, column (2) FCERROR,
and column (3) EPS1SD. The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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6.5.2 Measurement of Shareholders’ Satisfaction
As mentioned in the description of the research design, the empirical measure of
shareholders’ satisfaction is computed by a log transformation of the percentage
of votes against the discharge of the board members in order to address the high
skewness of the voting outcome. However, the main regressions are replicated using
untransformed voting outcomes, and the results remain unchanged.124 In order to
lose no observations of zero votes against the discharge of the board, the natural
logarithm of 1 plus the percentage of votes against the discharge of the board is used
in the analyses to measure shareholders’ satisfaction. Re-estimating the main model
using a simple log transformation does not alter the stated conclusions. However,
the coefficient of DACC in the supervisory board model is no longer significant (one-
tailed p-value of 0.106), which might be a result of the sample drop of approximately
100 observations.
Despite the supposed methodical subordination, the two modified approaches al-
low a direct interpretation of the economic influence. The economic effects are to be
considered exemplarily for the management board. The model with untransformed
voting outcomes reveals an increase in votes against the discharge of the manage-
ment board of almost 1 percentage point with an increase in the variable of interest
by one standard deviation (coefficient of DACC equals 18.0952). The simple log
transformation shows for this case an increase of 21.23% (coefficient of DACC totals
3.8602).
Additionally, two further model specifications are tested and show qualitatively
identical results. First, a variable indicating whether the voting dissent is above the
mean observation is generated, and a logistic regression model is estimated. Second,
a tobit regression is conducted using a dependent variable that divides the voting
outcome into different groups (less than 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10% and more
than 10% of votes against the discharge of the board members). Thus, the findings
are not dependent on the different specifications, and the skewness of the voting
variable should not be considered particularly problematic.
Some studies treat votes abstain as an expression of shareholders’ dissatisfaction
by including them when calculating the voting variable (e.g., Brickley et al. 1988;
Cunningham 2017; Dao et al. 2008; Sainty et al. 2002). This approach does not
seem appropriate for the German setting, as the number of abstentions is not re-
124 Implementing a tobit regression (Tobin 1958) leads to qualitatively identical results (cf.
Balsam et al. 2016).
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ported consistently and, therefore, votes abstain are only available for parts of the
sample. Nevertheless, running the regressions when including (available) abstentions
indicates that the results regarding the influence of DACC on shareholders’ satis-
faction with the supervisory board are sensitive to this modification. In contrast,
the findings in the management board regression and, in turn, the main conclusions
drawn in this study remain unchanged.
6.5.3 Alternative Model Specifications
In addition to the sensitivity checks with regard to the used time and industry
fixed effects, measurement of specific control variables, clustering method, and win-
sorization already mentioned in footnote remarks in the variable description of the
research design in section 6.3, further model specifications are tested to evaluate the
robustness of this study’s findings and related conclusions.
In particular, the following analyses should address potential endogeneity prob-
lems or omitted variables to enhance confidence in the results. First of all, a
change analysis is performed by re-running the main regressions in which each of
the variables equals the change compared to the previous year (Ettredge et al. 2014;
Kim et al. 2012). Performing the change analysis shows consistent results. Fur-
thermore, the lagged value of the dependent variable is added to the regression as
an independent variable. This approach can be used to deal with simultaneously
determined associations (Klein 1998; Weir et al. 2002). Moreover, it also controls
for potential fundamental long-term shareholder dissatisfaction. This procedure
shows a significant association of the lagged variable with the present voting out-
come but, more importantly, even increases the significance levels of the variable of
interest in both the management board and the supervisory board model. More-
over, to control for time-invariant omitted variables, firm fixed effects are included
(Chenhall and Moers 2007; Roberts and Whited 2013). This approach reveals ro-
bust results, at least for the management board regression. Finally, to consider
the sentiment at the annual general meeting and the overall shareholders’ satisfac-
tion, two different extensions are made to the model: (1) VOTESB (VOTEMB) is
included as an independent variable in the management board (supervisory board)
regression and (2) the average voting outcome from all other annual mandatory votes
that took place at the annual general meeting is controlled for, in addition to the
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respective discharge vote.125 In all cases, a significant positive influence of the added
variable can be observed in the management and the supervisory board regression.
The measure of earnings quality (DACC ), on the other hand, is significantly associ-
ated only with the proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction with the management board
(VOTEMB). The findings do not contradict the conclusion that earnings quality
seems to be relevant to shareholders. Moreover, they are in line with the story told
by this study that shareholders primarily hold the management board accountable
for insufficient earnings quality.
Besides alternative specifications regarding the models, sensitivity checks should
also concern the sample composition. First of all, this study’s findings remain robust
when a balanced sample is used. Furthermore, firm-year observations are eliminated
in which the discharge of the board members is voted for without exception. Such
voting behavior could indicate general shareholder indifference, and therefore, the
annual general meeting might not be a functioning corporate governance instrument
in this case. Examining the modified sample leads to a considerable increase in
significance levels in both models, which supports the assumption made. Eventually,
resampling and using bootstrap standard errors does not alter the results.126
6.5.4 The Influence of Corporate Governance Factors
Cohen et al. (2004, 87) motivate their literature review by the following statement:
“One of the most important functions that corporate governance can play is in
ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process.” Therefore, it should be
ruled out that the variable of interest does not purely capture corporate governance
effects. Thus, six corporate governance factors are included in the model in addition
to firm size and index membership.
The first variable (AC ) concerns the existence of an audit committee whose es-
tablishment is not obligatory (§ 107 (3) AktG) but is specifically recommended by
125 With regard to the regression with the dependent variable VOTEMB (VOTESB), the mean
value of the voting results regarding the discharge of the supervisory board (management
board), the auditor ratification vote and, if applicable, the appropriation of the balance sheet
profit, is used as a control variable. The influence on the results remains unchanged if the
minimum or maximum value is used to capture the base or upper limit of the general shareholder
sentiment.
126 This approach can provide correct standard errors even for data that deviate from the normal
distribution (Deis and Hill 1998; Marais 1984). A number of 1,000 bootstrap replications is
chosen and should provide reliable standard errors (Wooldridge 2016).
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the German Corporate Governance Code.127 Since an audit committee strengthens
the monitoring of the financial reporting process (Albersmann and Hohenfels 2017;
Cohen et al. 2004; McMullen 1996) an indicator variable—equal to 1 if an audit
committee is established, and 0 otherwise—is introduced (Ratzinger-Sakel 2013).
Moreover, it is controlled for further characteristics of the management board and
the supervisory board (Brunninge et al. 2007; Ding et al. 2010; Ferris et al. 2003;
Larcker et al. 2007): the number of management board members (MBSIZE), the
number of supervisory board members (SBSIZE), and the number of supervisory
board meetings (MEETINGS). While large board size—especially that of the su-
pervisory board—is considered negative regarding its effectiveness and, hence, as
an indicator of weak corporate governance (Larcker et al. 2007; Yermack 1996), the
number of supervisory board meetings should indicate the activeness and efforts in
monitoring the management, and therefore, are considered as a sign of good corpo-
rate governance (Brunninge et al. 2007; Larcker et al. 2007; Vafeas 1999). Further-
more, the variable SOP indicates whether the firm has adopted a say-on-pay vote in
one of the three most recent annual general meetings.128 This variable is included
in the model because the say-on-pay vote is regarded as a monitoring mechanism
that gives shareholders a voice on management remuneration (Cuñat et al. 2016).
Finally, CGDEVIATION represents the number of deviations from the German
Corporate Governance Code, and therefore, reflects the willingness of the company
to comply with the principles of good corporate governance (Kaspereit et al. 2015;
Kaspereit et al. 2017).129
127 See paragraph 5.3.2 of the German Corporate Governance Code; https://www.dcgk.de/en/
code.html; accessed on October 1, 2018.
128 The first possible adoption of a say-on-pay vote is supposed to be during the annual general
meeting for the fiscal year 2009, which is the start of the sample period. Since the opportunity
to have the remuneration system approved by the shareholders was explicitly enrolled in the
law in 2010 (§ 120 (4) AktG), this annual general meeting season was also the starting point
for many companies to adopt say-on-pay.
129 See https://www.dcgk.de/en/code.html; accessed on October 1, 2018.
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Table 6.8: OLS Regressions—Corporate Governance Factors and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Management Board and the Supervisory Board
Dependent Variable
VOTEMB (1) VOTESB (2)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
DACC 1.7228 0.5691 0.003 0.9703 0.6456 0.134
AC -0.0154 0.0805 0.848 0.0280 0.0924 0.762
MBSIZE -0.0105 0.0234 0.655 -0.0198 0.0252 0.433
SBSIZE -0.0068 0.0112 0.547 0.0237 0.0119 0.047
MEETINGS -0.0063 0.0122 0.605 0.0133 0.0124 0.281
SOP 0.0401 0.0528 0.448 -0.0226 0.0672 0.737
CGDEVIATION 0.0109 0.0090 0.228 0.0416 0.0124 0.001
Intercept: Yes Yes
Control Variables: Yes Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm
n 1,125 1,125
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.182
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed ef-
fects, and standard errors are clustered by firm. All continuous variables other than VOTE are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported
p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are tested for the satisfaction with the management board and the supervisory board, respectively:
V OTEit = α0 + β1DACCit + β2ACit + β3MBSIZEit + β4SBSIZEit + β5MEETINGSit + β6SOPit + β7CGDEV IATIONit + β8SIZEit + β9AGEit + β10LOSSit +
β11ADJROAit + β12ADJRETit + β13CARit + β14ALTZit + β15LEVit + β16BTMit + β17BTMNEGit + β18TSHit + β19TURNOUTit + β20INDDit + β21DELAYit +
β22DAXit + β23MDAXit + β24SDAXit + β25TECDAXit +
∑
33
j=26
βjINDit +
∑
38
j=34
βjY EARit + εit, where IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR
represents five year dummies. VOTEMB (VOTESB), TURNOUTMB (TURNOUTSB), and INDDMB (INDDSB) are included in the management board regression model in
column (1) and the supervisory board regression model in column (2), respectively. The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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A look at the results presented in Table 6.8 shows the following picture: The
variable of interest (DACC ) is still significant in both models considering one-
tailed p-values (0.001 in the management board regression and 0.067 in the su-
pervisory board model). Therefore, the stated conclusions regarding the influence
of earnings quality on shareholders’ satisfaction with the members of the com-
pany’s board remain unchanged. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the
variable CGDEVIATION has a significant effect on shareholders’ satisfaction with
the supervisory board in the expected direction.130 The positive coefficient on
CGDEVIATION (0.0416) implies that shareholders blame the supervisory board
for deviations from the German Corporate Governance Code through dissenting
votes.
The coefficient of CGDEVIATION in the management board regression is con-
siderably lower (0.0109) and insignificant (two-tailed p-value of 0.228). This finding
could be interpreted to mean that shareholders hold the supervisory board respon-
sible for fulfilling the principles of the German Corporate Governance Code. In
contrast, shareholders attribute low earnings quality mainly to management, which
could indicate that insufficient earnings quality is perceived as opportunistic man-
agement behavior. Besides, shareholders might have the opinion that in contrast to
safeguard adequate earnings quality, it should be more feasible for the supervisory
board to ensure compliance with corporate governance guidelines.
6.5.5 Moderating Effects on the Influence of Earnings Quality on Shareholders’
Satisfaction
6.5.5.1 Company’s Performance
To validate the possibility that earnings quality, not unobservable factors, drives the
results, different situations need to be identified in which earnings quality should
have a comparatively more or less strong influence on shareholders’ satisfaction.
Since findings of prior works (e.g., Cai et al. 2009), as well as this study, show that
a company’s performance has a positive impact on shareholders’ satisfaction with
board members, some might argue that shareholders of well-performing companies
are more likely to be willing to tolerate lower levels of earnings quality. Thus,
130 All other variables except for SBSIZE in the supervisory board regression are not significantly
different from zero. The positive coefficient (0.0237) indicates that as the supervisory board
grows in size, the shareholders’ dissatisfaction with the supervisory board increases. This
finding supports the notion that large boards are less effective in monitoring than smaller
boards (Eisenberg et al. 1998; Ferris et al. 2003; Sauerwald et al. 2016; Yermack 1996).
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POSRET is introduced and equals 1 for companies performing better than the
industry median (synonymous with a positive ADJRET ), and 0 otherwise.131 The
results tabulated in Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 support the reasoning mentioned above
since a relatively good performance has an attenuating effect on the association
between earnings quality and shareholders’ satisfaction with the company’s board
members.
6.5.5.2 Company’s Information Environment
In addition to its performance, the company’s information environment should af-
fect the association between earnings quality and shareholders’ satisfaction. In
cases of a better information environment, shareholders should be less reliant on
financial reports and, in turn, sufficient earnings quality. Moreover, agency costs
might be higher for firms with less information and, therefore, weaker monitoring
of the management (Fernando et al. 2010). To examine the moderating effect of
the information environment an operational measure must be employed. There-
fore, (ANALYST )—i.e., the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts
following the firm at the date of the annual general meeting—is used to capture
the company’s information environment (Daske et al. 2013; Gleason and Lee 2003;
Lang et al. 2003; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990).132
Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 provide evidence that there is a mitigating effect of the
company’s information environment on the impact of earnings quality on sharehold-
ers’ satisfaction with the members of the management board and the supervisory
board. Since this is in line with the story told by this study, it corroborates the view
that earnings quality is what matters to shareholders and influences their satisfaction
with the members of the company’s board.
131 Market-based performance is chosen due to the significant effect on shareholders’ satisfaction (cf.
Table 6.5). However, untabulated evidence using the accounting-based performance measure
(ADJROA) does not alter the results.
132 Further sensitivity checks reveal qualitatively similar results if firm size is used as the proxy for
the company’s information environment (Atiase 1985; Collins et al. 1987).
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Table 6.9: OLS Regressions—Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Management Board: Moderating Effects
Dependent Variable = VOTEMB
Moderator: Moderator: Moderator:
POSRET (1) ANALYST (2) AC (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
DACC 2.3214 0.6579 0.000 4.3717 1.3285 0.001 2.2850 0.7767 0.004
MODERATOR 0.1511 0.0603 0.013 0.1479 0.0856 0.085 0.0908 0.0861 0.293
DACC×MODERATOR -2.2091 0.7764 0.005 -1.8355 0.6156 0.003 -1.9747 1.0184 0.054
Intercept: Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 1,237 1,152 1,237
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.235 0.249
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors
are clustered by firm. All continuous variables other than VOTEMB are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression
models are tested: V OTEMBit = α0 + β1DACCit + β2MODERATORit + β3DACCit ×MODERATORit + β4SIZEit + β5AGEit + β6LOSSit + β7ADJROAit + β8ADJRETit +
β9CARit + β10ALTZit + β11LEVit + β12BTMit + β13BTMNEGit + β14TSHit + β15TURNOUTMBit + β16INDDMBit + β17DELAYit + β18DAXit + β19MDAXit + β20SDAXit +
β21TECDAXit +
∑
29
j=22
βjINDit +
∑
34
j=30
βjY EARit + εit, where IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents five year dummies. MODERATOR represents the
variables POSRET in column (1), ANALYST in column (2), and AC in column (3). The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.10: OLS Regressions—Earnings Quality and Shareholders’ Satisfaction with the Supervisory Board: Moderating Effects
Dependent Variable = VOTESB
Moderator: Moderator: Moderator:
POSRET (1) ANALYST (2) AC (3)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value Coefficient Robust
Std. Err.
p-value
DACC 1.4415 0.7453 0.054 2.7601 1.3598 0.043 0.9356 0.7920 0.239
MODERATOR 0.0663 0.0836 0.429 0.1285 0.0924 0.166 0.0608 0.0937 0.517
DACC×MODERATOR -1.6868 0.8921 0.060 -1.2713 0.6153 0.040 -0.2367 1.1660 0.839
Intercept: Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Firm Firm Firm
n 1,237 1,152 1,237
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.170 0.164
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the pooled data. The regression models include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are
clustered by firm. All continuous variables other than VOTESB are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reported p-values are two-tailed. The following regression models are
tested: V OTESBit = α0 + β1DACCit + β2MODERATORit + β3DACCit ×MODERATORit + β4SIZEit + β5AGEit + β6LOSSit + β7ADJROAit + β8ADJRETit + β9CARit +
β10ALTZit+β11LEVit+β12BTMit+β13BTMNEGit+β14TSHit+β15TURNOUTSBit+β16INDDSBit+β17DELAYit+β18DAXit+β19MDAXit+β20SDAXit+β21TECDAXit+∑
29
j=22
βjINDit +
∑
34
j=30
βjY EARit + εit, where IND is a set of eight industry dummies, and YEAR represents five year dummies. MODERATOR represents the variables POSRET in
column (1), ANALYST in column (2), and AC in column (3). The variables are as defined in Table 6.1.
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6.5.5.3 Audit Committee Existence
Finally, it is examined whether the existence of an audit committee has a moderating
effect on the association of earnings quality and shareholders’ satisfaction with the
management board and the supervisory board. As in subsection 6.5.4, the indicator
variable (AC )—equal to 1 if an audit committee exists, and 0 otherwise—is used.
With regard to the expectations regarding the moderating effect, however, it must
be differentiated between the two parts of the company’s board.
Both agency theory and empirical evidence suggest that the presence of an audit
committee improves the monitoring function of the supervisory board (Cohen et al.
2004; Dechow et al. 2010; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). In particular, an
existing audit committee should be more effective in constraining the management’s
opportunistic accounting policy. This is also supported by the findings of the recent
study of Albersmann and Hohenfels (2017) in the German context. Accordingly,
an audit committee as a subcommittee of the supervisory board may contribute to
safeguarding the reliability of the financial reporting information (McMullen 1996).
However, it remains questionable how the existence of an audit committee could
affect the association of earnings quality and shareholders’ satisfaction with the
supervisory board. On the one hand, it can be assumed that the presence of an audit
committee could have a mitigating effect, as the supervisory board has attempted
to fulfill its duty to monitor the financial reporting process in the best possible
way. On the other hand, shareholders’ dissatisfaction with the supervisory board
due to insufficient earnings quality could be exacerbated. This argument could be
explained by the fact that the shareholders can assume that the supervisory board
has sufficient expertise regarding the financial reporting process due to the existence
of an audit committee. The consequence might be that the audit committee and,
therefore, supervisory board members are more likely to be held responsible by the
shareholders for earnings quality, as also indicated by the evidence of Gal-Or et al.
(2018).
The latter argument could, in turn, lead to the consequence that the management
board members are held less accountable for earnings quality. Furthermore, a sup-
posed low earnings quality could be legitimized by complying with good governance
principles. The audit committee would thus have an assurance function. Conse-
quently, the presence of an audit committee would have an attenuating moderating
effect on the association of earnings quality and shareholders’ satisfaction with the
management board.
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The empirical analyses in Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 reveal the following picture:
The coefficient of the interaction term of DACC and AC is negative (-1.9747) and
significant (two-tailed p-value of 0.054) in the management board regression. The
mitigating moderating effect of the existence of an audit committee supports the
assurance function reasoning. The results regarding shareholders’ satisfaction with
the supervisory board are not that clear since the related coefficient is insignificant.
This finding could be explained by the fact that the above arguments counterbalance
each other. Nevertheless, the results regarding the supervisory board do not offer
substance for further interpretation. Overall, the evidence supports the conclusions
of this study, especially with regard to the postulated influence of earnings quality
on shareholders’ satisfaction with the management board.
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6.6 Summary and Limitations
Since there is little direct evidence on shareholders’ perceptions of the relevance
of earnings quality, this study aims to examine whether earnings quality matters
to shareholders and is related to their satisfaction with the management board
and/or the supervisory board. For this purpose, the results of the shareholder
voting regarding the discharge of the management board and the supervisory board
at German annual general meetings are examined. The empirical analyses show that
shareholders’ dissatisfaction—obtained from the shareholder vote on the discharge of
the board—is positively associated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals—an
inverse measure of earnings quality.
Therefore, the quality of earnings seems to be such an important matter for share-
holders that it affects their voting decisions. Combined with the findings regarding
company visibility, performance, and ownership characteristics, this result corrob-
orates the view that shareholder votes, as a measure of shareholders’ satisfaction,
“should not be considered insignificant” (Sainty et al. 2002, 113) and represent a ma-
terial mechanism of corporate governance (Cai et al. 2009; Iliev et al. 2015). More-
over, the results regarding the discharge of the supervisory board are less pronounced
relative to those regarding the management board. The evidence might imply that
shareholders primarily hold the management board responsible for earnings quality.
These insights could inform shareholders and the representatives of the company
and should be crucial for the accounting and corporate governance literature and
future regulation.
The empirical evidence suggests that earnings quality is related to shareholders’
satisfaction and, hence, is relevant to shareholders. Therefore, the study responds to
the suggestion of Basu (2012) in his commentary on the accounting literature to ad-
dress fundamental accounting questions in future research and the call of Cai et al.
(2010) for further research on shareholder voting in international settings. In sum-
mary, this study’s findings emphasize not only the relevance of the literature on
shareholder voting but also—and potentially more importantly—the relevance of
accounting research. In particular, the insights into shareholders’ (negative) per-
ceptions regarding discretionary accruals emphasizes the value of research on the
definitions or measures of earnings quality.
This study is also subject to some limitations, such as the usage of discretionary
accrual-based measures of earnings quality. Although this approach is common in
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the accounting literature, it is not free from criticism and might suffer from mea-
surement errors (cf. Dechow et al. 2010). However, this study tries to alleviate the
existing problems by using various approaches to calculate absolute discretionary
accruals (Albersmann and Hohenfels 2017). Furthermore, the additional analyses
using other proxies of earnings quality provide triangulating results. Eventually, the
observed moderating effects of the company’s performance, the company’s informa-
tion environment, and the existence of an audit committee might support the story
told by this study.
A further point to be mentioned is that this study investigates the association be-
tween shareholders’ satisfaction and proxies of actual earnings quality. Additionally,
it would be possible to use a measure of perceived earnings quality as the variable
of interest instead. The literature commonly uses short window event studies to
measure perceived earnings quality based on the ERC (DeFond and Zhang 2014;
Gaynor et al. 2016; Kothari 2001). However, due to the underlying research design
of an event study, problems would arise in the determination of an independent
experimental variable to test the developed hypotheses. Moreover, this approach
could lead to serious endogeneity problems due to an omitted variable bias, making
casual inferences even more problematic (Gow et al. 2016).
Furthermore, it is left to future research to further differentiate between circum-
stances in which the management board or the supervisory board is blamed for in-
sufficient earnings quality. For example, auditor expertise and independence could
be a crucial factor in the determination of shareholders’ voting decisions. The re-
sults are in the first instance valid for the observed companies and the chosen sample
period. Besides, this study focuses on the perceptions of shareholders, and it would
be interesting to examine the opinions of other stakeholders of a company. Finally,
this study focuses on the German setting, which, despite the corresponding benefits,
may be subject to limitations in terms of external validity. However, the evidence re-
garding the control variables is comparable to those of director election, say-on-pay
or auditor ratification votes in other countries.
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